

NASH'S WAR MANUAL

Facts about the Causes
of the War: The Armies
and Navies Engaged:
Descriptive Information
about the Countries
Involved Etc.



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**NASH'S
WAR MANUAL**



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LONDON
EVELEIGH NASH
1914

WYSE'S
NEW SYSTEM

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE DIPLOMACY THAT LED TO WAR

ON June 28, 1914, a Slav who thought he was a patriot killed the German Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria. An inquiry was begun in which evidence was introduced to show that the assassin's work was part of a plot for the revolt of the Southern Slav provinces of Austria, instigated by Serbians if not by the Serbian Government. On July 23, however, before the investigation was completed, Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia ordering her to use every means in her power to punish the assassins and also to stop all further anti-Austrian propaganda. Austria demanded to be permitted to have representatives in the work of investigation.

JULY 24TH

On July 24, Russia joined Serbia in asking for a delay. Austria refused to grant this.

25TH

On July 25, when the ultimatum expired, the Serbian Premier gave his reply to the Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade: Serbia agreed to all the conditions and apologies demanded by Austria, except that allowing Austrian officials to participate in the inquiry to be conducted in Serbia into the assassination of the Archduke. Even this was not definitely refused.

27TH

On July 27, the Austrian Foreign Office issued a statement in which appeared these words:

"The object of the Servian Note is to create the false impression that the Servian Government is prepared in great measure to comply with our demands.

"As a matter of fact, however, Servia's Note is filled with the

8 DIPLOMACY THAT LED TO WAR

spirit of dishonesty, which clearly lets it be seen that the Servian Government is not seriously determined to put an end to the culpable tolerance it hitherto has extended to intrigues against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy."

Russia notified Austria that it could not allow Serbian territory to be invaded. The great Slav nation had come to the rescue of its little kinsman. Semi-officially, Germany let it be known that no one must interfere with the Austrian-Serbian entanglement—an intimation that Germany would back Austria.

To stem the trend toward war Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, made the definite proposal that meditation between Serbia and Austria be undertaken by a conference of the Ambassadors in London. France and Italy accepted the proposal. Germany and Austria declined.

28TH

On July 28, came the official announcement that turned Europe into an armed camp:

VIENNA, July 28.—Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia was gazetted here late this afternoon. The text is as follows:

"The Royal Government of Servia not having replied in a satisfactory manner to the Note remitted to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to proceed to safeguard its rights and interests and to have recourse for this purpose to force of arms.

"Austria-Hungary considers itself, therefore, from this moment in a state of war with Servia.

(Signed) "COUNT BERCHTOLD,
"Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary."

29TH

On July 29, the Tsar issued an imperial ukase calling all reservists to the colours.

On July 30, the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, showed where he stood in the following telegram to the German Ambassador at Vienna:

"We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Servia, with whom she is in state of war. The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake.

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"We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty as ally. We must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration owing to Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice. Your Excellency will express this to Count von Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, with all emphasis and great seriousness."

In reply to this communication Count Berchtold told the German Ambassador that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had already been instructed to begin negotiations with Sergius Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister. But nothing came of these efforts.

30TH

On July 30, Germany asked Russia to stop its mobilization and requested a reply within twenty-four hours. Great Britain notified Germany that if a general conflict should occur it could not stand aloof and see the balance of power in Europe destroyed.

31ST

On July 31, Mr. Asquith announced in the House of Commons :

"We have just heard, not from St. Petersburg, but from Germany, that Russia has proclaimed the general mobilization of her army and her fleet, and that, in consequence of this, martial law is to be proclaimed in Germany.

"We understand this to mean that mobilization will follow in Germany, if the Russian mobilization is general and is proceeded with."

Russia paid no attention to the German ultimatum, but M. Gorymykin, president of the Council of the Empire, issued a manifesto which read :

"Russia is determined not to allow Servia to be crushed and will fulfil its duty in regard to that small kingdom, which has already suffered so much at Austria's hands."

The German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, went to the French Foreign Office and expressed the fear that dangerous friction might arise between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente in the event of the Powers of the Triple Entente not taking steps to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia.

AUGUST 1ST

On August 1, the German Ambassador handed a declaration of war to the Russian Foreign Minister at 7.30 P.M.

The French Government issued a general mobilization order.

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2ND

On August 2, Germany began the invasion of France through the Duchy of Luxemburg. As this territory was neutralized by the Powers, including Germany, in 1867, this act was generally criticized as involving a breach of treaty. England asked Germany if she would respect the neutrality of Belgium. Germany replied that she could not answer the question at that time. The British Cabinet spent the day in discussing what attitude England should assume.

3RD

On August 3, Germany sent an ultimatum to Belgium demanding free passage for her troops. Germany said that it already had information that France was to use Belgium as a military base. Belgium refused entrance to German troops and demanded that Germany respect her neutrality. She followed up her reply by proclaiming martial law. The French Government declared martial law in France and Algiers.

Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons read a telegram addressed to King George by King Albert of Belgium, asking "the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." So far as England's treaty obligations with France were concerned, said Sir Edward, "we have perfect freedom to decide." For years England had "had a friendship with France. Whether that friendship involves obligations, let every man look into his own heart and feelings and construe the obligations for himself. If the German fleet bombarded the unprotected French coast," he added, "England could not stand aside with its arms folded." The German Ambassador had made a strong bid for British neutrality. The Emperor had promised not to attack the northern and western coast of France if England would remain neutral. Mr. Redmond, the Nationalist leader, aroused great enthusiasm by pledging the support of all Irishmen, Protestant and Catholic, to whatever course England decided upon.

Italy proclaimed her neutrality. Although a member of the Triple Alliance, this alliance, her statesmen explained, was intended to protect the parties to it against an attack. Italy interpreted Germany's and Austria's acts as amounting to an aggressive war.

The German Emperor gave the Russian Ambassador his passports. British Fleet mobilized.

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4TH

On August 4, England sent an ultimatum to Germany, demanding a satisfactory reply by midnight on the question of the neutrality of Belgium. No reply having been received from Germany the British Foreign Office announced that a state of war existed with Germany, dating from 11 P.M., August 4. Meanwhile Germany had given the British Ambassador in Berlin his passports.

5TH

On August 5, President Wilson offered the good offices of the United States in an attempt to bring about a settlement of the European difficulties. The Germans began an attack upon Liège, Belgium, and were repulsed.

Lord Kitchener appointed Minister of War.

6TH

On August 6, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia. The Austrian Ambassador left St. Petersburg.

Mr. Asquith moved in the House of Commons a vote of credit for one hundred millions. Army to be increased by half a million men.

7TH

On August 7, the German Government used strong representations to Italy, in its efforts to enlist its participation in the war. Italy, however, maintained her neutrality. The Kaiser issued a proclamation asserting that jealousy of German progress was the real cause of the war.

9TH

On August 9, Serbia declared war against Germany in order to get rid of the German Minister.

10TH

On August 10, France declared war on Austria as a result of Austrian troops aiding Germany.

12TH

On August 12, Austria and Great Britain each declared war on the other.

A PRÉCIS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

“THE White Paper” [Cd. 7467] containing the “Correspondence respecting the European Crisis” is a document of such historic importance, that it would seem a national duty to publish a *précis* of it so that our readers may fully grasp the policy of the German Emperor, which led to war. No Diplomatic Correspondence has ever been published of greater significance. No more terrible indictment of a people has ever been revealed to civilization. It is the proof absolute of German war-madness, the documentary evidence of the German intention, not only to force Austria into war, but to bring on war against France and Russia at a moment when German Diplomacy held those countries to be unprepared.

June 28.—The Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated at Serajevo. July 20, the crisis begins, Sir Edward Grey informing Sir E. Goschen, at Berlin, that the position was “very uncomfortable.”

July 22.—Sir E. Goschen wires from Berlin that the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had just “insisted” that the question at issue was one for “settlement between Serbia

and Austria alone ” ; moreover, he had repeatedly told the Serbian Minister that “ Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.”

July 23.—Sir E. Grey is alarmed. He informs Sir M. de Bunsen, at Vienna, that he (Grey) had expressed great regret to the Austrian Ambassador in London that Austria should have imposed a *time limit* to the communication addressed to Serbia, amounting thereby to an ultimatum. The Austrian Ambassador replied that it was “ absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.” On Sir E. Grey pointing out the possible consequences of offensive action on the part of Austria, the Austrian Ambassador replied that it would “ all depend upon Russia.”

July 24.—The Austrian Note to Serbia is published. It is an ultimatum. The Powers only know of it twelve hours after its delivery. Sir E. Grey immediately wires to Vienna, saying he had informed the Austrian Ambassador in London, he (Grey) had never seen one State address to an independent State a document so formidable ; that England was concerned simply and solely from the point of view of general peace.

The first note of alarm comes from Sir G. Buchanan, in St. Petersburg. He wires Sir Edward Grey he has just seen M. Sazonoff (Minister for Foreign Affairs), who said that Austria’s conduct was “ both provocative and immoral ” ; that she “ *would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted* ; some of the Austrian demands were obviously unacceptable.” Sir G. Buchanan goes on to say that the French Ambassador there pressed him for a declaration

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of English solidarity with France who, in any case, would unreservedly support Russia.

So that on July 24, France announced her intention to fight on the side of Russia.

This telegram is highly important. It shows that on July 24, both France and Russia anticipated war, and that Germany knew it, and that Sir E. Grey was already being pressed for a declaration of England's attitude.

July 24.—Mr. Crackanthorpe, from Belgrade, wires that Serbia regards Austrian demands as “unacceptable.”

At this juncture the German Ambassador in London communicates a Note to Sir E. Grey, setting out that Austria's attitude is entirely justified, can only be regarded as “equitable and moderate,” and that the German Government regards the matter as one to be settled “exclusively” between the contending parties.

Sir E. Grey telegraphs Sir F. Bertie in Paris, suggesting that Germany, France, Italy and England should act together as mediators simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg; the important thing was to gain time in Vienna.

July 25.—The Russian Ambassador informs Sir E. Grey that Russia deems it of the highest importance to procure extension of the time limit.

Sir E. Grey wires to Paris and Vienna that the Austrian Ambassador in London had just explained that the step taken at Belgrade was a *démarche*, not an ultimatum; but Sir F. Bertie wires back to say that the French Government had “not received” that explanation.

Sir G. Buchanan wires from St. Petersburg

(July 25) that, owing to the time limit, it was impossible to act on Sir E. Grey's suggestion; that Russia was willing to leave the settlement of the dispute to the non-interested Powers, but that Russia regarded Austria's action 'as "in reality, directed against Russia," "Austria aiming at the overthrow of the present *status quo* in the Balkans," to which M. Sazonoff adds that "*Germany was convinced that she should count on England's neutrality.*"

July 25.—Sir H. Rumbold wires from Berlin to Sir E. Grey that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs* was away, thereby causing serious delay; but that Austria professed to be optimistic regarding Russia's action.

Serious news comes from Vienna (July 25) about warlike attitude of the Austrians. Mr. Crackanthorpe wires that Serbia considers that, unless Austria wants war, she must be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply. Immediately after, Mr. Crackanthorpe wires that the Austrian Minister had left Belgrade.

Sir E. Grey now realizes the grave danger to Europe involved by what he himself calls the "sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche*." He informs the German Ambassador in London that the co-operation of Germany is essential to any diplomatic mediation. At the same time, both the French and Russian

* To be noted here is that the two indispensable forces for peace, the German Emperor and the Austrian Foreign Minister, were away, and so unapproachable the day of the expiry of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia.

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Governments do their utmost to induce Austria to extend the time limit.

In vain. Sir E. Grey receives a wire from Vienna to the effect that the German Ambassador there is "*confident that Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia*"; that "France also is not at all in a condition for war."

July 26.—Sir E. Grey proposes Conference. France accepts (July 27). Italy and Russia accept unreservedly. Germany *refuses point-blank*. The Kaiser returns from the North.

July 27.—Sir E. Goschen wires that Secretary of State says proposed Conference "would practically amount to a Court of Arbitration," and Germany could not, therefore, co-operate; he thought personal conversations the better plan. To be noted is that the Kaiser was in Berlin when this attitude was decided on.

Sir E. Grey wires (July 27) that the German Ambassador in London declares that Germany is "ready to accept" mediation in principle; but from Berlin, Sir E. Goschen wires back that this is not the case. Sir E. Grey, in conversation with Count Mensdorff in London, says openly that Austrian action looks as if war was intended; informs him that "the English Fleet, in the circumstances, cannot be disbanded"; that it was very disappointing to find Austria so hard towards Serbia, who had agreed to humiliate herself more than any independent country ever had done.

July 28.—Austria declares war on Serbia.

The same day a telegraphic Note is communicated to our Foreign Office, stating that M. Sazonoff is convinced that "Germany is, if anything, in

favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria ; that the Berlin Cabinet appears to be doing nothing ; that the key to the situation is to be found at Berlin."

July 28.—A wire from Vienna stating that Austria "*declines any suggestion on negotiations.*"

Sir E. Grey continues wiring to British Ambassador to the effect that the German Ambassador in London protests that Germany is ready to accept the joint mediation of Powers, though Austria had already declared war and officially refused all intervention.

This should be carefully noted. Up to this point, the German Ambassador in London kept on assuring Sir E. Grey of German willingness to secure peace, in spite of our Ambassadorial contradictions from Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin to Sir E. Grey, that the Berlin Government regarded intervention as impossible.

July 28.—Sir E. Goschen informs Sir E. Grey that the Austrian Ambassador told him that "Russia neither wanted, nor was in a position to make, war."

July 29.—Sir E. Goschen wires that the German Chancellor had informed him it was "too late to act upon (English) suggestion" of mediation.

In a further wire, Sir E. Goschen reports that the German Secretary of State was much concerned about Russian mobilization. He "denied that the German Government had recalled officers on leave"—Sir E. Goschen adds to this, "as a matter of fact, it is true."

To this telegram Sir E. Grey wires polite thanks to the German Chancellor (July 29). Sir G.

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Buchanan wires from St. Petersburg, announcing "Partial mobilization." Sir R. Rodd informs Sir E. Grey from Rome that there appears to be general difficulty in "making Germany believe that Russia is in earnest." Mr. Beaumont, from Constantinople, informs Sir E. Grey that "Austrian designs may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory."

Even then, Sir E. Grey bravely persists. He again (July 29) wires to Sir E. Goschen in Berlin that the German Ambassador in London assures him he (the Ambassador) has been instructed from Berlin to mediate. Sir E. Grey adds: "I told him that mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would '*press the button*' in the interests of peace."

Now there comes the first German bid for English neutrality. Sir E. Goschen wires that the German Chancellor declares that Germany "aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, but that he could give no such assurance *regarding the French Colonies*. *If Holland remained neutral*, her neutrality would be respected. He had in mind a "general neutrality agreement between England and Germany."

July 29.—Sir E. Grey wires Sir F. Bertie that he told the German Ambassador in London not to be "misled into thinking that England would stand aside if all the efforts made in the cause of peace failed." Over Morocco, the case was different: it was not an English interest. A war between Austria and Russia, likewise, was a

Slav and Teuton question; but with France it was otherwise. England would then have to consider the position, would have to decide what "British interests required her to do." He (Grey) told Prince Lichnowsky "not to count on England standing aside," intimating that, though this did not imply inevitable military action on the part of England, it left the matter open the moment the question became one involving the hegemony of Europe.

July 29.—Sir E. Grey next wires to Sir E. Goschen in Berlin. He tells him he had informed the German Ambassador of England's position, saying he did not wish to be open to any reproach that the "friendly tone of all our conversations had misled the German Government into supposing that *we should not take action.*"

These two communications of Sir E. Grey are of the highest importance. They show clearly that on July 29 the German Government knew of Sir E. Grey's official intimation that England could not remain indifferent if France was drawn in. None the less, Germany still maintained that Austria could not accept mediation. The German Ambassador at Vienna, well known for his anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling, was obviously, as Sir M. de Bunsen pointed out to Sir E. Grey (July 30), hardly the man to undertake peaceful overtures. It was he who had telegraphed the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia to the German Emperor, *before it was dispatched*, thus affording proof that the Emperor was perfectly cognisant of what was taking place.

July 30.—Russia learns that Germany is

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mobilizing, is making naval preparations in the direction even of the Gulf of Finland. M. Sazonoff, in desperation, draws up a formula as last hope, to the effect that "Russia will stop all military preparations if Austria declares her readiness to eliminate points which violate principle of Sovereignty of Servia."

Sir F. Bertie wires (July 30) asking for intention of England, France growing extremely anxious.

July 30.—Sir E. Grey wires Sir E. Goschen regarding the German "bid for neutrality." This telegram is so important that it is given here in full :

No. 101

SIR EDWARD GREY *to* SIR E. GOSCHEN
(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 30, 1914*

"YOUR telegram of 29th July.

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object his Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has

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hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

Here we have English statesmanship at its best. That message will secure Sir E. Grey a lasting place among English statesmen. It shows Sir E. Grey working unceasingly at the eleventh hour for peace, but quite firm and frank on the question of the national honour.

In the meanwhile, the crisis pivots on the attitude of England in view of the German mobilization against France.

July 31.—Sir E. Grey is informed by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that all French advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of ten kilometres from the frontier, so as to avoid any possibility of French aggression. The Note ends by saying: "As you see, Germany has done it," and the Minister adds that the German preparation began the day the Austrian Note was handed in.

On the evening of July 30, the German Chancellor, who up till that moment had not found time to reply to Sir E. Grey's supreme effort to obtain the mediatory influence of the Four Powers, informs Sir E. Goschen that he was "pressing the button" at Vienna (as Sir E. Grey suggested), but that, as the results of his efforts, "matters

had been precipitated rather than otherwise." The Serbian efforts were "seriously handicapped" by the Russian mobilization.

As a fact, the Tsar had wired to the German Emperor at the time, craving his mediation.

July 31.—Sir E. Grey wires to Sir E. Goschen that England would support any reasonable proposal put forward by Germany : but that he (Grey) had "told the German Ambassador that *if France became involved, we should be drawn in.*"

To this clear statement, on Sir E. Grey's part, of the English attitude Germany replies, through Sir E. Goschen (July 31st), that "Kriegsgefahr" will be proclaimed at once.

From St. Petersburg comes a telegram announcing Russian general mobilization.

Now begins the question of Belgian neutrality. Sir E. Grey telegraphs to Paris and Berlin, asking for specific engagements respecting the neutrality of Belgium (July 31).

Sir E. Grey telegraphs to Brussels that "I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain, to the utmost of her power, her neutrality."

To these inquiries of England, France replies at once, agreeing to Belgian neutrality. Belgium undertakes to uphold it. The answer of Germany is evasive.

Sir E. Goschen wires that the German Secretary of State says he must "*consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer*" (July 31).

The delay caused by Germany's evasive answer gave the Germans a good couple of days' advantage.

Sir E. Grey wires to Berlin again.

Here is the telegram :

No. 123

SIR EDWARD GREY to SIR E. GOSCHEN

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 1, 1914*

“ SIR,

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we have been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined *largely by public opinion here*, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we would give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would re-

main neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

The news of the German ultimatum to Russia and France is reported to Sir E. Grey from Paris and St. Petersburg ; but still no reply comes from Berlin regarding Belgian neutrality (August 1).

August 2.—The Luxemburg Minister of State telegraphs that the Germans have violated the neutrality of Luxemburg.

August 1.—Sir E. Grey wires Sir E. Goschen to ascertain the ground for the detention of British ships at Hamburg.

August 1.—News comes that Austria is prepared to " discuss the substance of the ultimatum to Servia."

This readiness on the part of Austria (it should be noted) came *after the expiry* of the German ultimatum to France and Russia, after the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg before the order of mobilization, after Austria had consistently refused all possibility of mediation, in short, when Germany was completely mobilised.

Germany throws it down, as the following communication from Berlin shows :

SIR E. GOSCHEN to SIR E. GREY

(Telegraphic.)

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914*

" YOUR telegram of to-day.

I have communicated the substance of the above

telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war."

The following telegram regarding the Russian position is instructive :

No. 139

SIR G. BUCHANAN to SIR EDWARD GREY.—(*Received August 2.*)

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURG, *August 1, 1914*

“ MY telegram of 31st July.

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonoff had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-

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Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonoff informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonoff was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between

Austria and Russia ; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilization, and the mobilization of Germany had created a desperate situation."

August 2.—Sir E. Grey assures M. Cambon of British help.

No. 148

SIR EDWARD GREY to SIR F. BERTIE

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 2, 1914*

"AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum :

'I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

'This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.'

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French

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Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.”

August 4.—The King of the Belgians makes his dramatic appeal to King George.

August 4.—Sir F. Villiers informs Sir E. Grey that Germany announces her intention to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable, to which Sir E. Grey returns this clear and courageous answer :

SIR EDWARD GREY to SIR F. VILLIERS

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 4, 1914*

“ You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce

them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years."

August 4.—The German Embassy makes an attempt to "dispel distrust," but Sir E. Grey has taken his stand, and vindicates the national honour in the following telegram to Berlin :

SIR EDWARD GREY *to* SIR E. GOSCHEN

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 4, 1914*

"WE hear that Germany has addressed Note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received hereby 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for

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your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves."

Out of this correspondence the attitude of Germany stands as clear as the attitude taken up by Sir E. Grey. We find from the outset that Austria refuses all mediation, affecting diplomatic optimism; and that Germany firmly upholds the Austrian attitude.

It is clear that Germany believed in the unreadiness of Russia to fight; in the weakness of France; in the neutrality of England.

Not until the expiry of the German ultimatums to France and Russia does Austria consent even to discuss her attitude towards Serbia; and when at last she does seem to show some readiness to help ward off a European conflagration, it is Germany who absolutely declines on the ground that, Russia having mobilized, she (Germany) could not give Russia time to concentrate on the German frontier.

On the French and Russian—particularly on the Russian—sides, these dispatches reveal a quite remarkable honesty of intention; and the last throw of M. Sazonoff, offering to disarm, if only Germany would put forward some formula for mediation, proves that Russia was sincerely anxious for peace.*

* As the German Embassy in America are endeavouring to show that Sir E. Grey took the opportunity to attack Germany, it is to be hoped that all English-speaking peoples will carefully read this White Paper, which is the documentary evidence that

The part played by Sir E. Grey all through is probably the most peaceful, if not Quixotic, effort ever made by a statesman in history.

It is clear that the German Ambassador in London, wittingly or unwittingly, consistently led Sir E. Grey to believe that Germany was "pressing the button" at Vienna, and that Sir E. Grey was apparently inclined to trust him, whereas she was, in reality, doing precisely the contrary, her own Ambassador at Vienna being a notorious anti-Russian fire-eater, and Germany arming at full speed all the time.

Sir E. Grey went to the extreme limits of even national safety. At the same time, he was splendidly firm and frank on the question of Belgian neutrality.

It was he who first sent out messages demanding declarations of Belgian neutrality, and at the same time informing Germany that England would uphold the neutrality of Belgium. And when Germany violated it, Sir E. Grey's answer was war.

On the German side, then, we find that she was mobilizing before she sent her ultimatums to France and Russia ; that she violated the neutrality of Luxemburg before the declaration of war ; that she violated international law by seizing English ships and cargoes, while professing good

Sir E. Grey actually refused, even to the French ambassador, to guarantee English help in the event of war, though the dispositions of the French and English fleets strategically provided for English military co-operation, and only declared war after German soldiers had invaded Belgium. Diplomatically, we went to war over Belgium—not as the ally of France. Had Grey been firmer earlier, war might have been prevented.

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friendship in London for England ; that, diplomatically and militarily, she was preparing a gigantic *coup de main*, while gaining time by diplomatic subterfuge, evasion, procrastination and perfidy, believing that England would never fight, and that Russia would probably back out of it.

The dispatches of our respective Ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, and Belgrade show that none of them were, in the least, duped by Germany's attitude ; that one and all gave Sir E. Grey the clearest warning of the German aim, and that they all contradicted the friendly protestations carried on by the German Ambassador to Sir E. Grey at London.

In addition to the Ambassadors, the following Sovereigns interceded on behalf of peace : King George, the King of the Belgians, and the Tsar. The notable omission is that of the Kaiser.

Not a word from him. After his return on July 26, the German attitude became more rigid and evasive, and the most talkative man in Europe became the most silent.

The significance of this omission is all-important. His silence means that he fully approved the German attitude, and, as the German army cannot mobilize without his permission, that he sanctioned its mobilization, also the violation of treaties and neutral territories which ensued before the declaration of war.

These documents are the indisputable proof of the Kaiser's complicity and duplicity. At any

moment he could have stopped war. As these dispatches show, the question under contention ceased to be the Serbian murders—nor must it be forgotten that one of the assassins, Milan Ziganovitch, was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The question was European peace, as Sir E. Grey repeatedly insisted upon. Yet the German Emperor maintained silence.

After his return to Berlin (July 26), the semi-official German Press broke out in violent abuse of Russia, and things drifted deliberately into war, though the only thing needed to stave off the conflagration was a diplomatic formula for discussion, Russia offering immediately to disarm if only Germany would put one forward. Without doubt, had Russia and France not taken military precautions after July 29, Germany would have caught them both unready. Without doubt the Emperor had from the outset decided to support (to insist on) Austria's unparalleled ultimatum to Serbia at the risk of European war. Finally, there is the fact that not until a week after actual hostilities did England or Russia declare war on Austria—whose actions formed the *casus belli*—and that the Austrian Ambassador only left London the tenth day after Germany had refused to demobilize; thus giving irrefragable proof that even then, after Germany had entered Belgium, that the Powers were willing to come to an agreement with Austria whose right to inflict Serbia had been from the outset admitted even at Petrograd. The truth is that (1) mobilization; (2) the ultimatum to the Powers; (3) war—all three acts of

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hostility, were committed by Germany, who, except as the ally of Austria, had no grievance at all, and that Austria was still at peace with the Powers for a week after Germany's invasion of neutral Belgium.

AUSTIN HARRISON

X

DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AM- BASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECT- ING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLO- MATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

SIR E. GOSCHEN *to* SIR EDWARD GREY

SIR,

LONDON, *August 8, 1914*

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of his Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could

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not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition, entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which

he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when his Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, his Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Govern-

ment was terrible to a degree ; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had also often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future ? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that ?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome

by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.*

At about 9.30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued ; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that his Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before his Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police,

and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorized by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential *Tageblatt*," which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

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On the following morning, August 5, the Emperor sent one of his Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message :

“The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles.”

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured

that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise

too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside, and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, etc.,

W. E. GOSCHEN

DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AM-
BASSADOR AT VIENNA RESPECT-
ING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLO-
MATIC RELATIONS WITH THE
AUSTRO - HUNGARIAN GOVERN-
MENT

SIR M. DE BUNSEN *to* SIR EDWARD GREY

SIR,

LONDON, *September 1, 1914*

The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on July 23 of the Austrian Note to Serbia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tchirschky, who must have been aware of the tenor, if not the actual words of the Note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On July 22 and 23, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that

the Note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply.

At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the Note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the Note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about July 20. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received, on July 15, the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the *Neue Freie Presse* and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia. The official *Fremdenblatt*, however, was more cautious, and till the Note was published the prevailing opinion among my

colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On July 24 the Note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when on the following afternoon it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Serbian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organized processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the

Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connexion with the recent Balkan War. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the delegation.

Now the flood-gates were opened and the entire people and Press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on July 24 that Russia would stand aside.

This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course,

the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilization against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilization, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by his Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.

On July 28, I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said his Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, his Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question

primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandizement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation, that though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonize were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirschky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on

July 28 to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szápáry with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonoff (the Russian Foreign Minister). Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later, though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilized against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on August 1 I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szápáry had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonoff that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the Note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonoff, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on August 1 by Count Mensdorff to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations. M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter as well as Count Forgach had responded in

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the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on July 31 by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, and on France on August 3. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on August 6, when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on August 7. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he

might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till August 12. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On August 9, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on August 5. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons,

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and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of April 4, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The *Neue Freie Presse* was violently insulting towards England. The *Fremdenblatt* was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left his Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On August 5 I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that his Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, August 13, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia, who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria

had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of August 12.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of his Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country.

I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilization should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of *Chargé des Archives*. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that his Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening. In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Dunsen at the Embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs,

on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of August 17. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to his Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the Embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, August 22.

I have, etc.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN

THE ALLIANCES THAT MADE THE WAR

BY THE EDITOR OF "THE NEW YORK
EVENING POST"

It may be doubtful who lighted the match that has wrapped Europe in a flame of war, but there can be no question what constituted the material of conflagration. It was the grouping of the great Powers. They were as a series of powder magazines so connected that when one was exploded the others blew up. Fire started in the Triple Alliance set the Dual Alliance ablaze; and the Triple Entente speedily showed that it, too, was highly inflammable. The verdict of history will agree with the calmest contemporary judgment in holding that but for these various alliances, these balancings of the nations, these arrangements, treaties, understandings, Europe could not have been suddenly turned into a vast shambles.

It would be hard to find a swifter conception or clearer statement of this truth than in the columns of a leading organ of German public opinion, on the very eve of the war. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of July 27, 1914, had a searching analysis of the perilous situation created by the savage ultimatum of the Austrian Government to Serbia.

The significance of that act penetrated the European mind much more quickly than it did the American. This was partly because the press of the United States was badly served by its foreign correspondents in that affair. They cabled almost nothing about it, even days after every intelligent newspaper in England, in France, in Russia, and in Germany was expressing a sense of the terrible danger confronting Europe. It was again a case (as with the tell-tale premonitions of the Balkan War) when those who supply European news to the American press found it easiest to ignore the whole matter, as simply another of those far-off, tedious quarrels in southern Europe in which the public of the United States took no interest. Near by, however, the alarm was instant and acute. To go back to the *Frankfurter Zeitung's* article of July 27, it began by saying that the Austrian demand on Serbia would be a severe test of "the existing system of European politics." It immediately perceived that the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Italy) would be strained in its last fibre. It was in no doubt that the Dual Alliance (Russia, France) would at once vibrate in response, and that the Triple Entente (Russia, France, England), also beginning to move, the nerves of all Europe would be racked. Then would come the answer to the question whether these alliances were really a splendid "instrument of peace." As such they have long and loudly been vaunted, but the intelligent Liberal newspaper of Frankfort proceeded to say: "We have not shared that belief, but on the contrary have firmly maintained that

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European peace did not depend upon an equipoise of Powers in groups but upon the broad basis of a justly ordered union of the peoples." Then it added that the proof as to who was right would soon be forthcoming. If the Triple Alliance prevented war, it would be truly "rich in blessings to European politics"; but if not, it would be seen to be "a chain binding the peace of Europe to the will of persons and cliques in whom the citizens of states governed in the spirit of liberty could place small trust."

The event demonstrated that the fear was better grounded than the hope. To alliances that were long held up as the surest safeguards of peace is directly traceable the most stupendous and, in high probability, the most devastating war Europe has ever known. Almost as the guns began to go off, the President of France and the Tsar of Russia were toasting in Petrograd the Dual Alliance which, in their phrase, made peace a certainty. Hardly had the words "*la paix assurée*" died on their lips when declarations of war were thundering all round the horizon. The famous "Go, my son, and see with how little wisdom the world is governed," gains new point from the melancholy crumbling into ruin of the fabric which the best statesmanship of Europe has been for thirty years erecting.

To understand the system of alliances we must know something of the system which preceded it and which it displaced. This was the old doctrine of a European equilibrium. It was commonly known as the Balance of Power. This has never been described more picturesquely,

and at the same time philosophically, than by Kinglake :

Any prince who might be inclined to do a wrong to another State casts his eyes abroad to see the condition of the great Powers. If he observes that they are all in a sound state and headed by firm, able rulers who are equal, if need be, to the duty of taking up arms, he knows that his contemplated outrage would produce a war of which he cannot foresee the scope or limit, and, unless he be a madman or a desperado desiring war for war's sake, he will be inclined to hold back. On the other hand, if he sees that any great nation which ought to be foremost to resist him is in a state of exceptional weakness or under the governance of unworthy or incapable rulers, or is distracted by some whim or sentiment interfering with her accustomed policy, then perhaps he allows himself to entertain a hope that she may not have the spirit or the wisdom to perform her duty. That is the hope, and it may be said in these days it is the one only hope which would drive a sane prince to become the disturber of Europe.

This was the general theory of alliances—fluid and changing as will be seen—which obtained in Europe for fifty years after the Napoleonic wars. It was brought to an end by Bismarck. In place of it he set up the idea of rigid and hard-and-fast alliances. Himself the creator of the Triple Alliance, and—by reflex action—of the Dual Alliance, it is the workings of his mind that we must study if we would comprehend the “system” of modern Europe that emerged from it. A wonderful brain it was, that one of Bismarck's, and for years it was busy combining and shifting and re-combining the Powers, as a chess-master works over the possible moves. To a statesman who could occupy his sleepless hours by selecting a new Cabinet for Portugal, the game, or task, of so arranging and allying the countries

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of Europe as, in the first place, to further German policy, and, next, to keep the peace as long as possible, must have been fascinating. He did not leave the world in ignorance of his view-points or his methods. No more repaying chapters will one find in his "*Gedanken und Errinerungen*" than those in which he unfolds his theories of European alliances. What he writes has to be carefully checked at certain points, but as we read we feel that we are being let into the first plans of the architect who built the edifice that, until the other day, stood before us in its proud and fair proportions.

It all dates back to the battle of Sadowa in 1866. By this is meant that immediately after that crushing military overthrow of Austria, Bismarck, whose spirit more truly than Metternich's ever "wrestled with to-morrow," perceived that Germany might soon need an alliance with Austria, if not her friendship. Thereupon he proceeded to enforce an amazing policy of moderation upon the reluctant King William and the impatient leaders of the Prussian army. He vetoed a march into Vienna. In preparing for the treaty of peace at Nikolsburg, he insisted that no territory should be demanded from Austria. Why take land that would have to be occupied by Prussian soldiers when every available man would soon be needed for the greater struggle with France? It required all Bismarck's force and authority to carry through a settlement of this character. Only by the aid of the Crown Prince was he able to break down the strong opposition of the King. But he succeeded; and his foresight was completely

justified later. Having in his pocket the secret treaties of offensive and defensive alliance with Bavaria, Würtemberg and Baden, and with Austria's benevolent neutrality assured, he was free to go on spinning his diplomatic and military net about Napoleon III.

This germ of an alliance with Austria, Bismarck set himself to cultivate and expand after the defeat of France and the consolidation of the German Empire. He had no fancy for temporary coalitions. They gave him nightmares, he said. What he desired was an enduring combination of Great Powers. The Triple Alliance, as he originally conceived it, consisted of an alliance of the three Emperors. Later he hoped to bring in Italy. He had cherished the plan even before the end of the French War, and immediately after the Peace of Frankfort set about accomplishing it. Europe soon saw it in apparent effect. The *Dreikaiserbund*—Austria, Russia, Germany—worked successfully for three or four years. It was broken up in 1875, by, as Bismarck maintained, the provocations and lies of Gortchakoff. Whether in that year Bismarck really intended to make another war upon France is still disputed. It is certain that Moltke urged him to do so. It is also certain that England and Russia were seriously alarmed, and that at this time began the Russian inclination to France, out of which soon grew the Dual Alliance. This compelled Bismarck to alter his scheme, to abandon his hope of a firm understanding with Russia, which he protested to the end that he always would have preferred, since he believed that Russia was the natural ally of

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Germany, and at the same time the strongest one she could have, and to fall back on the only powerful alliance then open to him—that with Austria and Italy. In this way was born the Triple Alliance, which has lasted for more than thirty years since Bismarck formed it, and which was the immediate cause, through its obligations and binding military agreements, of the present war in Europe.

Italy's motive for joining the Triple Alliance has always seemed a little obscure. How could Bismarck persuade her to clasp hands with her hereditary enemy, Austria? It has been said that he did it by playing upon her vanity. Italy was flattered by being invited into the circle of the great Powers. But there was another and a real inducement, which Bismarck knew how to lay before Italy in attractive form. She was jealous of French expansion in North Africa. Against that she could fortify herself by entering the Triple Alliance. And when the time came for her descent upon Tripoli, she would have, as she did have two years ago, a free hand. This must have been the chief consideration in the mind of those Italian statesmen who have for a generation held Italy true to what seems for her an unnatural and awkward alliance. Now that she has achieved the main end she aimed at, it is not strange that she has displayed signs of coldness to an alliance that could hereafter mean for her only small benefit and great burdens.

Bismarck was perfectly frank in stating the object he pursued in forming and maintaining the Triple Alliance. His reasons were partly

dynastic. The houses of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg he would firmly establish beyond the shock of republican or socialistic agitation. The Romanoffs he would have gladly included, had not Russia drawn apart. He feared that there would be a great struggle between the two European tendencies which Napoleon called the Republican and the Cossack. Bismarck was for the system of order on the monarchical basis, and it was to stiffen and strengthen it that he created the Triple Alliance. But he had also a military purpose—a defensive purpose, as he contended. He desired to add to the fighting power of Germany the armies of Austria and Italy, in such a way that the Empire could be free from danger of attack, and might enter securely upon that work of national development and increasing influence in the councils of Europe which he thought of as belonging by right to the Greater Germany which he had built up. And it is certainly a high tribute to his prescient and puissant statecraft that this creation of his genius should have endured, with scarce a change in form, till this day. The Triple Alliance has been regularly renewed, at each period of expiration, as if it were one of the fixed institutions of European politics.

It is not to be supposed that the Triple Alliance was an alliance in everything. Each country in it was free to act as it chose in those matters which lay outside the agreed scope of common action. The result is that there has often appeared to be, in questions not exclusively European, a regrouping of the Powers as if in utter disregard to the Triple Alliance. One such case arose at the

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close of the war between Japan and China. In opposition to England, Russia and France were closely drawn together with Germany in protesting against the proposed cession of territory to the Japanese. This they did indeed prevent. At that period both Russian and French diplomacy was strongly anti-English; and an observer at that time knowing nothing of what had gone before would have concluded that the real Triple Alliance, if one existed at all, was between France, Russia, and Germany! So like a dissolving view does the whole system of European friendships and alignments often appear.

No student of European politics could, for example, have predicted anywhere between 1899 and 1903 that Europe would in a few years see, over against the Triple Alliance, and supplementary to the Dual Alliance, a Triple Entente uniting France, Russia, and England, and bidding fair, as it does at this moment, to re-fashion the whole political system of Europe. This was, given the past history and diverse interests of the countries composing it, an even stranger mating of opposites than the alliance which bound Italy and Austria in the same bundle. That England could act in hearty unison with France seemed only less unlikely than that she could so act with Russia. But she actually joined both in the Triple Entente! Its nature has all along been indefinite; its scope has not been known accurately by the other European Powers; it has been, as it were, the mystery of diplomacy. There was no absolute Treaty underlying it. This was made certain by the statement a year ago of the British Prime

Minister, in answer to a question put to him in the House of Commons, that England had not bound herself by treaty to act jointly with France and Russia. This left the matter still very much in the dark. The first clear light was given by Sir Edward Grey just before the war broke out. He explained that, while no specific and binding agreement had been made with France, an exchange of notes had taken place between the two Governments. The purport of them was that if either country were attacked by a third, the two would consult together for common defence. Sir Edward had nothing to say to the Commons about Russia. But in the official publication of diplomatic correspondence which he authorized shortly afterwards was a telegram from the Tsar to King George urging him "to stand by" Russia and France. This would imply that all three were placed very much on the same basis by the Triple Entente. Not a formal pact, it was of the nature of "a gentleman's agreement." All depended upon the goodwill and good faith in which it was lived up to. In the result, it appears to have been as effective as an actual alliance cemented by treaty; having most of the advantages of the latter without some of the embarrassments.

How the Anglo-Russian *entente cordiale* was brought about is not definitely and fully known. But the work of perfecting a good understanding between England and France was done under the eyes of the whole world. Sir Thomas Barclay, in his recent volume of "Anglo-French Reminiscences," has detailed most of the steps. Great difficulties had to be overcome. There was in-

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herited suspicion along with historical causes of bitterness, on both sides. Moreover, there had been recent instances of severe friction. The position and the interests of France and England in Egypt furnished material for sharp controversies and almost open quarrels during a period of years. The French annexation of Madagascar was a thorn in the side of Great Britain. In 1898 Major Marchand at Fashoda brought the two countries to the very verge of war. And as long as Lord Salisbury, who neither liked nor trusted the French, was in charge of the conduct of British foreign relations, nothing was possible except the continuation of a policy of pin-pricking on both shores of the Channel. A better spirit showed itself when Mr. Balfour became Prime Minister; and little by little, by the aid of commercial organizations, by the tactful offices of King Edward, and by means of a more intelligent diplomacy in Paris as well as in London, the two countries entered upon cordial and even close relations. The great outward and visible sign of this significant change was the Anglo-French Arbitration Treaty of 1904. Indeed, in this was the formal decision of France finally to give England an entirely free hand in Egypt, as well as England's consent that Morocco should thereafter be ear-marked for France; and any other question that might arise to disturb the good feeling between the two countries, they agreed to refer to arbitration. After this, the pressing on to the fuller and more fruitful Entente, into which Russia was soon drawn, was natural and easy. Thus against Bismarck's Three came to stand a Three which he and all the statesmen of his day

would have asserted that it would be absolutely impossible to bring together. But the political impossibility of one generation is often the established fact of another.

Though the Triple Alliance was in effect for a generation, it was until very recently of the nature of a dormant force. Not what it did, but what it might do, was long the chief concern of the other European Powers. It was plainly a potential force. Yet the purely ornamental or, at least, exterior functions of the Triple Alliance were for many years the only public proof that it gave of its existence. There was the annual exchange of royal visits between Vienna and Berlin and Rome; there were the military reviews, the naval displays, the banquets, the toasts, the embracings. Similarly the Dual Alliance seemed content to take it out in flourishes about the undying friendship between Russia and France. But a sharp warning was given six years ago. An overt act showed that the latent possibility in the Triple Alliance might any day become a threatening reality. In 1908 the Austrian Government suddenly announced the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two provinces had by the Treaty of Berlin been placed under an Austrian protectorate; but their cool taking over as part and parcel of a Dual Monarchy was a direct challenge to European diplomacy. Russia was deeply moved. Every Slavic fibre in her heart thrilled with remonstrance against this subjection to Austria-Hungary of Slav populations. England was the first to protest. Sir Edward Grey urged that no step in disregard, if not violation, of a

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public treaty of Europe could be warranted except by a congress of the Powers, of which he proposed the early summoning. But Germany, of course aware in advance of the Austrian plans, objected; and when Russia thereupon began to hint at using force against Austria, the action of the Kaiser was swift and menacing. He threatened an instant mobilization on the Russian frontier; and the Tsar's military advisers warned him that the Russian army was in no condition to resent this. On the 24th of last July, however, the Minister of War informed the Grand Council at Petrograd that 1914 was very different from 1909, and that Russia was now in position to ignore or defy the military threats of Germany. This shows how the affront, as Russia considered it, of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had rankled in the Tsar's mind these six years, and how he was determined not to be caught again by an anticipatory German mobilization. The Bosnian incident may also have had its effect on the year's crisis in another way. It may have made Berlin over-confident. Having frightened Russia from interfering with Austria's forward policy once, why not think to do it successfully twice? However this may have been, there can be no doubt that the events of 1908-9 were the sure prelude to the war of 1914.

In whatever way that war may end, one result of it is certain to come. The Triple Alliance will expire. This would happen even if German and Austrian arms should triumph. In that case Italy would come in for something very different from an invitation to renew the Triple Alliance.

Victory by England, France and Russia would clearly make such a renewal impossible. Indeed the whole system of European alliances will be radically altered by the war. Perhaps in time we may see it displaced by some form of that *Völkerverein* of which the *Frankfurter Zeitung* spoke. At all events, the Triple Alliance, which was said to have kept the peace of Europe for thirty years, and which has now plunged it into the most terrible of all wars, will soon be as dead as the Holy Alliance of our grandfathers.

WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT

AN AMERICAN PROFESSOR'S VIEW

BY ALBERT BUSHNELL HART

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

FOR the wreck of this conflict which will increase from day to day, is there any good, clear, inevitable reason? No Napoleon has forced his neighbours to war. No Bismarck has racked Prussia in order to make Germany. No Agadir incident has set off the match. No invincible horde is advancing out of Asia. Europe got through two Balkan conflicts without general war.

It is no explanation to say that this king or that emperor or the other president or prime minister wants war. Sovereigns nowadays are, at their strongest, only train-dispatchers who can order a switch to be thrown in one or another direction. No monarch can go against the spirit of his people. Every country included is united in what is considered a natural war. It is not a war of dynasties or statesmen or military leaders. It is not a war of revenge for Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Questions of trade and markets play a large part in the drama—but it is not the love of money which leads great navies to spend what they do. This is a war of peoples and not of interests.

The military spirit, commercial expansion, desire for territory, and the self-assertion of great nations are things that in the long run may overcome all the checks of Parliaments and statesmen and the Hague conferences. But none of them could have brought about the fearful conditions of the year 1914. The strongest and determining reason for war is the growth of race antipathies; the world has at last realized that the political boundaries of Eastern Europe cut across older and more persistent divisions of race, language and religion, and thus bring conflicts with nations and between them.

Europe is a mosaic of races. In most countries the race elements have amalgamated or have ceased to conflict with each other. In this crisis the Irish in Great Britain and the Walloons in Belgium have sunk their consciousness of race in their consciousness of nationality. Eastern Europe still bears the marks of the successive waves of barbarian invasion out of the heart of Asia. The Hungarians and the Bulgarians are both races that forced their way into Europe, where they found the Slavs, the Germans, and the Latins. Then the Slavs received the fearful weight of the Turkish invasion and for centuries lost independence and vitality.

Yet till recently there was no strong race antipathy between Germans and Slavs. Germany and Russia have not been at war with each other since the Tsar Peter III saved Frederick the Great in 1762. Till forty years ago the Bohemians and Germans got on tolerably well side by side. The race strains which are pulling Europe to pieces at

last have showed themselves by rousing country against country ; and inside Austria. There the antipathy between Germans and Slavs has grown so bitter that, in the judgment of the Austrian statesmen, the Germans must fight Slavs either outside of Austria or inside of Austria. They have preferred to make the issue perfectly clear by declaring war on the one markedly successful and independent Slav state outside of Russia.

The challenge aroused Russia, but did not directly concern other Powers farther west. Most of them, to judge from the proclamations and official communications, are fighting only in self-defence. In the midst of the appalling misery of the time, there shines out a comic gleam in the exchange of discourtesies about mobilization. As soon as the trouble began, every one of the four Central European Powers began to move troops with all possible speed toward its threatened frontiers, at the same time calling the world to witness that they were not "mobilizing." Every nation threatened every other, hoping thus to frighten its neighbour into giving way without war. The responsibility for the war rests upon no individual and upon no one nation, but upon the interlocking of Europe commercially, territorially, and racially, so that one Power after another was drawn into the maelstrom. Perhaps statesmen felt that the cleaning time had come at last ; and that the rival claims and pretensions must be settled by the court of war, the only one that executes its own decrees.

Perhaps this war is what Tolstoi thought all wars to be, merely a blind movement of human beings, they know not why, and they know not

whither, like a foray of soldier ants. Nevertheless reasons for war can be found in the make-up of Europe, in the character, in the aims and ambitions of the great Powers. The continent of Europe is divided into ten groups of nations. Four of these are the minor groups of the Balkans ; Scandinavia ; the neutralized Powers of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland ; and Spain and Portugal. Alongside these and overtowering them in wealth and military strength, are the six great Powers, Italy, Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, and Germany.

Europe has for some centuries been divided between four main religions. The Moslems up to two years ago still counted eight millions of Turks, Bosnians, and Albanians, but there are now only about three or four millions left in Europe. The Protestants, principally Germans, English, Swiss, and Hungarians, are about 100 millions. The Roman Catholics in all the Latin countries, Southern Germany, Croatia, Albania, Bohemia, and in Russian Austria and Russian Poland are about 180 millions. The Greek Catholics include Russia, the Balkan countries, and a few provinces in the Austrian Empire, but by no means all the Slavs. Their number is about 110 millions.

Differences of religion have caused many European wars, but during the last hundred years every European country has been obliged to tolerate churches other than that established by the State. These sects are attached to their country. Protestant and Roman Catholic Magyars are a unit when it comes to a discussion of their

place in the Austro-Hungarian Empire ; and there is no visible difference between the Catholic Bavarians and the Protestant Prussians in their support of their country in the present war.

Four comparatively small groups of people of Asiatic origin are the Finns, Magyars, Bulgarians and Turks, in all about fourteen millions. The Scandinavian group is small, though effective, and the three countries together, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, have ten and a half million people. The English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish, between whom there is no race division in time of national danger, are forty-six millions. The Latin powers, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, and Italy, count 106 millions. The two and a half million Greeks are akin to the Latin. The Germans in Germany, German Switzerland, and Austria-Hungary are a compactly situated mass of seventy-nine and a half millions. The Slavs of Russia, including the Poles and not the Finns, together with the Roumanians (who claim to be a Latin race, but seem to have more Slav blood than anything else), the Serbians and the various Slavic elements in Austria-Hungary are in all 111 millions.

Before sketching the status of the great Powers, the place and influence upon the war of the minor groups must be noticed. The Balkans is an example to the world of the immense difficulty of carrying on states which contain large numbers of people who in race and in sympathies belong to some neighbour. The second Balkan War in 1913 came about solely because there were so many Bulgarians in Greek and Serbian territory, and so many Greeks and Serbians in Bulgarian territory.

No geographical boundary line can be made to fit with these race groups. The effort to adjust the matter by killing off villagers of different race from that of the conqueror of a region was so thoroughgoing as to shock mankind, but not drastic enough to solve the problem. If the war is primarily a fight between the organized Slavs and the Germans, the Balkans are not much interested, since there are only about five million Slavs south of the Danube. The Emperor William last year called for a larger army and a bigger war chest, because he felt that the armies of the Balkans altered the balance of European military power. If the Balkan Powers could have stood together till this year, Austria could not have declared war on Serbia. Bulgaria and Greece may easily be drawn into the conflict, particularly if Turkey makes war on the German side; and when the general peace comes, it must include a settlement of the Balkan question.

The Scandinavian Powers are unwilling sharers in the danger of war because two of them control the natural entrance into the Baltic Sea; and the Swedes are convinced that Russia wants to subvert them. Portugal is an ally of England, and may join in the war. Spain may enter the lists if France seems to need aid.

The three little neutralized Powers, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, have already learned what "neutrality" means between desperate nations. The Emperor William some time ago was much pleased by the Swiss manœuvres, because they prove that he could "spare two army corps." The remark meant of course that

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neither France nor Germany could safely force a way through Switzerland. It meant also that the Germans intended to use Belgium as their highway into France, treaty or no treaty, international law or no international law. Holland has no protection from Germany except the troops and ships of the nations that comprise the Triple Entente.

ITALY

Italy joined the Triple Alliance about twenty years ago, because she was then on very bad terms with France. To Germany and Austria the Italian navy and merchant marine were a special attraction.

Italy has three territorial objectives which must largely affect her position : (1) on the other side of the Adriatic Sea, a decided conflict of interest with Austria has developed ; (2) Italy desires the extension of her colonies, as Tripoli is at present her only valuable colonial possession. Italy desires to annex Trentino, an Italian-speaking district in the Southern Tyrol, and Trieste, the population of which is Italian. But they might as well attempt to pluck out the right eye of the Emperor Francis Joseph as to take Trieste, for it is the only seaport in the Austrian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

RUSSIA

Russia has for centuries been a reservoir of compressed political gas, pushing in every direction for an outlet. When Peter the Great came to the throne two centuries ago his country was almost shut off from the Baltic by the Germans

and Swedes—and the Tartars cut him off from the Black Sea. War after war was necessary to gain free access to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Meanwhile the Russians pushed into the thinly settled area of North Asia until they reached the Pacific.

The obvious line of approach to the world's commerce for Russia is through the Bosphorus and the Ægean Sea to the Mediterranean. That route is held by the Turks, who for the last fifty years have been backed up by first the English and French, and then by the Germans.

Russia has gradually torn away fragments of the Turkish Empire along the Black Sea and has aided in building Roumania and Bulgaria out of the ruins of Turkish provinces. In 1878 a Russian army marched till it was in sight of the minarets of Constantinople, but England under Disraeli compelled Russia to give up the fruits of that victory. As the great Slav Power, Russia is not always keenly interested in the expansion of small Slav Powers ; but it has for years urged the policy of pan-Slavism, whatever that may mean. If the issue of German against Slav is clearly raised, as it seems to be in this war, Russia could no more keep out of it than she could forbid her subjects to attend the Greek Catholic Church.

It is a singular fact that till 1914 there never had been a serious war between Russia and Austria. Though the Russians were defeated by the French, English, and Piedmontese in 1855, and by the Japanese in 1905, they have in many wars shown military talent and a fine fighting force. Russia is the only nation which without the assistance of allies defeated the great Napoleon.

In case of victory the Russians may possibly demand Constantinople, which means that the Turk would be finally shoved out of Europe. What England and France will have to say with regard to this is open to conjecture. Some "rectification of the frontier" might be exacted from Austria.

ENGLAND

England in this contest is not fighting to gain anything new, but simply to hold what she has : first of all her commerce. It is certain that she can protect English merchantmen while German and Austrian must lie in port or be captured. The Japanese have undertaken to look after English interests in Asia.

The English must shut the German navy up in the North Sea, for without a supply of food-stuffs from other parts of the world England would be starved out after a few months ; while France, Germany, Austria, and Russia can probably feed themselves and their troops. The English colonies scattered all over the world are a bait to the Germans. But Canada, Australia, and probably South Africa can take care of themselves, and the attitude taken up by India has falsified German hopes. Germany, Russia, or France can be badly defeated without losing much territory or dropping a place in the scale of nations ; but not so with Great Britain. A victory of the German powers would infallibly deprive Great Britain of a part of her colonies, a large portion of her trade, and the prestige of being the greatest sea-Power in the world.

FRANCE

Of all the great powers France is the freest from internal dissension. The 207,000 square miles of the main country has but forty millions of population ; and the French have been almost in despair because Germany grows so much faster and therefore has so many more recruits. The colonies of France in Africa and Eastern Asia are nearly as large as the United States and its dependencies ; but they contain only forty-one millions of an indifferent population. Almost the whole population of France, so far as it has religious affiliations, is Roman Catholic.

France is supposed to be the thriftiest large country in Europe, and is able to raise nearly £200,000,000 a year for national and local public purposes ; but the debt is more than six years' national income, and it will be much increased by the war. The country has had a splendid foreign trade of £340,000,000 of exports and £400,000,000 of imports, and it owns a considerable merchant marine.

If the central powers should get control of the sea it would go hard with the French colonies, which it is supposed the Germans hope to secure. What the French expect from the war is first of all the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, which the school children are taught to consider two French provinces temporarily in possession of a foreign power. It was a tactical mistake for the Germans to wrest from France provinces which have shown themselves so French in feeling that they have never been allowed to have a popular government.

The French frontier lies nearly within sight of Metz, which is one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. If the French have the physical power, and their allies will back them up, Alsace-Lorraine will be claimed as their reward at the end of the war.

A second important object of France is to wipe out the fearful disgrace of the war of 1870 and 1871. Napoleon the Third put his country in a position to be disciplined ; but it was the French nation, the French people, and the French army that were defeated and humiliated. They mean to prove to mankind that they cannot be so treated a second time.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The centre of the crater in European affairs is Austria-Hungary, through which for ages has run the boundary between the German and the Slav races.

The Austro-Hungarians have but one sea-coast stretching between the two ports of Trieste and Fiume, beside the mountainous coast of Dalmatia, which has a Serb population. Nevertheless she has developed a creditable commerce and her ships run to Constantinople, to India, and to New York. A main object of Austria in this war is to push that coastline farther south, wiping out Montenegro and part of Albania ; or even to follow out a plan cherished for half a century to obtain a tongue of land between Bosnia and the Ægean Sea, with the port of Salonica.

The three objectives of Austria in the war therefore appear to be : (1) The " execution " of

Serbia as a lesson to all Serbs of what will happen to any head that raises itself above the level. (2) The extension of territory southward. (3) The holding of the Slav population, partly by force, and partly by trying to bring those people to feel that their country is in danger. For it must never be forgotten that both the Balkan people and the Austro-Hungarian Slavs if they cannot be independent will at least not be Russian. Probably every group of Slavs inside the Austro-Hungarian boundary will stay there, rather than incur any such danger.

Whatever happens to any other power, Austria-Hungary is playing a desperate gambler's game in this war. The Magyars, who have long hated and thwarted the Germans, have now united with them to keep their Slav fellow citizens in order. If Austria and Germany were victorious, the empire would be safe for the time; although no one outside the boundaries of that empire can guess the possibility of Slav risings during the war, or the likelihood that the Slavs will take to heart the lesson that they must remain inferior and subordinate in Austro-Hungarian affairs.

GERMANY

By common consent the most formidable military power in Europe is Germany. In area (209,000 square miles) it is almost exactly equal to France, but the population is 65,000,000, of whom 52,000,000 are Germans and 2,000,000 are Slavic Poles. With that exception there is nowhere in the land a seriously discontented race element. In its colonies, which are chiefly African,

the million square miles contain only 24,000 white people. In the Empire there are 40,000,000 Protestants, 24,000,000 Roman Catholics and half a million Jews.

The national taxes are nearly £200,000,000 a year and the debt is about twelve years' income. The country has a magnificent system of railroads and canals, and a splendid merchant marine of more than 3,000,000 tons; and an inward and outward trade of £1,000,000,000. No country has ever made such efforts to carry on business, government, and military affairs in a scientific and systematic way.

Germany's objects in the war are perfectly clear. First of all, to give notice to all the Germans in Europe, to the Magyars, and to the German, Austrian, and Hungarian Slavs who "stay good," the assurance that Germany will fight for them and with them. In the second place, the Slavs outside those two empires are notified that the Germanic power is massed against them. In the third place, if only Germany could get the command of the sea (in which Austria can be of very little aid) the French and English colonies would fall. Germany is not likely to look for Russian territory, except perhaps one of the German-speaking provinces on the Baltic; but if she can she will insist upon a free hand in Asia Minor, either by an understanding with Turkey or by crushing Turkey. Finally, if Germany is able to bring it about, Holland will almost surely be annexed. It is the natural distributing point of German commerce, and with Holland goes a large number of Asiatic islands.

THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES OF GERMANY

BY THE EDITOR OF "THE ENGLISH REVIEW"

To understand the psychology and motives of the German war-madness it is necessary to go back to the day when the Emperor William dismissed Bismarck and proclaimed the new course to be "full steam ahead." From that hour the Kaiser set up personal government in Germany. Coming to the throne on the top of the patriotic swell generated by the war of '70, the Emperor was not only able to impose his limelight personality upon a victorious people, but to intoxicate them with his doctrine of the "historic" Hohenzollern mission based upon the teachings of Treitschke and the Pan-Germans, Paul de Legarde, Robertus, Jahn, and Frederick List, who had all preached, as end and aim of the national design, the consolidation by force of an All-Germany.

From the date of the telegram to President Kruger, which first drew the attention of the world towards him, and was so intended, the German Emperor has never looked back. And the first thing he did was to reverse all existing policies, all the old ideas, national habits and notions, and centrifugal Germanic tendencies, making as the

force and expression of Germany—militarism vested in the supreme will and control of the “Kaiser-idea.” Bismarck, Von Sybel, even Treitschke, Mommsen, all fell into the Imperial disfavour. He put his heel on Berlin and crushed out all individuality ; on the arts ;* on all that survived of pre-Sedanic sentimental, homely, simple, Philistine Germany ; creating in its place an all-powerful military organization after the manner of “Old Fritz.”

We must remember that by the Constitution, the Federal Council is not responsible to the “Reichstag,” or the Chancellor to the “Bundesrath,” the Ministry being responsible to the Chancellor, and the Chancellor being responsible to the Emperor alone. The German Government is thus both powerless and irresponsible ; moreover, the Kaiser, as the Supreme War Lord, is absolutely free to declare or to end war. To an energetic Sovereign, autocratically minded, the power thus given is unlimited. The Emperor took every advantage of it. The powers of the Reichstag were nil. The Press was hidebound and subservient. His personality soon became a national obsession. In the Emperor’s personal composite Cabinet no man was tolerated who was not entirely submissive and sycophantic. About the year 1900 the Emperor’s doctrine of *Macht-politik*, or Force, had become the State religion of the Empire.

* For the last twenty-five years Germany has produced no notable writer, poet, painter or musician—Hauptmann, Sudermann, Strauss, Lembach, being all older than, or contemporaries of, the Kaiser.

Every one knows how the Emperor used his opportunities. He gave Germany a Navy,* finding in Admiral Tirpitz a willing tool; he built the Kiel Canal; he went to Palestine as the "Champion of Mohammedanism"; he initiated the Bagdad Railway; he gave out that it was his pleasure to see Berlin the greatest "City of Pleasure" in Europe; he went to Morocco; he told Germans their future "lay on the seas"; signalled himself to the Tsar as "the Admiral of the West." Pan-Germanism, militarism, what German professors, in countless books and pamphlets, styled the "Anthropological conception of life," mass production, mass organization, mass application, became the watchwords of the people; in other words, materialism, based on force, as opposed to the old Germanic idealism of Goethe. An economic school arose, in which the staidest German economic professors vied with one another to preach the gospel of Hohenzollern architectonics. In all the schools, in all the school books, England was proclaimed as the great enemy of Germanic expansion to her "natural" boundaries—the mouth of the Rhine, the Low German peoples, the Adriatic. Everywhere the military spirit became predominant. Drunk with success, young Germany found in the Kaiser's religion a doctrine after her own heart. Germans cultivated the "dynamics of power," preached daily at the

* January 1, 1900, the Kaiser said: "I shall reorganize my Navy, so that it shall stand on the same level as my Army, and *with its help* the German Empire shall attain to a place which it has not yet reached." No monarch ever declared his policy in plainer terms.

universities. Deliberately, by Imperial order, Old Germany was "wiped out." The *Flottengedanke*, or Navy idea, became the idol of Germans. Modern Germany grew up on the Hohenzollern doctrine of race conquest, of force *versus* force, of conquest and war. The sword alone, Germans were told to believe, could solve the Germanic problem which it was the mission of the Kaiser to fulfil.

When the Boer War broke out we, in England, were astonished to find all Germany arrayed against us. We began to understand the nature of the Teuton policy, the meaning of Germanic Anglophobia. It led, as we know, to the Entente with France—the policy which Germans called the "coalition policy" of King Edward—to "round up" Germany in Europe by a system of hostile alliances.

Immediately, as the result of the Entente Cordiale, the Pan-German League petitioned the Chancellor to seize the West Coast and Hinterland of Morocco as "suitable compensation." The Kaiser went to Morocco, landed, and declared, in a speech at Tangier, that the Sultan of Morocco "is an absolutely independent sovereign."

Germany's Moroccan policy with France need not be recalled. The point is that Germany, regarding France as a negligible quantity, ever since that visit used Morocco as a kind of unedited Ems telegram, partly to test the quality of England's arrangement with France, but chiefly with a view to browbeat that Power whenever it pleased Germany.

Up to Algeciras, however, the German Emperor

had maintained the foundation stone of German policy laid down as axiomatic by Bismarck—friendship with Russia. Time after time Bismarck warned his countrymen that Germany could never “risk a war with Russia,” however important it might be for Austria to seek to expand to her “natural” boundaries. Bismarck’s great fear was always the renovation of the “Kaunitz Coalition”—France, Russia, Austria. His whole outlook was governed by this necessity of “Reinsurance” with Russia, and until the defeat of the Russians by the Japanese the Emperor William held to it. Muscovite “demands” invariably had the ear of the Wilhelmstrasse. “Pogroms,” Armenian and Macedonian atrocities always found Berlin “indifferent.” When England complained of the passage of Russian torpedo craft through the Dardanelles, Germany regarded it as a “local” question (1902). The “Manchurian question” (before the Russo-Japanese War) was “not Germany’s concern.” But after Mukden, Germans came to regard the Russians with the same kind of contempt as they regarded the French. The victory of the Japanese was the last thing anticipated by Germany. Once more it showed the Kaiser how “wrong” Bismarck had been.* The Russian “bugbear” was gone. Germany felt herself to be militarily supreme in Europe. Her

* It should be clearly understood that the Kaiser’s policy has had little to do with Bismarckianism which stopped at the seas; which always insisted that Germany could never become a Great Colonial Power. The Emperor’s aim has been Pan-Germanism—the reclamation of all the Germans in foreign parts. Nor would Bismarck ever have gone to war with Russia. The Kaiser’s policy has been Bismarckianism “gone crazy.”

Philo-Turkish policy seemed to ensure the position of Turkey in Europe as the buffer State between Germany and Russia on the one hand, and as the trade artery between Hamburg and Bagdad on the other. After the Russian War it became the fashion for the youngsters in the German Navy to drink to the "great day (with England) about the year 1913."

A Prophetic forecast !

How has it been brought about ?

Once more we must seek the cause in the action of the Kaiser. Hostile as Prince Bülow always was to England, he always held steadfastly to the Bismarckian pro-Russian tradition. It was he who secured the fall of M. Delcassé, by reinsuring himself with Russia. Then, in turn, he fell, and M. Delcassé returned to office (1911).

Since then the German Emperor has been *absolutely his own Chancellor*. The German policy of the "mailed fist" had, to all intents and appearances, "come off." France had been bullied successfully time after time. Even the Austrian Bosnian coup, in wrecking the Treaty of Berlin, had been swallowed by Russia. Germany, "in shining armour," had awed Europe. Moreover, the price Austria paid was the creation of the Austrian Dreadnoughts. From that hour the difficult ethnic problem of the Austro-Hungarian German Alliance was solved. Germany's help welded again the two Empires together. It made Austria the vassal of Berlin, reconsolidated the Austrian arm of the Triple Alliance, even if German politicians began clearly at the time to understand that Italy could not be counted on as an "active partner" against France.

But with the Kaiser his own master, unfettered by a Chancellor with either influence or policy, Germany seemed, in 1911, to have arrogated to herself the position that Napoleon occupied in Europe after Jena, without ever having fired a shot. There were powerful pro-German agencies at work in England—pro-Germanism, in fact, became a Party affair, the concern of Mr. Stiggins. The Liberal Government were reported to be working strenuously for “German friendship,” in the conviction of the Kaiser’s “peace policy,” and the new Chancellor took his cue accordingly. Although Germany kept on increasing her Navy by all the resources of her power, there was a strong movement in England for an “agreement” with Germany. The Emperor had good reason to believe that the English Entente with France was weakening, that, in short, England might even be detached from it. German publicists wrote openly of a “wave of sloppiness” emasculating England; there were the women; there were the “Peace men”; there was the universal belief, held in Germany, that the Liberal Government would never draw the sword on behalf of France.

King Edward was dead—Russia had been crushed by the Japanese. Nobody in Germany feared France. On the other hand, the German Navy was now the second (on paper) in Europe, and Austria had taken a new life of national consciousness and aggression, promising excellently for the ethnic landslide down to Salonika, which was to be the German jumping-off board to Asia Minor. The Emperor could well point to tangible results. He had kept the peace—if mainly by

means of threats. He had made Germany a "world sea-Power." Men in England publicly spoke of him as the "popular Kaiser," even as the margin of superiority of English capital ships kept diminishing year by year. In Germany he had won "hands down." Parliamentary Social Democracy had effected nothing. He had accomplished the task of the Great Elector—the Germans were at last "all Germans."

A great wave of materialism swept over the country. Berlin had become the "fastest" town in Europe. All the world over men spoke of German "thoroughness," German science, German organization, German power and German culture. The German significance was apparent to all. Force seemed to radiate from the whole Teutonic Empire. Krupp guns, German steel, German cavalry charges—Europe looked on in silence. The watchword "With God and Kaiser" seemed in very truth to have created an invincible people under the spell of a mediæval and sinister despot.

Then came the astonishing and unexpected double war in the Balkans, resulting in the complete transformation of power in Southern and Central Europe to the advantage of the Slav. With the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, German near-Eastern policy collapsed. The rise of Serbia changed the whole position for Germany, diplomatically, economically, and strategically. Germany saw herself hemmed in where least she had expected it, with an ancillary tongue of Russia running right under her base. As she had misjudged the Russo-Japanese war, so she misjudged

the Balkan War. The rout of the Turks was an utter surprise to her. From the military point of view—the only point of view held by Germany—the result of the war was disastrous to the German ambition.* With characteristic promptitude the Kaiser answered it.

The Kaiser's answer was the *Fifty Million German War Loan* (1913) promulgated "in the name of God."

Its meaning was obvious. The money was largely to be spent on fortifications and "strategic structures" on the Eastern frontiers. Germany meant to fight. From that date the Kaiser looked exclusively towards the East. From that date Russo-German relations began sensibly to deteriorate. At the time, I wrote in *The English Review* (April 1913): "The game now is between Germany and Russia. Germany will neither listen to sense nor remonstrance. As there is no justification for her war fever, so there will be no justification for her actions. She will arm and attack if, and when, she pleases. The whole European situation is curiously similar to the terrorism of Bonaparte. The War Drum is beating in Europe. On the question of the stability of France, English opinion will have to take a decision, and it will be the turning-point in European history."

A word now about the psychology of the Kaiser, who is that dangerous compound, a religious mystic. In Germany his nature is perfectly under-

* As the result of the dislocation of power in the Balkans, German export and import trade in those parts very materially diminished during the last year.

stood, his chief characteristic being "sudden inspiration," what the Germans call *Plötzlichkeit*. The Kruger telegram is an example. The visit to Morocco was undertaken at a moment's notice. Pathologically, the Emperor is a man liable to violent starts and fitfulness. It is a well-known thing in the Emperor's entourage that no man knows what the Emperor may do on the morrow. If proof were needed we have but to consider the extraordinary waywardness and changeability of German diplomacy during the last twenty years,* and we can see at once how irresponsible the German course has been, now friendly to France, now bullying her; now approaching England, now insulting her; a policy which thoughtful Germans long ago denounced as "Imperial Patriarchism," leading to that spirit of chronic *malaise* which has been so typical of modern Germany. To this must be added the Emperor's "versatility," his passion for tall talk, telegrams, speeches, for pomp and theatricality; in short, the *Plötzlichkeit-Kaiser*, as he is called in the Fatherland, has always been the subject of ominous fear and speculation.

The influence of such an autocrat made itself felt throughout Germany in the triumph of mediocrity—all personality being anathema to the Kaiser, who gathered round him only willing servants, placemen and soldiers; and what kind

* The German course received its first shock over the Samoan question with America, when Admiral Dewey gave the Kaiser his first lesson in international comity. Since then the Kaiser has given up the "indemnity" tradition, and lickspittle has been the watchword towards everything American.

of men these were was revealed very conspicuously by the "scandals" of the Emperor's "Round Table," denounced by the journalist, Harden. Germans have long recognized the danger of this one-man rule. In Bavaria men have for years protested against the Prussianification policy of the Kaiser, the government of drill and militarism, the perils of reliance upon the all-wisdom of a single man, the absence of all constitutional check and control, the absolute sovereignty of the First War Lord, supported by the fighting military class and the huge civilian army of bureaucratic mediocrities.

The Emperor's way of "suddenly doing the unexpected" is well known to all Germans. When, a short time before the outbreak of the present war, the Kaiser one night ordered the "full mobilization" of all the regiments quartered in and round Berlin (amounting to some 50,000 men), Europe saw no hidden design; it never occurred to us that the Emperor had his reasons for "testing" the readiness of Brandenburg; from that day, none the less, in Germany men prepared for the crisis of war.

Thus Germany has been dragooned by the Kaiser on militarism, military arrogance and swagger, overweening pride and cocksureness, braced for war whenever it might suit the Emperor to declare it. The Cambridge professors who wrote of a peace-loving Germany are dreamers, grotesquely ignorant of modern Germany. To understand the German mind we must remember that ever since Algeciras, Prussianism, which contains all the controlling forces in Germany,

has been spoiling for the "*Gewaltsame Auseinandersetzung*," or forcible settlement. Up to the year 1909 Germany expected England to attack because, obviously, it was not to the interest of Great Britain to allow the German Navy to approach the margin of "the fighting chance"; and good German sportsmen openly expressed the opinion that if England did not seek to destroy the German Navy before it had grown too strong, she was either a fool or afraid. Let me recall what happened in April-May 1907 as the result of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's article, published in the weekly, *The Nation*, in which he proposed a General Disarmament discussion at the projected Hague Conference. Immediately a war panic broke out all over Germany. The Army was mobilized. The Navy was cleared for action. I was in Germany at the time. A high official in the German Foreign Office told me that it was "the most diabolic ruse to force Germany into isolation," and that if England carried it out, Germany would fight for her life." *

Since then a more sober view has obtained in Germany, and it became the object of the Emperor and Admiral Tirpitz to allay English suspicions and expedite the building of the German Navy. In which task the German-English policy of Imperial "*petits soins*," blandishments, and

* In a little book, "England and Germany," published 1907 (Macmillan), I wrote: "In the event of hostilities Germany would invade France within a few hours after the declaration of war directly *through Belgium*; nor is there any doubt that all her military plans are drawn up with that intention."

subterranean influence proved (as we can now grimly look back upon) signally successful.

No doubt, after 1908, a better feeling towards England did arise in Germany, in Bavaria in particular ; unfortunately, German policy is controlled neither by feeling nor sentiment. What is quite certain is that the German Navy was being built for the issue with England, as Admiral Tirpitz said to me once at a private dinner-party, "to assert Germany's right of say on the seas." There was never the smallest secrecy about that in Germany. The only fear was "would England allow us to grow strong enough at sea to risk it?" The various Moroccan crises all seemed to show that England would refrain as long as she could, and they were regarded by Germans as useful tests of England's attitude. But though things looked peaceful enough, Germany was always expecting the war, and since Russia's defeat no longer even feared it. That is the key to Germany's outbreak. Germans stood in the centre of Europe penned in—some day they would have to "hack their way through." That has been the common sentiment for the last nine years. Mothers have brought up their sons to expect it. That is why the Germans wrecked the first Hague Conference and nearly went to war when the most peaceful Premier England ever had proposed another. As a nation in arms, the Germans were on the constant look-out for the "opportunity." The grand adventure and the rise of an All-Germany has been the subject of thousands of books, lectures, pamphlets, and newspaper articles, in which professorial and intellectual Germany played a con-

spicuous part. *Furor Teutonicus* has been the constant dream of middle and upper class Germany.

While for some years past it has been the object of German diplomacy to play upon English sentimentality by conjuring up recollections of the "Old Fatherland" of Kant and Goethe, of music and the professors, of Michael with his beer and sausage sandwiches, as a fact so complete has been the Emperor's education of his people that now for years (since the *Panther* incident, to be exact) the German Press—under the direct guidance of the Press Bureau in the Foreign Office—has written of the Emperor as "The Peace Kaiser," "The pusillanimous War Lord," "Our Poltroon Hohenzollern," &c., nor have the stringent laws of *lèse-majesté* ever been enforced. All this was part of the Emperor's game. It upheld the fiction of "William the Peaceful." It had its considered effect upon English politicians. It invested the Emperor with a halo of mystery. Above all, it acted in a very insidious and subtle way as a national irritant. Germans felt gratified at the thought of being more militant than their Emperor. They felt they were leading him, as they did in the days of the deliberately worked-up outbreak of Anglophobia. Thus the spirit of war has been kept up all the time. To keep Germans up to the war mark has been the avowed policy of the Government. The recent talk of peace, disarmament, and "Grand Illusions" has been scouted by Germans as fantastic nonsense. General Bernhardt's book has been their gospel, so much so that in recent years even the leaders

of Social Democracy have openly come into line with the "defensive" argument of German military policy.

The effect of militarism upon modern Germany* has been—and there is no other word for it—the brutalization of the finer feelings of humanity. Based on a misreading of Nietzsche, Max Stirner and egocentric theories of life, the general attitude of the Germans has been moulded on the copy-book of the drill serjeant. Dozens of German novels have described it. "*Drauf Schlagen*" (smash your way through) is the common principle, and it is acted on through all classes of society. Brutality in Germany is synonymous with virility. The Berlin police are notorious for their brutality. The treatment of horses is sickening—the lash is a German driver's sole remedy. I have seen cavalry horses flogged till they shrieked. The German working-classes are the roughest in the world. As the Emperor has deliberately fostered the use of duelling, so in all classes "bullying" is countenanced and encouraged. When two Germans meet it becomes a question which shall treat the other "like a dog." Towards women the German manner is an institution. In the schools boys are whipped with a ferocity hardly to be credited. As for the Army, the Socialists are never tired of bringing forward cases of men driven to suicide

* In its incidence upon the public, its effects have been disastrous, leading to what German doctors have themselves described as a pathological insanity, in which sex perversities played a prominent part. Those interested should read Maximilian Harden's "Prozene," wherein he fleshes his satire on the diseased condition of moral and social Germany, based on the material of the Law Courts.

by serjeants and officers ; indeed, the Army scandals are the stock "copy" of every newspaper. It is not that Germans are cruel—they have become brutal as part of the deliberate national training. Pity is a word expunged from their vocabulary. That is why the South Germans hate the Prussians so fiercely. To any one who knows modern Germany the accounts of German brutalities in the present war cannot cause the smallest surprise. When the Chancellor informed the Reichstag (August 4) that "necessity knows no law," and that Germans had broken into Belgium, he merely expressed what every German there knew to be the German war attitude ; nor was there a man present who was not aware that the German offensive would take the field through Belgium.

A Governance by bullies obviously shuts out much of the intelligence of the country. Diplomatically, German blundering has been exhibited on countless occasions during the last decade. Vertiginous arrogance, which has been the characteristic of modern Germany, is not likely to produce either statesmen or soldiers. We must remember that Germans sincerely believed their Army to be invincible ; that it was only through the staying hand of the Kaiser that it was not years ago set in motion. Germans have often told me that £700,000,000 would be the "next" French indemnity—I mention it because it shows the spirit. There is no humility in the Fatherland. This German arrogance is bound to play a great part in the war. The Kaiser's war tactics have frequently been denounced by Germans, by

Colonel Gaedke notably. It is commonly assumed that they are based on "mass shock tactics," regardless of life. Militarily, I am not qualified to speak, but at the last German manœuvres I attended (in Poland), I shall never forget the plight of the German infantry and artillery sullenly waiting to be ridden down by the great cavalry attack, which was three hours late in coming. We could see the horses cantering along two hours before the charge. "Why don't you get on to that strategic crest?" I asked an officer. "Why wait in the hollow to be attacked?" And he smiled. "We are here to be ridden down," he replied, "or the Kaiser's charge would fail." So they waited and were duly ridden down. An English officer present said to me afterwards, "If they do that in war, the Germans will be wiped out."

If it is asked why Germany attacked all Europe, what motives could she have for risking the long-prophesied Armageddon, the answer is that war is the logical result of Germany's war system, the end for which the German Stratocracy was created. In the *Times* (August 11) a very interesting account was given of the Emperor's personal feelings about the Serajevo murders, which, in his position of Kaiser "by divine right," he naturally regarded as a personal insult to Majesty. But the real reason is more than pathological: it is that the Emperor regarded the right moment to have arrived for the trial of strength which should complete the German destiny.

The war was undertaken to found the "Greater" Germany, as the Prussian Monarchy was the

military creation of the Mark Brandenburg, as the German Empire, with its union with Austria, was the realization by war of Bismarck's policy of "Blood and Iron," which ever since has been the cognizance of the Imperial Government. The whole State organization of Prussia (Germany) has been military from top to bottom through history. Its social system is military. Its monarchs have always been soldiers. The entire *régime* of the country is martial, maintained by the military Junker classes, whose sole profession is war, an aristocratic caste ruling and trained for war, under the supreme command of the Monarch. There is, and can be, no true public opinion, no free Press, in Germany, because of this warlike class fetish, which has a monopoly of all government, all social position, all authority, privilege and prestige.

The sole justification of the military Junker classes being war—the successful results of war—Germany, under the Hohenzollern Emperor, existed avowedly for that purpose, and boasted of its challenge. In a hundred speeches the Emperor has proclaimed the German policy—to "strike terror" into all foes of the Fatherland. Those who argue that Germans have been duped into the present war must be unable to read history.

The truth is that Germans, even the Bavarians, with their Catholicism and æsthetic tastes, long ago accepted the Bismarckian-Hohenzollern conception of State reason which, whether it be styled *Realpolitik* or Military Despotism, stood there in Europe for war. I have often talked this matter

over with * Germans of all trades and always I have received this answer: "Man is a fighting animal. Fighting is therefore natural and, so, justifiable. The Germans are fighters, the Germans, therefore, will fight and have the right to fight for the possessions of the world, on land and on sea."

To argue that Germans were not ready for this war is ignorance—they have been expecting such an outbreak for years, only they thought the Emperor would not "take on" England and Russia at the same time. Talk of the European conflagration has been as common during the last five years in Germany as was for years the "spring war" in the Balkans. As a fact, upper and *bourgeois* Germany have talked battles all this summer. Professors in Berlin have said: "We won't stand this much longer," and if you asked them what they meant by "this" they said: "Oh, the Franco-Russian menace!" What they implied was that Germany considered the position of the Slav had grown too strong and that Germany, as is her wont, would not permit it. In this attitude, the German women encouraged their men. At the height of the outbreak of Anglophobia in Germany during the Boer War, the Emperor, surprised at its virulence, asked Dr. v. Symens, who knew England and the English well, the inspirer of the German Anatolian Railway, what was its cause; and Dr. Symens replied—"the women." He was right. German women have kept up the

* International brotherhood is one of the leading principles of Social Democracy. It is right to say that German Socialists do not share the German view.

anti-English spirit ever since. Military despotism does not make for humanitarian sentiment. I have heard intelligent German women say at their own tables that nothing could give them greater pleasure than for their sons to die in a naval battle against the English. All through this summer, ever since the Balkan War, German women have acclaimed Germany's right to "break out." Nor can there be any doubt, indeed the proof lies in the "Diplomatic Correspondence," of which a *précis* is given in this book, that it was the German object to seize the mouth of the Rhine and push to the sea through Belgium, as part spoils of the "conquest."

"He is a fool," Frederick the Great said, "and that nation is a fool, who, having the power to strike his enemy unawares, does not strike and strike his deadliest." Such has been the motto of Hohenzollern-Germany ever since. And when, in 1911, President Taft's "message" of brotherhood resounded through the world, it was Herr Bethmann-Hollweg (the present Chancellor, till recently regarded by half our pro-German Government and a Party school of "politicians," as the Anglophil friend of peace and culture) who gave the German answer in Bismarckian language: "The vital strength of a nation is the only measure of that nation's armaments." Again, to Mr. Winston Churchill's "Naval holiday" (1911), to Mr. Haldane's visit to Berlin, the Emperor's answer was the great War Loan. General Bernhardt's watchword, "World-Power or Downfall," is the accepted reason of German State policy, the end of the Imperial design. To arm, to force

European armaments to the breaking-point—to that point when one by one the other nations felt they would either have to stop the mad expenditure or fight—such has been Germany's cynical peace policy, hailed in this country as friendly and progressive. That Germany set out to fight England and Russia as well as France is due simply to the arrogant stupidity of the Emperor and the Emperor's soldier advisers—Bismarck certainly would never have attempted it. It is due to the Kaiser's miscalculation of the English character, to his misreading of history.

That war had become imminent after the War Loan of 1913 was plain to all serious students of foreign affairs. For ten years the peace of Europe had hung on his Majesty's pleasure. It had only been averted at the time of Austria's Bosnian coup by the "climbing down" of Russia, as, on various occasions over Morocco, war had only been staved off by the climbing down of the French.* Convinced as he (and all Germany) was that England would not move, the Emperor without a doubt thought he could "take on" France and Russia by rolling up the French armies before the Russians could take the offensive. That is the explanation of the furious anti-English outbreaks in Germany when it became known that

* For the last two years the attitude of the French soldiers and civilians has been one of quiet and expectant resolution, for France had made up her mind not to put up with any further German indignities. In May of this year in Paris I found everybody ready for war, which was openly talked of as "a continual and insupportable menace." Everywhere I inquired I heard the conviction expressed that "this time the Germans would get a full run for their money."

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England was "coming in." From the military German point of view, the Slav arm at Germany's base was certainly a serious matter. The Emperor had been told that civil war in Ireland would keep England quiet ; it was August ; France was at the seaside Tangoing ; the French President was away ;* Russia was reported to be "concerned," but not bellicose ; in the summer weather the armies could move quickly ; we may be sure that the Emperor thought the time propitious, the cause both justified and logical for Germany's great "expansion." In a word, the Emperor went war-mad, as he had taught all Germans to understand that on the chosen day he would.

* There can be no doubt that Russia was on the eve of another revolution, just as England stood on the brink of internecine warfare in Ireland. The Germans, as Nietzsche wrote of them, "ludicrously ignorant of psychology and penetrative social instinct," entirely misjudged the national character of both English and Russians ; thinking that, if war broke out, socialist Russia would rise up against the Tsar, and that India and Ireland would keep England too occupied to dispatch an expeditionary force to France. Bismarck would never have made such an elemental blunder in statecraft. It shows how curiously Germany failed to understand the principles of human liberty, or the basic conditions of what one may call Anglo-American civilization.

“MADE IN GERMANY”

“THERE,” said a German diplomat, pointing to a box marked *Made in Germany*, “is the Briton’s grievance against us. Too many things are made in Germany.”

Germans generally believe that it is jealousy of Germany’s phenomenal industrial progress and her fast-growing merchant marine that has caused the talk of war between England and Germany for the last decade. In a measure this is true. The old agricultural Germany has become a vast workshop. It imports food for one-seventh of its population of 64,000,000 people. It has become, in fact, a nation like England that must have outside markets to prosper, for its home consumption will not take up the goods it makes. To get oversea markets it has built up its great merchant marine and to protect its merchant-marine it has built its great navy. The German Government is intimately linked with German trade. Germany’s foreign policies are designed to find larger markets for the ever-increasing German manufactures. With Germany, as with other countries, the flag is likely to follow trade. German manufacturers want a trade outlet to the East. For example, the German Government, through its Austrian ally, would like to reach the

Ægean Sea. In its rapid commercial and maritime rise the European countries that it has most often met in competition are England and France. Naturally their policies and their colonial empires were used to encourage their own trade rather than Germany's. To ensure the future of its foreign trade Germany has in the last decade risen to contest Great Britain's supremacy on the sea.

Germany's expansion is a natural phenomenon. The country is overpopulated. It must expand. The Atlantic Ocean is a barrier to its westerly expansion. The north is uninviting. The south is being drained of its resources by active and intelligent inhabitants. The *Drang nach Osten* of German Imperialism is therefore inevitable. The line of least resistance points to the east, where fertile territory awaits development.

The attention, therefore, of Germany's statesmen has been directed toward Oriental countries, whose wealth of natural resources and genial climate combine to render them ideally attractive. The verdant vales and forest-clad mountains of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria abound with raw material necessary for Germany's increasing industries. Beyond the narrow watercourse intervening between Europe and Asia at the Dardanelles and Bosphorus lies Asia Minor, a land marvellously rich in minerals and susceptible of great agricultural development. Farther toward the rising sun the exceedingly fertile Mesopotamian valley, once the granary of the civilized world, stretches between the western Euphrates and Tigris, and bids fair to provide humanity anew with vast supplies of grain and cereals.

This is the vision which has dangled alluringly before the minds of German and Austrian statesmen, working hand in hand, Austria paving the way in the Balkans, Germany forcing herself successfully towards control of Asia Minor, which to-day is a German colony in all but name. By joint efforts, the Dual Alliance have laid the foundation of an empire whose northern shores will be washed by the Baltic and whose southern boundary will be formed by the Persian Gulf.

To the east, in South America, in China, the German fleets have carried the products of German mills and German factories. That phenomenal growth, however, like most such things, has developed certain weaknesses. The iron ore of Germany is not inexhaustible, and already the Krupps, the German steel king Thyssen, and others have gone into Scandinavia, into Belgium, and into Morocco. As Germany is likely to need raw materials from abroad in the future, it already is a great borrower of capital. There is not money enough in the country to finance its industry. In the autumn of 1911, for instance, when the Agadir incident seemed capable of producing a European war, Germany had to borrow £12,000,000 from the United States at twice the usual rate of interest. It is generally believed that Germany's financial dependence prevented a war in 1911. Since then both Germany and France have been hoarding gold for the struggle which is now raging.

THE KAISER AND THE "MAILED FIST"

BLOOD AND IRON—MANILA BAY—THE KRUGER
TELEGRAM — BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA —
AGADIR—AND THEN THE DELUGE

THERE is an explanation of the "blood and iron" policy of Germany, of the "mailed fist" of the Kaiser, of what Mr. H. G. Wells calls "that tramping, drilling foolery in the heart of Europe, that has arrested civilization and darkened the hopes of mankind for forty years—German Imperialism and German militarism." The explanation is in the history of the rise of Prussia. Bismarck lifted Prussia from a second-rate member of the German Confederation, which was dominated by Austria, to a first place among the German states and then formed round it a new nation—Germany, and made that nation one of the great Powers of the world. Bismarck believed in autocracy, he believed in "blood and iron," in the "mailed fist." He achieved his success by war, deliberately planned, prepared for and efficiently carried out.

Look closely at the lessons of war and diplomacy which Emperor William inherits from his grandfather and the Iron Chancellor.

In 1862, Emperor William I, the grandfather of the present ruler, was struggling to get the Prussian Diet to grant him money to double the size of his army. He had been unsuccessful in this effort. He was about to give it up when as a final experiment he consented to invite into his ministry the then young reactionary leader, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck's political ideas centred around the belief in the Prussian monarchy. It had been the Prussian kings, not the Prussian people that had made Prussia great. Bismarck believed in the king and disbelieved in the people. He hated democracy. He also believed in war as a means of national progress. In the most famous speech of his life in 1863 he announced, "Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided—but by 'blood and iron.'" These are the views of the man from whom the present Emperor learned his statecraft.

In 1863, Prussia and Austria went to war, a war chiefly of Bismarck's contriving, against Denmark, and took the duchy of Lauenburg and the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, in which the Kiel Canal and the German naval base now are. Austria was to administer Holstein, and Prussia Schleswig. Prussia paid Austria £360,000 for the duchy of Lauenburg. Bismarck approved this whole arrangement because he thought it would lead to war with Austria, and it was a part of his "blood and iron" policy that a German nation under Prussian domination could come only after a war with Austria. There was not room in a German Confederation for both Austria and Prussia—"one or the other must bend." Within a year

after the division of Schleswig-Holstein, Bismarck had obtained a promise from Napoleon III to remain neutral if Prussia attacked Austria. He also made a treaty with Italy providing that Italy would join Prussia in a war on Austria if Prussia began the war within three months for the sake of reforms in the German Confederation. The enemy was thus isolated, and Prussia was prepared to use both "blood and iron." Bismarck immediately and quite unexpectedly introduced into the Diet of Frankfort, the governing body of the German Confederation, a new plan for the federation of German states. With this as a background, to satisfy the Italian treaty, Bismarck picked a quarrel with Austria over its administration of Holstein, declared the old confederation dissolved, attacked Austria, and invited the other German states to do likewise. None of the other important states sided with Prussia. Four of them stood with Austria. But Prussia was prepared, trained and ready for war. In seven weeks Austria was defeated and soon after all Germany was at the mercy of the Prussians.

Prussia now annexed the kingdom of Hanover, four duchies and the free city of Frankfort, bringing under the Prussian king practically all the peoples and land along the north coast from the Russian border to the border of Holland. There was no thought of having the people of these states vote on the question of annexation as had been done in Italy. They were annexed by the right of conquest on decrees issued from Berlin, where one king who ruled by "divine right" deposed two or three others whose thrones were

similarly bolstered up. Thus increased, Prussia became the leader in a new German Confederation which included all but four German states and from which Austria was excluded.

The "blood and iron" policy had triumphed. Prussia had humbled Austria and become the dominant power in Germany. Yet Germany was not united. The four southern states still were outside the Confederation. So there was need for more "blood and iron." Bismarck believed a war between France and Prussia inevitable and (Hazen's "Europe Since 1815," pp. 289-90) "in his opinion it was desirable as the only way of completing the unification, since Napoleon III would never willingly consent to the extension of the Confederation to include the South German states. All that he desired was that it should come at precisely the right moment, when Prussia was entirely ready, and that it should come by act of France, so that Prussia could pose before Europe as merely defending herself against a wanton aggressor. In his 'Reminiscences' he avows that he entertained his belief as early as 1866. 'That a war with France would succeed the war with Austria lay in the logic of history'; and again, 'I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must take place before the construction of a United Germany could be realized.' The unification of Germany being his supreme aim, he was bound by logic and ambition to see that that war occurred."

He explains frankly in his "Reminiscences" how he brought the war about. There was a delicate diplomatic situation between Prussia and France

in 1870 which arose over the succession to the Spanish throne. The King of Prussia was at Ems. The French ambassador went to see him and made certain demands. The Emperor telegraphed these to Bismarck saying that he could use his discretion about publishing them. Von Moltke and Roon, the great Prussian soldiers, were with Bismarck when the telegram came. They were in a dejected mood, for they saw no chance of war. Then, says Bismarck, "I reduced the telegram by striking out words but without adding or altering. . . . After I read out the concentrated edition to my two guests Moltke remarked: 'Now it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge.' I went on to explain: 'If in execution of his Majesty's order I at once communicate this text, which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram, not only to the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and not only on account of its contents, but also on account of the manner of its distribution, will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull. Fight we must if we do not want to act the part of the vanquished without a battle. Success, however, essentially depends upon the impression which the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we should be the party attacked, and this Gallic overweening and touchiness will make us if we announce in the face of Europe, so far as we can without the speaking-tube of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly met the public threats of France.' He adds that 'this explanation brought about

in the two generals a revulsion to a more joyous mood, the liveliness of which surprised me.' "

The trick had its desired effect. France declared war against Prussia. The ever-ready "blood and iron" were loosed again.

Everything was as Bismarck wished. The South German states joined Prussia. The French were defeated quickly and completely. In less than six months, after the first gun was fired, on January 18, 1871, King William the First was crowned Emperor of a united Germany, the four southern states had joined the Empire, and Alsace and Lorraine had been annexed to Prussia.

In less than ten years the great Chancellor had turned a second-rate German state into an Empire, a first-class Power among the nations of the world. He did it by "blood and iron," by unscrupulous diplomacy backed by the best trained army in Europe, and by unhesitatingly throwing the country into war where the army could be used.

The present Emperor inherited German militarism and German Imperialism, a belief in the divine right of kings and the strength of the German army. The lessons of the history of his country and of his family are plain. Germany was built by "blood and iron."

On his accession to the throne, in the speech he made to the army and navy three days before his speech to the people, he reiterated Bismarck's doctrine in these words :

"The soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is placed on the army."

At the centenary of the firm of Krupp, at Essen, the Emperor said :

"The history of this firm is a piece of Prussian and German history. Krupp guns have been with the Prussian lines and have thundered on the battlefields which made ready the way to German unity and won it at last."

William II broke with the great Chancellor, not because he believed more in the people than Bismarck, but because he believed so much in the rule by divine right that he was unwilling even to be overshadowed by the Chancellor who had made the Empire.

Bismarck's use of "blood and iron" made Germany the strongest nation on the European continent. But he recognized very clearly that "blood and iron" was a policy to be used with great care. Before every one of the three wars he precipitated he was careful to do two things : (1) to isolate the country he was going to attack by arrangements that would keep other nations from interfering with his war, and (2) be certain that his army was better prepared than the enemy.

This was the game that Bismarck played by which he achieved the great ambition of his life—the unification of Germany.

The Emperor William has an even larger vision. "Our future is on the water," he announced. "The more the Germans go upon the water the better it will be for us." This announcement was in 1901. But the date of the first naval programme was 1893, three years after Bismarck's retirement. The Kiel Canal was opened in 1895.

To further his imperialism, the Emperor has used the "mailed fist," the threat of his army rather than the army itself. It is interesting to see what the Kaiser's imperialism, backed by the "mailed fist," has achieved, and its influence in the present crisis.

In 1895, the year in which the Kiel Canal was opened, Germany joined France and Russia in a demand upon Japan that it give up Port Arthur, which it had just taken from the Chinese. The interest of Russia and therefore of its ally, France, was plain enough. Russia wanted the port itself. Germany's interference seemed entirely uncalled for and provoked much resentment in Japan. This combination against Japan threw that country upon England and resulted in the Anglo-Japanese alliance which now gives the Japanese fleet an excuse to attack the German port of Kiao-chau.

In 1896, the day after the Jameson raiders were captured by the Boers, the Emperor William congratulated President Kruger that it had been done "without appealing to the help of the friendly Powers." This direct slap at England was met by the formation of a flying squadron and by calling attention to the London Convention reserving supervision of the foreign relations of the Transvaal to England. Later the Emperor snubbed Kruger and was very friendly to England, but the incident served to set English public opinion against the Kaiser almost until the rise of the German navy gave England a renewed feeling of coolness.

In 1898, after Admiral Dewey had defeated the Spanish fleet in Manila, Admiral Diederich

with a German fleet entered the harbour and sounded the English admiral, who arrived about the same time, as to what his attitude would be were Germany to try to force the American fleet to give up Manila. The answer was sufficient to prevent any move on the part of the German admiral, but not to prevent a feeling against the German Government.

In 1905, the Emperor in person landed in Morocco, where France felt it had particular claims. As a result of this visit the Sultan refused to accept the French programme and asked for a conference with representatives of the leading Powers to advise him. M. Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, protested that France would attend to the matter alone. The German Chancellor, Von Bülow, used threatening language. France submitted, M. Delcassé resigned. The "mailed fist" had been successful and another country was provoked against Germany.

In 1908 Austria took over Bosnia and Herzegovina, England and Russia protesting that this was against the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin. Russia intimated that the annexation of Slav provinces might lead to its interference. The German Emperor responded with a threat of instant mobilization. Russia had not recovered from its Manchurian campaigns, and the Tsar had to back down. Again the "mailed fist" was successful and another nation was given a grievance against Germany.

In 1909 an agreement was made with France concerning Morocco. All was seemingly satisfactory when on the July 1, 1911, the First Secretary

of the German Embassy called upon the French Foreign Minister to inform him of Germany's decision to send a warship to Agadir. The cruiser *Panther* served as the "mailed fist" this time. She failed of her mission. France was not intimidated as before, but the incident was fresh fuel to the French feeling against Germany.

In July 1900, at the launching of the *Wittelsbach*, William II declared that the "ocean was indispensable to German greatness":

"The ocean teaches us that on its waves and on its most distant shores no great decision can any longer be taken without Germany and *without the German Emperor*. I do not think that it was in order to allow themselves to be excluded from big foreign affairs that thirty years ago our people, *led by their princes*, conquered and shed their blood. Were the German people to let themselves be treated thus, it would be, and for ever, the end of their world-power; and I do not mean that that shall ever cease. To employ, in order to prevent it, the suitable means, if need be."

The Emperor has carried out his policies. Germany has not been excluded from big foreign affairs. No great decision has been taken without Germany and the German Emperor. But the net result of the activity has been to leave Germany nearly isolated when the great war came—in the very predicament in which Bismarck used to manœuvre the enemies of Germany before provoking war. Moreover, he has forgotten Bismarck's maxim that "success essentially depends upon the impression which the origination of the

war makes upon us and others ; it is important that we should be the party attacked."

Whatever the provocation in this war, Germany actually declared war first on Russia and France.

There is another policy or rather belief which the Emperor William inherits. It is exemplified in the speech he made as late as 1910, in which he said :

"Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, without heeding the views and opinions of the day, I go my way."

Against the spread of democratic principles the Kaiser stands as the first defence. Behind him are the Emperor of Austria and the Tsar. But the German Emperor, the champion of Teutonism against the Slav, is the defender of autocracy of which the Tsar is the best exponent. The German Emperor's insistence on his divine right has lost Germany the sympathy of the democratic countries of the world.

At Oxford this year the German Ambassador to England was given an honorary degree, and in giving it the college authorities dwelt upon the fact that the strained situation between England and Germany that was acute in 1911 had been entirely relieved. A few days later six English battleships were in the friendly harbour of Kiel during the great Kiel Week. Officers of both nations danced gaily on the decks of the British Dreadnought *Ajax*.

Five weeks later the *Ajax* with a great fleet was in the North Sea "to capture or destroy" their hosts of but a short time before.

The German Emperor cut short his yearly visit

to Norway. President Poincaré hurried back from Russia to France, Earl Kitchener was stopped on his way to Egypt and brought back to organize England for war. Germany's threat prevented Russia disturbing Austria's Balkan policies once before. The "mailed fist" had worked against almost every country in Europe and yet no war had occurred. Then suddenly it fell; Germany's threat of mobilization was met by mobilization elsewhere, and the Emperor found himself isolated, fighting half the world and with little sympathy from the other half. With him is only Austria, which precipitated the struggle and to whose assistance he went.

AUSTRIA'S CASE

By AN AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT

This article was written before Great Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary, and is included on the principle of hearing both sides.

At this portentous moment in history, when the activities of Austria-Hungary in the Near East have suddenly been made a world-issue by the outbreak of the most terrible war in the history of civilization, the aims and methods of the dual monarchy are of paramount significance.

Situated upon the outskirts of Central Europe, in the debatable region between the West and the East, Austria stands in a peculiar sense as the connecting link between civilization and vanishing barbarism, between to-day and yesterday. The double eagle of Austria is the symbol that connects racial fragments in a civic bond which spells progress and peace. The aims of Austria, whether in the Balkans or farther east, are mainly commercial and cultural. They are political only in so far as the geographical situation of the dual Empire makes it incumbent upon her statesmen to maintain her territorial integrity and to provide for the normal expansion of her industrial output.

The attempt to centralize and Germanize the Austrian Empire as a whole has been twice made—once under the Emperor Joseph II, toward the end of the eighteenth century, and again under Francis Joseph after the suppression of the revolution of 1848. In each case the attempt failed, and it was abandoned as impracticable by the present Emperor-King. Hungary had always retained its old liberties under the hegemony of the Magyars. By the compromise of 1867 the dual form of the monarchy was definitely fixed. So carefully were the rights of the various races in the Empire safeguarded under this readjustment that in Hungary, for instance, the Croats were recognized as a separate entity, under their own Ban or Governor, their separate Diet, and their distinct machinery of local and provincial administration.

In Austria proper the constitution of 1867 created a central parliament in Vienna and left a large measure of autonomy to the old provinces. One of the most important articles of the constitution guarantees to every nationality the free use of its language “in word and writing.” By this means it made for ever impossible any attempt to interfere with the legitimate aspirations of the various races in the Empire. In fact, the entire spirit of the new constitution was to assure to each race the greatest and freest use of its language in its educational system, from the primary school to the university, in the Diets, in the provincial legislatures and in the administration, excluding only the ministries at Vienna, and in the courts with the sole exception of the Supreme Court in the imperial capital.

Even to this last reservation in favour of a central authority an exception is made. In Polish litigation the entire process of litigation and judicature, including the highest court, may be carried on in the Polish language.

Only in the army common to the Empire is there a common language, and that language is the German. This arrangement is not based upon any propaganda, but is the outcome of the entirely practical consideration that an army made up of so many races as is the Austro-Hungarian would be badly handicapped in the performance of its duties if it did not have a common language of command and communication. The selection of the German language for this purpose was the logical outcome of the German origin of the Empire.

The tangible result of this practically unlimited freedom of race-development is presented by the present complexion of the Reichstag in Vienna. So long as the franchise was based upon property qualifications the votes of the landed proprietors kept a disunited German majority in the Reichstag, but the granting of universal suffrage upon the personal initiative of the Emperor a few years ago resulted in the return of a Slavic majority in the imperial legislative chamber—a remarkable result if one is to believe the persistent charges that Austria has sought to destroy or Germanize the Slavic nationalities within its boundaries.

This presence of a Slavic majority in the chamber has brought about a state of affairs wherein no Austrian administration can neglect the wishes of the Slavic groups without being forced to resort

to the short-lived and unpopular expedient of imperial decrees.

Thanks to its liberal treatment of the claims of contending nationalities, the German element in many parts of Austria is already on the defensive, and the ascendancy of the Slav element is more and more felt in the political and intellectual life of the Empire. The Slav has taken the offensive all along the line, and the Germans have lost many important positions in the civil and financial administration and in the courts. Bohemia is the centre of the Slavic movement. In Prague, the capital of Bohemia, the new Czech university is a dangerous rival to the old German university, the renowned Carolina, founded in 1348 by the Emperor Charles of Luxemburg. This Czech university has become the focus of Slav science, literature, and thought—and, unfortunately, also of pan-Slavic agitation, as hundreds of Servian and Croatian students have flocked to its gates to be imbued with the dreams of the future universal Slavic domination.

In the midst of these contending racial forces, the mission of Austria has been, first, to introduce among the great Slavic populations within her borders the ideals of German culture and German civilization. Her greatest achievements in this direction have been in Bohemia. It is recognized by the Slavic world universally that the Slavic movement in Prague is the outcome of German culture inculcated by Austria. It is one of the tragic circumstances of history that the German culture imparted to the Czechs is now operating in favour of the pan-Slavic cause, intellectual and political.

In the east, the mission of Austria has been suggestively indicated by the flow of the Danube. Eastward and southward, with the current of the mighty river, have gone Austrian cultural and industrial activities, hand in hand. And one of the earliest stations of the commercial and moral expansion—the stations of Austria's *Drang nach Osten*—are Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The destinies of Bosnia and Herzegovina came under the purview of Austria in 1876-77, when the revolutionary movement in the provinces, in conjunction with the Servian war against Turkey, was suppressed with unexampled severities by the Ottoman Government. At that time the natural refuge for the stricken Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina was Austria. Two hundred thousand of them were cast upon the resources of the authorities and had to be taken care of. As there was no promise of the immediate amelioration of the stricken provinces, the question of the day at Vienna became the final solution of the problem of introducing order and personal security in the territory infested by brigands and terrorized by official severities, just across the Turkish border.

The relation of Austria to Bosnia and Herzegovina duplicated in a marked degree that of the United States and Texas during the Texan uprising against Mexico, and the solution of the problem in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as in that of Texas, appeared to be an Austrian occupation. This destiny of the distracted provinces was recognized by the Congress of Berlin, which adjusted the affairs of south-eastern Europe after the defeat of Turkey by Russia in 1877.

The congress, after a thorough balancing of international interests and international jealousies, handed over the two provinces to Austria for pacification and administration, and conceded to Austria the right to occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar, the narrow strip of territory which lay between Servia and Montenegro. This occupation was in the nature of a condominium with Turkey.

Installed in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the mandate of Europe, Austria entered upon its task of cleaning the Augean stable of Bosnian affairs with an energetic realization of the difficulties of its undertaking. The first obstacle that confronted the newly installed authorities was an uprising of the Begs, or Mohammedan nobility. Aroused by the land-owning Moslems, secretly instigated by the Sultan, they undertook to oppose by force of arms the peaceful entrance of Austria into its new functions. The outcome of the contumacy of the Begs was a six months' war, which ended in the suppression of the Moslem resistance and the restoration of internal peace. Next, Austria undertook the task of cleaning out the brigands who infested the country and made travel and commerce practically impossible.

Side by side with measures for the pacification of the provinces and the restoration of internal order, the new Austrian administration accomplished wonders in the construction of a system of roads, the first that Bosnia and Herzegovina had had since the Ottoman conquest.

The land question in the newly occupied provinces was extremely delicate. When Austria marched into Bosnia she found there a survival

of the feudal ages in the distribution of the land. The entire area of the provinces, with rare exceptions, was owned by the Beggars, and the tenants who cultivated them for the scant reward of one-half the produce were in a condition of serfdom. Two alternative solutions of the question presented themselves. One was the forcible expropriation of the lands of the nobles, and the other was the gradual distribution of the holdings through a period of years.

It is one of the foremost grievances of the Servian agitators on the Austrian border provinces that the administration of the dual monarchy did not at once proceed to the seizure of the land and its distribution among the peasantry by arbitrary means, after the method employed by the Servians after the fall of the Ottoman power in Servia. Such, however, was not the Austrian method of dealing with the rights of property, and it had been understood by the signatories to the treaty of Berlin that no agrarian revolutionary measures would be undertaken by Austria.

Baron Kallay, the first Austrian civil administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, adopted the much more equitable and on the whole far more successful plan of encouraging thrift among the peasants, and at the same time enabling them to achieve independence by the gradual acquisition of the lands they cultivated. This conservative reorganization of the agrarian system of the country was accomplished through the aid of the Land Bank of Bosnia, an institution of private finance under the rigid supervision of the Government. Baron Kallay's project, which produced highly

satisfactory results, was carried on by his successors, Burian and Bilinski.

The educational problem of the provinces was no less difficult than that presented by the distribution of the land. When Austria entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, she found no schools there, with the exception of a few mosque classes and madrasahs for the chanting of Arabic prayers and verses from Al Koran. Far from attempting to make German the language of the people, or even the language of the more highly educated among them, the Austrian authorities at once undertook the establishment of native schools, in which the instruction should be carried on in Serb or in Croatian, the former written in the Cyrillic or Bulgarian alphabet, and the latter in Latin characters. Not only was no attempt made to introduce German schools, but the Government declined to permit the expenditure of public money for instruction in any language except the two named idioms of the Slavic language.

This liberal policy stands out in sharp contrast to the destructive activities of the Servians in the newly occupied Macedonian lands, where they have closed all the Bulgarian schools amid circumstances of severity, to which some reference is made in the Report of the Carnegie Commission. Certainly there is nothing in the establishment of Serb schools by Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina to justify the contention of the Servians that Austria is seeking to crush out Serb nationality under the rule of the double eagle.

Nevertheless, the Servian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following closely the Servian

propaganda in its first stage in Macedonia, was conducted along cultural lines, quite regardless of the palpable fact that the people of Servia themselves stood in need of all the cultural efforts of which their Government and their financial resources were capable. This fact is easily demonstrable when it is remembered that in 1909 the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after thirty years of Austrian administration, stood higher educationally than any of the independent Slavic nations of the Balkan Peninsula. Despite the manifestly hostile purposes of the so-called cultural Servian propaganda in the border provinces, the Austrian authorities took no measures to combat it until it had entered the phase of bomb-throwing, in which the Servians had become adepts in the course of their abortive struggle for the conversion of Macedonia to Serbism. And that final and intolerable phase of the Serb nationalist propaganda was close at hand. The crisis began in 1909, when the Austrian Government declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This annexation was based upon three essential considerations, each one of which would have been considered sufficient in itself by any nation. The first of these considerations was the mandate of Europe ; the second was the right of conquest, established at the beginning of the occupation by the suppression of the armed resistance of the recalcitrant Begs ; the third was the expenditure of about £50,000,000 by the dual monarchy for the construction of railways and other means of communication, public works of various sorts, and education and local improvements ; and the

fourth was the duty of continuing a régime which had brought peace and prosperity to the country itself. All the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin readily acquiesced in the accomplished fact as a logical outcome of accomplished events.

Servia, however, conceived that it had been robbed by the act of the Austrian Government, and the press of that country launched a campaign of bitter and indecent vilification of the dual monarchy. The contention of the Serbs that they were entitled to the annexed provinces was based upon two considerations, each easily demonstrable as absurd. The first was that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been a part of the great Servian Empire under Stefan Dushan about five hundred years ago. This argument may best be compared with a Mexican claim to Texas because that state had formerly been a part of Mexico. And the Servian pretension to Bosnia-Herzegovina is very much weaker than the hypothetical Mexican claim to possession of Texas, because the inclusion of the contested provinces in the gigantic empire of Dushan (The Strangler), which was only one-tenth as large as the State of Texas, lasted, as did the empire, only about twenty years.

The second basis of the Servian claim to Bosnia-Herzegovina is the allegation that the provinces are inhabited by people of Serb race, of Servian language and of Serb faith. Not one of these contentions even approaches the facts. Of the less than two millions of people who populate the provinces, only 800,000 at the most are orthodox Serbs. The remainder are Roman Catholic Croats, whose written language the Orthodox

Serb cannot even read unless he has a knowledge of the Latin characters, or Mohammedans, who detest the Servians heartily and despise them profoundly.

The frothing protests which the Servian press continued to make against the act of annexation, it was realized clearly at Vienna, were instigated partly from St. Petersburg, where the statesmen saw, or pretended to see, a fresh sign of Austrian encroachment upon the Southern Slavs, those dear Southern Slavs whose destinies have been for centuries the pawns on the chessboard of Russian diplomacy. But the Russian statesmen did not observe, or, observing, did not care to admit, that Austria, while annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, had definitely abandoned her alleged road to Salonika by the withdrawal of her troops from the Sanjak of Novibazar, which was the key to the military situation in any advance farther south and east. A glance at the map will convince even the most hostile critic of Austrian policy in the Balkans that the abandonment of Novibazar by Austria is incompatible with any suspicion of an Austrian design of territorial expansion in the direction of Salonika or of Constantinople.

Thus events wore on toward the culminating tragedy of Serajevo. In 1913 the Serbs had attained a wild dream through the annexation of a large part of Bulgarian Macedonia by the defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War. The Servian campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina, following out its previous metamorphosis in the Macedonian agitation that preceded the alliance with Bulgaria for the first Balkan War, emerged

from the "cultural" stage and entered the bomb-throwing phase. The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort at Serajevo by a young Serb patriot this summer startled the world and aroused Austria to the imperative need of energetic action to put a check upon a political and racial movement which had degenerated into a conspiracy to commit murder.

The tremendous events which have cast the world in gloom since July 23, are the outcome of Servia's resistance to Austria's demand for a cessation of this orgy of violence. The Servians have opposed Austria's civilizing mission with unpardonable venom, and Austria has not flinched before the task of undertaking to crush that opposition.

ITALY'S HATRED OF AUSTRIA

WHY SHE HELD BACK FROM HER ALLIES OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

THE reason why Italy held off from her allies in the Triple Alliance is written large in her history. The grandfather of the present king of Italy, Victor Emmanuel, of Sardinia, with Cavour's guidance, made an alliance with Napoleon III and picked a quarrel with Austria in 1859 much as Bismarck in 1866 made a treaty with Italy and picked a quarrel with Austria. In each case these nation-builders deliberately provoked war as a means to the unification of their country. In the campaigns of 1859, Lombardy was taken from Austria. In 1866, in alliance with Prussia, Italy went to war with Austria again, this time, chiefly as a result of the Prussian victory at Sadowa, receiving Venetia from Austria. Austria was held to be the chief enemy of Italy's independence and unity. Despite this, however, in 1882 Italy joined Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance. This unnatural alignment was entered into chiefly because France, Italy's normal ally, had blocked her colonial ambitions in Tunis. Yet the alliance never made Austria popular with Italians, nor did it cover the Mediterranean or the Adriatic. The head of the

Adriatic is a constant source of enmity between Italy and Austria. In Trieste and Fiume, sea-ports of Austria, the population is chiefly Italian. Italy has always coveted not only these ports but the Albanian shore of the Adriatic as well. She looks with suspicion upon the German-Austrian attempts to dominate the Balkans. Early in the Italian-Turkish War Italy began to bombard the Albanian coast, then held by Turkey. She was immediately warned off from Avlona by Austria. This added fresh vigour to the old antipathy. Again, the tension over the control of the Adriatic was so acute during the Balkan War that there was even a possibility of hostilities between Italy and Austria. When, therefore, the question of renewing the Triple Alliance came up in 1913, it was only with great difficulty that Germany succeeded in getting Italy to join it again, even though it was only a defensive alliance and did not include the Mediterranean. The Italians look upon securing Trieste and the control of the Adriatic as the French look upon reconquering Alsace and Lorraine.

Austria stands fair in the path of this ambition. The memory of former wars and the recognition of present conflicting policies make the Italian people unwilling to support Austria. The Italian Government's decision that it was not bound to help Austria and Germany because they were not engaged in a defensive war, relieved it from entering upon a warlike policy which would probably have failed of public support.

Moreover, Italy has nothing to gain by a war against the Triple Entente, unless it might be part

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of France's North African possessions. The chance of acquiring these would hardly be worth exposing a long coast-line to the French and English Mediterranean fleets. On the contrary, a German-Austrian victory would almost certainly work harm to Italy's hope of control in the Adriatic.

THE BALKANS

THE GREATER SERBIA IDEA WHICH BROUGHT ON
THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT—THE SANJAK
OF NOVIBAZAR, A LITTLE-KNOWN LOCALITY
THAT WAS ONE OF THE PRIME CAUSES OF WAR

At the present time the most interesting thing about the Balkans is the idea of a greater Serbia.

In Serbia itself, including territory recently acquired, there are about 4,500,000 Serbs. In Montenegro there are perhaps 500,000. In Austria there are nearly 3,500,000 Serbs and Croats who belong to the Serbian race.

The Serbians dream and talk and write of a greater Serbian kingdom that shall take in all the Serbian race. They want it to take in more than that. They want it to take in Bulgaria also. They look back to the time of King Stephen Dushan (fourteenth century) and his French wife, when Serbia was supreme in the Balkans and was nearly as advanced in civilization as the great nations of Europe. They feel that the recent battle of Kumanova against the Bulgarians atones for the battle on the plains of Kossovo in 1389, which put Serbia under Turkish rule—a battle about which the Serbian peasants still sing folk-lore ballads. The re-establishment of this ancient

kingdom has become a passion with the Serbs, not only those in Serbia, but many of those in Hungary as well. These Serbs might have become satisfied with Hungarian rule if it had been more enlightened, but the Magyars have followed a repressive policy in trying to Magyarize the races under their domination. No matter whose fault it is, the fact remains that the Serbs of Hungary have watched with eagerness and delight the recent successes of Serbia.

As explained by Mr. Morton Fullerton, in his "Problems of Power": "Up to 1905 this little nations of farmers and stock-breeders (in 1912, Serbian exports amounted to about one hundred million francs, out of which 62 per cent. was represented by the products of the soil, and 20 per cent. by cattle and pork), remained in economic subjection to Austria. Austria's dream was to annex Serbia to her great composite Empire. Whenever Serbia displayed signs of political independence, Austria, who all but monopolized Serbian exports, began the economic blackmailing of her imprisoned neighbour by closing her markets to Serbian pork and beef. A Serbian statesman, M. Pashitch, resolved to put an end to these humiliations. In 1906 he proposed a customs union between the three Slav states of the Balkans, and thus took the first step towards the formation of that Balkan Confederation which six years later was to astonish the world. Serbian livestock was partially diverted from the old Austrian routes and transported by the Danube, the Ludwigs-Canal, and the Main to German markets. A second outlet for Serbian products was procured

at Varna by means of concessions accorded on the Bulgarian railways. A favourable treaty of commerce was arranged with France. Little by little the old trade-current through Bosnia and to the Dalmatian coast was diminished and Serbia was now selling her pork and cereals, without the Austrian middleman, through the channel of the Black Sea ports and Salonika, in all the Mediterranean ports, from Syria by way of Egypt to Italy. The need of direct communication between the Danube and the Adriatic became steadily more obvious, and Serbian claims to economic autonomy, the only form of independence which in the modern world is the sign of political autonomy, became more and more legitimate. Austrian imports fell from 60 per cent. to 35 per cent. Then came the war of 1912. Within only a few days after the opening of hostilities, Austria beheld the Serbian troops in possession of Uskub, of old Serbia, of a large portion of the sanjak of Novi-bazar, and rapidly making for the Adriatic coast-line. A national policy of more than thirty years was thereby suddenly stultified. Serbia had burst her bounds, and was no longer the ward of the Dual Monarchy. In an adroit appeal addressed to English sympathy, through the *Times* (November 24, 1912), the Serbian Prime Minister, M. Pashitch, explained that independence of trade and economic liberty were not only necessary for Serbia's development, and even for her existence, but also advantageous to the world; an Adriatic outlet, he argued, would give Serbia new neighbours, "since every maritime nation would then be Serbia's neighbour as much as Austria is to-day." Serbia

was particularly happy at the thought that she was thus to secure direct contact with England, and to live henceforth in close relations with the nations of the West."

In 1908, when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia felt that at any time it might be the next victim. The army which was launched first against the Turks and then against the Bulgars was originally prepared to meet an Austrian-Hungarian advance. It is now fulfilling that mission. Austria-Hungary has naturally chafed at the growth of a greater Serbian kingdom which would mean not only the loss of her Serb provinces but also the end of her ambition for further outlets on the Adriatic and the *Ægean*. The Dual Monarchy has felt that not only Serbians individually but the Serbian Government itself was preaching this hostile doctrine. A former prime minister, Count Aehrenthal, tried to show the complicity of the Serbian Government in the famous Agram trials, but it was proved that his evidence was forged. Nevertheless, the fundamental situation remained. Serbia's success in the Balkan War was propaganda enough. Sooner or later, without the Serbian Government's moving a finger, the Serbs of Hungary were likely to revolt. A successful Serbia was therefore a perpetual menace to Austrian peace and integrity. When a Serb killed the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Austria saw its opportunity to remove the constant menace from its frontier. It took his death as the excuse, and declared war.

If this were all the story the war would have been localized to these two countries. But Russia's

policy has been to encourage the Slav kingdom of Serbia in territory where the Powers will not let her go herself. On the other hand, Germany has always hoped to reach the East through its ally, Austria. Before the last Balkan War there was a strip of territory, the sanjak of Novibazar, belonging to Turkey, which ran up between Serbia and Montenegro and touched Austria. Through this route Austria, and through Austria, Germany hoped to reach the Ægean and the East. After the Balkan War Serbia and Montenegro took this territory and put a solid line of Slav domination across the path of German-Austrian ambitions.

Unless the policy of years—the *Drang nach Osten*—was to be given up, here was another fundamental reason why Austria and the greater Serbia idea could not live peaceably together.

In no country in the world has the question of population caused so much bitter dispute as in the Balkans. Because of racial and national animosities and jealousies, census figures have been deliberately padded and falsified, especially in that territory which was, until recently, European Turkey. Only in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece proper have genuine census enumerations been made.

Bulgaria claims to have had a population, in 1910, before the war, of about 4,337,000, this being increased since the war, through new territory, by about half a million. Serbia reported 2,900,000 in 1910, the new territory increasing this by a little more than 1,500,000. In Greece the population was 2,730,000 before the war and

now is almost 4,400,000. Little Montenegro, one hundred miles in length by a bare eighty in width, adds a trifle more than 500,000 to the total. The estimate for Albania, on a conservative basis, is about 800,000.

It is in the proportionate numbers of the various races and nationalities, however, that the greatest confusion exists. Nowhere in the world is there such a variety of different peoples intermingling with each other.

Broadly classified, the Slavs, Turks, and the Greeks are the chief elements. Of these three, the Slavs predominate by a vast majority, but they again are sharply subdivided into two branches; the Bulgars and the Serbians.

The consensus of opinion would indicate that the Greeks predominate in the large cities and towns and along the seacoasts. In the interior they are not found much north of Salonika. Greeks in the cities are found as far north as Varna and Bourgas, and even on the other side of the Danube, in Roumania, most of them being engaged in commercial vocations.

In the interior the Bulgarians claim that they constitute the main bulk of the population down almost to the foot of Mount Olympus and as far west as Albania, up to Old Serbia, although the Serbians affirm that many of these people are really Serbians Bulgarized. Thence, up to the old frontiers and over into Montenegro the Serbians preponderate.

The Turks are nowhere found in a solid mass, but they are scattered over almost the entire Balkans, even up in the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nowhere are they more

numerous than in northern Bulgaria, along the banks of the Danube, and in the northern cities of Varna and Bourgas they still form a considerable portion of the population. The Bulgarian census figures give their number at almost 500,000, about a seventh of the total population. Serbia only admits having 14,000 Turks within her territory, but this is undoubtedly an under-estimate. There is no doubt that the Serbians have been energetic in driving the Turks out of Serbia during their longer period of independence.

Of the minor race divisions the Albanians deserve first mention. They are supposed to be the direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians, who have remained racially pure on account of the mountainous character of their country. While the majority are Mohammedans by faith, they differ markedly from the Turks, being rough in their manners, less fanatical in matters of religion, and not at all inclined toward steady pursuits. They are still in the patriarchal stage of social development, living in clans as did the highlanders of Scotland two centuries ago.

Next to the Albanians in numbers come the Jews. These are the direct descendants of the Jews who were driven out of Spain during the period of the Inquisition by Torquemada and were so hospitably received by the Sultan of Turkey. To this day their speech does not differ very much from modern Spanish. Up in Bulgaria they number nearly 40,000, and farther south they become more numerous. In Salonika, now a Greek city, the Jews form a big majority of the population, numbering about 100,000 out of a

mixed total of 174,000. Almost to a man they are engaged in trade. They have always had friendly relations with the Turks and have enjoyed many special favours under the Turkish Government.

The Wallachs are another considerable portion of the population throughout the Balkans, especially in the mountainous regions. They have usually been classified as Roumanians, but they differ somewhat from the Roumanians in Roumania proper.

Another scattered element is the Gipsy, especially in Bulgaria and Serbia. These people are the lowest in standards of living and culture of all the Balkan races. While all of them speak Turkish their natural tongue differs from any other Balkan dialect. They call themselves "Copts," which alone would indicate their Egyptian origin.

Although the Serbians and the Bulgarians, forming the biggest element in the Balkans, are classified as Slavs, there is still a striking difference in racial characteristics between them. The Bulgar, slow, heavy, inclined to be morose and tongue-tied, suspicious of strangers, uncouth, is not really a pure Slav. Originally the country which he now occupies was populated by an Asiatic race, called Volgars, because of their having come from the River Volga. It is supposed that they and the Hungarians and the Finns are of the same origin.

Later the Slavic hordes overran the country, sweeping down to the borders of Greece. The Bulgars were completely overcome and assimilated with the Slavs. To-day not a trace of their original tongue remains, the language of the

Bulgarians being the purest of all the Slavic dialects, not excepting even the Russian. But they still retain certain physical and temperamental characteristics that are distinctly not Slavic, such as their rather dark features and stolidity.

The Serbians are everything that the Bulgarians are not. Physically they are fairer and more refined in appearance. By temperament they are light-hearted, joyous, frivolous, and charming to deal with. Their country being more suited for defence, they were never completely overrun by the Turks, and as a consequence they still retain, like the Greeks, a native aristocracy of culture.

The Turks, too, present some wide differences of race. In the north of Bulgaria, along the banks of the Danube, there is a strong Tartar strain among them, whereas farther south many of them are simply converted Bulgars, called Pomaks, speaking the same tongue as their Christian neighbours, but hating them cordially.

Nor is there to be found a permanent friendship between any of these elements. That they could unite, even temporarily, during the attack upon Turkey was the wonder of wonders to all who have an acquaintance with the peoples of the Balkans. This mutual animosity has its foundation in history as well as in difference of race. In recent times Serbia and Bulgaria have fought each other twice. The Greeks have a universal prejudice against all Slavs, wherever they live.

In 1884, when Bulgaria took over the rebellious province of Eastern Rumelia from Turkey, Russia, fearing the menace of a territorially

aggrandized Bulgaria, yet not daring to interfere openly on account of the attitude of Great Britain, persuaded the Serbians to attack Bulgaria. The Serbians were completely routed in one three-day battle, for which defeat Russia was never able to forgive Bulgaria. On their side the Bulgarians, though feeling a warm affinity for the Russian people, have always violently hated the Russian autocracy. Nowhere in Europe have the Russian political exiles found a surer refuge than in Bulgaria. Of all countries this is the only one which has steadily refused to molest these refugees at the behest of the Russian police.

Serbia, on the contrary, has always looked to Russia as its protector against the aggressions of the Austrians. As a natural political result Bulgaria has found it necessary to maintain an understanding with Austria, to counteract the continual Russian intrigues against Bulgarian independence. Aside from that policy, of which the mass of the people know little, the Bulgarian has little sentiment to waste for the "Schwab," as he calls all Germans. In any general upheaval it is more than likely that politics would be forgotten if the will of the people were consulted, and Bulgaria would stand side by side with the Russians.

With the exception of the northern Albanians, who are chiefly adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, all the Christians of the Balkan countries belong to what is generally known as the Eastern, or Greek, Catholic Church. At one time it was really the Greek Church, with the Patriarch at the head, which included them all within its flocks. But after the liberation of Serbia and Bulgaria

these countries formed separate churches, between which and the original Greek Church there existed an animosity which was not felt toward the Roman Church. As the various Governments have warred for territory, so these churches have fought for adherents. The original Greek Church carried its propaganda so far that it organized bands of armed men who overran parts of Macedonia, forcing the adherents of the other churches to declare themselves Greeks, the alternative being the destruction of their villages, cattle, and even themselves and families. Nor were these empty threats; actually thousands of people, both men and women, were killed by these terrorists of the Church and dozens of villages were burned. The peasants, on their part, organized armed bands to protect themselves against the Greek Church, and many were the bloody fights engaged in by these armed bands, the Turkish soldiers supporting the forces of the Church while the peasantry gave aid and comfort to the informal militia bands. Hardly a peasant in the mountain regions but has been out at least once in a general or local insurrection against the Turks or against the terrorist bands of the Greek Church.

HOLLAND DEFENDED BY WATER

BY LETTING IN WATER THAT KEEPS
OUT THE ENEMY

WATER is the only means of defence of the low countries. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has no hills and to keep the heart of the country intact it is obliged to sacrifice many miles of territory which during the course of ages she has gained upon the ocean. Instead of a defensive line of hills Holland has a defensive line of water. The Dutch Government never has been very liberal with the details of its waterline defence, and the fortifications which, in time of peace, look like artificial hills covered with a luxurious coat of grass, can never be approached by the curious tourist without an immediate warning not to come too near and to refrain from getting a very thorough look at these strangely shaped mounds.

In case of danger the Government would be removed from The Hague to Amsterdam. The troops in the outlying provinces would slowly retreat, destroying the bridges across the large southern rivers and thus stopping the progress of the enemy for several days. They would then occupy the fortifications around Amsterdam and make ready for a siege. The German invader

might come as far as the dykes of the old bed of the River Rhine, but from there on he would meet with grave difficulties. The large artificial lake which would be formed by opening the locks of the canals near Ymuiden and Katwyk and the dykes near Amsterdam would, within twenty-four hours, cover the entire countryside with a sheet of water which is too deep to be crossed by a wading force, and which at the same time is too shallow to allow the use of armed vessels. It is true that modern siege guns might fire across this expanse of water. But the nature of the ground of the outlying territory is such that it will be so thoroughly drenched after a few hours contact with water that no heavy siege gun can be posted upon the muddy substance.

The system of defence is a desperate one. It will mean the loss of untold millions. It will mean the undoing of the work of five or six centuries. But in case the independence of Holland is attacked it is the only means by which the people can show their aversion to foreign domination; and in the past they have several times made the sacrifice.

THE TASK OF THE ALLIES

BY AUSTIN HARRISON

THE Spartan example set by the Belgians, set by the defenders of Liège, has given the watchword to Allied Europe. It is clear that the Germans never anticipated resistance in Belgium, that they expected the mere presence of the German soldiery in Belgian territory to strike the "terror" needful for submission. For years Belgium has been assiduously "courted" *ad hoc* by Germany, apart from the pan-German racial pretension. When King Leopold went to Berlin at the time of the "Congo Atrocities" the whole German press welcomed him with adulations. Only the other day the Kaiser was received "royally" at Brussels. For a long time past in pan-German circles Belgium has been called the "West Mark." But the military evidence alone is enough to show that the Emperor confidently thought that his regiments would march through "smiling" Belgium, pushing through into France, and so fall upon the French unexpectedly from behind and crumble up the necessarily long French line of defence on the frontiers.

The Belgians have frustrated the whole German "surprise," which was to strike quickly and

decisively. Without any doubt, Liège will stand out as one of the great corner-stones in history. As a military achievement it will take rank among the most heroic achievements of all time; but apart from its positive influence upon the German plan, its moral influence will be decisive upon the entire future course of the campaign. Caught unawares, ignored and attacked solely because she was supposed to be "helpless," Belgium has been plunged into the horrors of war, invaded and brutalized in a manner reminiscent only of Prussia's attack on Denmark in 1864, as part of the then German scheme of territorial aggrandizement; and Belgium has shattered the great myth of German invincibility, has arrested the treacherous offensive of Berlin, has given the call to civilization to rise up and shatter the monstrous war-madness of the Emperor at last revealed in his true light to an astounded Europe.

The duty and task of Allied Europe is thus defensive and punitive. Civilization stands to-day in the position it was forced into a century ago, only the cannibalism this time comes from Germany. At the present moment the honour of peoples is at stake. The cause for which the Allied Forces have been compelled to take up arms is the sacred cause of Liberty. Law, progress, respect for national and civic rights, responsibilities and obligations, communal and individual decency, all that civilization has learnt to prize and uphold, all that man holds dear—his home, his liberty, his country, his independence—these things Europe is fighting for with an absolutely clean conscience. Not a nation in

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Europe wanted war a month ago. We who have no quarrel with the Germans *qua* Germans, who admire them intensely, who demand nothing more than to live and let live, are fighting now once more the great battle of civilization, as we fought for it in the Napoleonic era. What Europe is fighting to-day is the madness of the greatest military monarchism the world has ever known. The Germans are fighting France and Russia, Belgium and England, not for any grievance political, diplomatic, economic, dynastic, princely or religious, but because for predatory motives their Emperor considered the time had come for the long-heralded German attack upon the old map of Europe; the barriers of peoples which shut out the German flag from the seas, which kept Germany a geographical prisoner in the centre of Europe, a map marked out, as Germans contend, during the period of shame and disintegration of the German peoples. It is a war of the Huns,* the deliberate attempt on the part of Germans to impose the doctrine of might upon Europe, to conquer and crush down nationalities, to break out over Europe after the manner of savage tribes, and spread by force the Germanic arm. In its entire conception the German invasion is Napoleonic. It is what Germans have long spoken of as the "Great Day." They are fighting to expand, ruthlessly to destroy, to superimpose Germanism

* "When you meet the foe you will smash him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Gain the reputation of the Huns of Attila."—The Kaiser to his troops (the Boxer Expedition, July 27, 1900).

upon Western and South Central Europe; to claim the mouths of the Rhine and the Danube, to flout every canon of civilization, to carry death and destruction into the hamlets of the weaker peoples and strangle their independence, to burn, slay and subjugate the less warlike civilizations for the glory of Teutonic ambition.

And this war is the logical and only possible result of the giant armament system imposed upon Europe in self-defence by German militarism. To the Allies it is thus in the truest sense of the word a religious war. No question of dogma, of "Holy Places." It is the struggle, the "bust-up," of materialism, the inevitable clash between the polarities of *Might versus Right* which govern Europe.

So European civilization stands upon its trial. The triumph of German arms would mean the breakdown of humanity under the despotism of Force. It would sanctify the rights of brute conquest, and destroy all vestige of national liberty in Europe. If the enthusiasm which inspires the German soldiers is glory, the fire glowing in the veins of every unit of the Allied Forces is the religious flame of justice. Never have peoples fought for a nobler cause. Every shot fired in its name is aimed against tyranny, brutality, military fanaticism, despotism, barbarism. The defence of the little peoples of Europe has become a sacred right. For failure spells ruin and the unutterable shame of what we call civilization. Success, the driving back of the Germanic invasion, means hope—the hope civilization will at last have won to—to realize itself for higher ends and truer purposes ;

to start afresh on nobler lines and for greater causes; to establish finer patterns of polity and social governance, happier conditions—to remove the incubus of the past.

This is certain. The German aim does not stop at the mere defeat of the French, the holding up of the Russian advance. It is far deeper. Germany's object is the deliberate attempt to fight to the coasts. On the way, France was to be crippled; Belgium to be annexed, and in all probability Holland; the Balkan States were to be crushed and devastated; Austria-Hungary was to effect the long-cherished "landslide" down to Constantinople; and as a result Denmark, too, would have been incorporated. These things have long been the avowed ambition of pan-Germans, of the Military Party, largely of intellectual Germany,* of the German women. It is a war of race. The technical cause of the war—Austria's claim to punish Serbia—is the merest pretext. Germany had but to find a diplomatic formula and Austria would have been permitted to chastise Serbia as much as she liked. She refused. At any time the Emperor could have stopped the crisis before the outbreak of hostilities. He refused. Germany had decided to strike. With the desperation that she decided to strike, so we may be sure she will fight.

Let no one think this war has been lightly engaged upon, or that the Germans will show a craven spirit. Whatever German strategy will reveal, we must count on a death struggle. To

* This is the war of aristocratic and middle-class Germany. The poor are only the tools of the German despotism.

the Germans, to the German Empire, above all to the Hohenzollern Emperor William, this war means life or death : on its issue the entire future of the German Empire depends, the fate of the German military classes, and of the Prussian military system—the *fate of the Kaiser*. He knows that German defeat carries with it his certain death. Born fanatic, soldier by the ancestral tradition of centuries, he will fight as Frederick fought, as the Barbarossas fought, as the Great Electors of Brandenburg fought, in the spirit of the “Mark.” The German Army will fight with him. As time goes on and German soldiers begin to realize the stupendous resistance they have conjured up, the magnitude of the task before them, we may be sure the national character of the struggle will fire them to deeds of magnificent bravery and stubbornness. To count on the breakdown of German finance would be quite wrong. To imagine that Germans at home will rise up in “peace demonstrations” is to misjudge the German character. On both sides now war is regarded as a religious duty. Every German will soon have it borne in upon him that he is fighting for his Fatherland, for the German place in history, for all that Bismarck and Moltke, Roon and the war of 1870 gave to him. He will die for these things. All the men who lead him are traditional soldiers—they will not fail. Germany, All-Germany, is fighting for history. They have gone into war determined to conquer at all costs, anyhow. They will wage war desperately, no matter what mistakes the German staff makes, no matter what holocausts are demanded of them.

Indeed, the mad storm of Liège proves it. Their whole military training is based on the principle of "shock tactics." Let us remember that, and respect these men. They will attack like the Japanese. The battles they will fight will be the bloodiest affairs in history.

That the Germans will make many mistakes, will sacrifice men ruthlessly and stupidly, is to be expected—"gun carrion" is the German soldier's trust. They have always scorned the lessons of the modern arm, revealed in the Boer War. "We can afford to lose men" is the axiom of German military science. Almost alone in Europe, the Germans have had no experience of modern warfare. The contingent they sent out to China was notoriously the worst equipped. At the manœuvres their serried ranks, their mass attacks and toy cavalry charges, have been the annual dismay of every foreign military attaché in the field. We may count confidently on terrible German losses, but we should remember that in German *Kriegsspiel* lives are of no account.

There is another point not to be overlooked—the Socialism in the army (over four millions voted "red" at the last elections); the known hatred of the men for their officers and serjeants, due to the brutality of the discipline. That, too, will play a part. There is a soul in all victorious armies, which, with the Germans, is lacking. Every French soldier worshipped Napoleon. To the German soldiers the Kaiser means nothing personal. Here the cynicism of modern materialistic Germany will work with deadly destruction. It is not conceivable that these Germans will fight

with the solidarity of the French and Belgians, fighting for their very homes. There can be no God with the Germans battling for vainglory. The spirit of brutality running right through the army is not an asset of strength in a struggle for life. We may be sure of that. When the real struggle for Germany begins, these things will count desperately.

None the less the Allies must be prepared to fight to the death. And Europe will win. Already the Belgians have struck the note of the war—the vindication of the little peoples. Once more, to the astonishment of Bismarckian Germany, it is a little nation which has saved Europe, united Europe as never before in the modern world. There is no question of diplomacy about it. The independence which Belgium is fighting for is the key to the whole situation. The German attack, which is the climax of monarchic and military alliances, systems and despotisms, has been challenged at the outset by what was regarded as the most insignificant military people in Europe. What Belgium has struck for is the old principle of Freedom. It is the justification of nationality, the ideal ruthlessly destroyed by Prussia and Bismarck, as a great many observers at the time, including Disraeli, predicted. Instead of an upholder of peace, the European system of Alliances—the Panjandrum Concert of the Powers—has been the inevitable cause of the conflagration—at the expense of the little peoples. It is for these peoples, primarily, that the Allies are fighting. Already their spirit has been seized in the Tsar's proclamation of independence to the Poles. So,

at the very beginning of the war, the fell work of Catherine, Maria Teresa, and Frederick has been swept away in the cause of humanity and national independence. It sounds the clarion call of Allied Europe. It is Europe's answer to Germanic invasion, the blast of Victory and Freedom.

At the end of this war there will be vast changes, upheavals and subversions. As civilization is now fighting for its life's justification, so as the inevitable result that civilization will change. The old order of things will go with the old ideas of Monarchical government, with the musty Feudal system of Kings and military autocracies which, as we have seen, have burst by process of self-combustion. Entirely new ideas, social and political, will come into the world, for militarism, as such, lies in its death grapple. The spirit of man will come into life as the result of his victory, and the old social systems which survive in Europe will disappear. The peoples will take over the right of war into their own hands. As the struggle for freedom, this is the people's war: it will be the people's victory. With it, a new political science will arise. Germany, who went into the war blessed by the Kaiser "with God," has shown up, as nothing else could, the inept anachronism of ecclesiastical Christianity powerless to prevent this hideous crime, yet invoked grotesquely by Germans to lead and anoint them. It is a quaint thought that the most Catholic country in the world started the war; that Catholic and Protestant Germans are fighting against Catholic and Protestant defenders. Insensate, hollow and power-

less, ecclesiastical wooden Christianity stands revealed to the world, and it will go with all the other mediæval legacies and shibboleths of antiquity. This war will be the great clearing-house of civilization. As its result, enlightened man will start anew. The fog of mediæval superstitions will be blown away. It will close the book of history as written by the schoolmen, the heroics of the Carlyles and the Treitschkes—the copybook history of Kings, with their courtiers' intrigues, battles, princely feuds, and chapters of religious tyranny. It is the final and inevitable cataclysm of rotten, effete, and mischievous survivals, heralding the dawn of a saner and nobler epoch.

All this is inevitable. For years civilization has stood on the brink of the *débâcle*. For years Europe has groaned under the insensate weight of armaments, hanging on the fear of this or that monarch's displeasure, entangled in the irresponsible and anachronistic system of secret diplomacy vested in the power of some half-dozen more or less unknown individuals. It is inconceivable that man—not to speak of modern woman—will emerge from this field of blood, the old-time pawn of militarism. When the dead are all buried, there will have to be a totally new conception of national responsibility, national government and authority. "Never again" will have to be the watchword of enlightened Europe, never again will men tolerate the old dark secrecy of Courts and Governments, the huge systems of military autocracy, the delirium of vested kingship. Fitly, logically, the European system has crumbled down,

because an Archduke * was assassinated, a man whom the Germans themselves regarded with undisguised mistrust : notoriously a religious fanatic, an element of discord and danger, whose advent to the throne was commonly spoken of by Austrians as the " storm signal " in Europe.

What form these changes will take, how they will take place, whether by internal revolutions or by the accord of the people's representatives, it is too early to predict, perhaps unwise to attempt to. But these changes will come sure enough. This war is the last struggle of old pipeclay Europe, its final act of desperation, inevitable and necessary. It is the breakdown of material greed, gross conceptions of life, false values, false idols, false gods and their derivative human mannequins, and its effects will purify and remodel the world.

In the meanwhile, the ghastly duty of Allied Europe is war—war carried on against the German invasion to the last extremities. We English once more have been favoured by fortune. The avowed enemy of this country, the people who were getting ready by every means in their power to challenge our supremacy on the seas, to destroy our navy, and wrest our Colonies from us—this enemy by the superlative folly of arrogant militarism now finds itself at grips not only with the two most powerful forces on land, but with the supreme power at sea. Almost it would seem a Providence watched over Britain's interests. For us—and the assertion is made in no spirit of brag-

* The full story of the murders has yet to be told. We may very possibly hear that his assassination was not wholly distasteful to Germany.

gadocio, but very deliberately as the result of calm observation and reflection—this war cannot but end beneficially to us in every sense of the word. We could never have fought the Germans on land without an army. Within ten years, had the peace of Europe been upheld, we should have had to fight for our very homes with Germany on the seas. This chance, which, with our pacific political notions, might have well reached the point of jeopardy, has been spared to us. The German onslaught will break itself against the guns of France and Belgium, against the guns of Russia. Our business is the destruction of the German navy. As the certain result of the war, Europe will be financially stricken down, destitute, its trade largely shattered, its financial system maimed, its mechanism in a state of chaos. We, in our little Island—almost alone in Europe—will remain immune. Our sea power is our world power. The gigantic wealth of the country will be ready when normal conditions come round again to step in and play the banker—we and America. Secure from invasion, England will find herself, at the end of the war, in much the same position towards Europe that we stood in after Waterloo. It will give the needed stimulus to English manufacturers, almost compel Englishmen to provide much of what hitherto came from Germany. Our merchants, our middlemen, our buyers and sellers will almost inevitably take over many of the markets formerly held by Germans. We shall be able to lend where all Europe is a borrower. Economically, the war will give England the greatest commercial impetus it has ever

received ; nor can anything, short of the destruction of our navy, prevent it.

During the war, of course, we shall suffer with the rest of Europe, but infinitesimally less in comparison with all the other nations, thanks to our insular position ; thanks, above all, to the British navy. It is, indeed, as if Fortune had conspired to perpetuate the wealth and significance of this country. The idea of panic in England is fantastic. Any man who preserves a sane outlook can see the inevitable economic results of the present conflagration, the need there will be for money and goods and markets, the destitution of commercial Europe, beggared and hungry. The succour necessary England will provide. Those markets England will come into. The money England will furnish. Had the god of Fate been asked to bestow upon England the greatest possible gift in his power, he could have given us nothing half so profitable, half so improbably providential. With the folly of madness, Germany has cast all her wealth, national greatness, strength, hegemony, and fortunes into the crucible of a war which is bound to destroy her. Her military and naval strength will be broken ; her wealth will be dissipated ; her markets will be forfeited. All that she has achieved in world-power she will lose. And the moral effect of the German crash will be even greater. The war will knit together, not only the English peoples, but the entire English-speaking world. It is impossible for America not to feel the repercussion of the great European disaster ; it is inconceivable that she should not respond to it. She will. As blood is thicker than water so this Teutonic

invasion, which is nothing less than an onslaught on civilization, will kindle, in the entire English-speaking world, that union of spirit and sentiment which hitherto has been lacking—the brotherhood of a common civilization, built up on the pillars and altar of freedom. Instead of the consolidation of the Germanic peoples—the object of the Kaiser's war—it is the English-speaking peoples who will perforce be welded together, united in a common cause. One of the great principles which this war will bring before humanity will be a settled standard of civilization, the standard as set by England in the defence of the French. In this trust, England and America will be as one. The New World sympathizes, and must sympathize, with the Allied Defence. We may be sure Americans will not forget it. They will triumph with our triumphs, cheer for our victories, clasp hands across the waters with us. The attempts at misrepresentation made by the astute German Ambassador in America will fail. Almost the entire American Press has branded the Kaiser's outbreak as the action of a "mad dog." See what a response there has been in England across the seas! We may feel proud of these kinsmen of ours. We may feel equally confident of the American spirit of common sense.

England, in her own despite dragged into hostilities, goes into the European fray with the quiet confidence of victory. It is an utter impossibility that the Germans should win, should be able to "eviscerate" civilization. As before said, we English stand to win all through. Already we find the little Island recovered from the first shock, calm and businesslike, unshaken, her credit

unimpaired. With the felicity of the English practical man, Mr. H. G. Morgan has defined the attitude of England as "business as usual." The word is—carry on. We will carry on. England has resumed the office of Pitt in Europe, naturally, as it were, responding to her historic rôle. All the qualities latent in the English race have risen to the occasion, and there is neither complaint nor bombast. A grim duty has fallen upon our sailors. They will fulfil it. Our duty, primarily, is to destroy the German fleet; to assist the French on land with all the means in our power. It is not to be supposed that our navy will issue from the ordeal unscathed. The Germans have sown the seas with mines; there have been "accidents"; there may be a pitched and catastrophic naval battle. But we who are sheltered on the island look forward without trepidation. It is one of the paradoxes of our insular situation that tens of thousands of Englishmen who would give their souls to stand in the fighting line in the defence of country are doomed to impotence, and must needs await the issue with what composure they may. It is not the least of the trials to be borne by us. To be sure, the most envied men in England to-day are those who man our ships.

It is the same with the army. We saw young Belgians crowded in trains *en route* for the front, men who were "called up" against the enemy, and we would have given all to be conscripts too, going forth at the call of arms, instead of spectators watching them from the stations. All over England men gnash their teeth that they are not able to help stem the barbaric onrush of the Kaiser.

Never has the nobility of a citizen Army been brought home to us so poignantly. We feel it to be the right of the individual male to face the common foe. We hear of the Belgian and French mobilizations, of France denuded of young men, of women getting in the harvest, and our hearts ache with the denial. At this moment we know it is an honour to fight. The married men, those over thirty, try hard to go about their business, but every hour of the day is an exercise in discipline and self-denial. Yes, it is very hard this enforced passivity of Englishmen. What would thousands of us not give now for conscription! If the Government were to impose compulsory service in England to-morrow, it would be acclaimed as the blessings of the millennium.

Had we a conscriptionist army, the Emperor would never have attempted this war. The result in England is a profound feeling of dissatisfaction which at once found expression in a fervour of sporadic volunteer organizations, schemes and offers, as at the time of the Boer War, threatening the waste inseparable from disjointed effort. Very splendid, no doubt, but not what is needed to roll up the Kaiser's legions. It is the price we pay for the nation's refusal to have a citizen army. As a result, thousands of men, especially men over thirty, are debarred from any active participation in the war, men who otherwise would be of inestimable service. In France, at the declaration of war, every man went automatically to his post; there was no excitement, no confusion, nothing was left to volunteer patriotism; the entire male machine of France was set in motion; it was not

a question of only the young men having their opportunity ; male France marched to the front as one man. " C'est la guerre."

Even now at the time of writing all traces of the "panicky" feeling have vanished. As a fact, England is serenely safe. All idea of invasion may be dismissed as fantastic. It has been accepted, even by arm-chair strategists, that a raid on these coasts could not be attempted under at least a force of 100,000 men ; that such a raid, even carried out successfully, could only be regarded as a "desperate hope" for the purpose of frightening the general public ; and that "invasion by evasion"—cutting through the defending navy—is against our fleet hardly a serious proposition. There can be no doubt about it. The military authorities are quite right to take all precautions, to prepare for raids, but unless our navy is practically put "out of being," it is the most improbable thing in the world that the Germans will either find the men to spare for such a purpose or find the means of "evasion" so easy that any ship in the Kaiser's navy would attempt it. Were Russia neutral, it would be a different matter. As it is, the invasion is "not likely."

It being of great importance that things in this country should carry on, it is to be hoped that by September people will return to the east coast resorts, many of which, owing to the ludicrous ideas of bombs from German Zeppelins, raids and torpedo attacks, have seriously suffered from the exodus ; while many people in a small way—hotel-keepers, lodging-house keepers, and shop-keepers there have been very hard put to it. There are

probably not five airmen in Germany who could hope to achieve anything by a flight across the North Sea. As for the Zeppelins, nothing would give our "old sports" more pleasure than to be able to snipe at them, if by some untoward chance a couple or so were blown this way. It is a pity that public notices were not in the early days placarded by the authorities in all these places, telling the public there was no danger. As it was, a great many families foolishly curtailed their holidays, and a great deal of fun for the children on the shores was lost.

No, England is as safe as the Mississippi, and those who require proof have but to remember the feat of our navy* in shepherding the Expeditionary Army across the Channel "without accident." That was a splendid achievement. To many of us, England's confounded safety is the annoying part of this war. Here we are absolutely shielded by our navy, bursting to do something, dreaming we are lying in trenches by the side of many of the waiters who the other day brought us our dinner and "overcharged" us, yet constrained to go about our business, even to play golf, because, well, because we are not trained soldiers, and therefore are not wanted! If 300,000 Germans effected a landing, a shout of joy would go up among us. To be sure, not a man of them would survive. But that, alas! is not conceivable. We can but fight with the "lead" of the Press: seeking to acquire the contemplative spirit, for we

* The "fortunate and fruitful" scrap in the Bight of Heligoland has given the Germans a foretaste of English sea-power.

are the "women" in this war, the "Girls they left behind them."

All the same, we have to steel our hearts for the terrible events that will come, to be ready for every emergency. The fight that has begun will be pitiless, disastrous beyond all precedent. Confident, as we have all reason to be, we may expect set-backs, reverses, long intervals of anxiety and silence. Not for a moment is it to be supposed that the German forces will not fight with the bravery of their race. Not for a moment is it to be thought that the Allies' task is a light one. On the contrary. This is the supreme crisis in European history. The Allies will have to fight their way through step by step, passionately, heroically. Every inch of the German lines will be disputed. Unless the Emperor proves himself a poltroon—which is not to be anticipated—the Germans will fight till they are beaten.

Militarily, apart from the Titanic forces engaged, the conditions are against the Germans. They are crippled at sea, with their entire oversea trade swept off the waters, their fleet doomed to inaction or to the "great chance" with England. On land their whole campaign depended upon swiftness. It was to be a campaign of haste—the dash through Belgium, the infliction of a pulverizing defeat on the French so as to be ready to meet the Russians. Haste is a bad general. So it has proved. Hence the mad attempts to "rush" Liège, the reckless pouring of German troops into Belgium, regardless of commissariat, the attempts of the Uhlans to "ride through" at any price, the savage reprisals of German soldiers, maddened at

the unexpected opposition. These things show that the ground plan of the German advance has miscarried. At the beginning their chief asset was time. It has become their enemy, thanks to the Belgian defence, which checked and "held up" the German offensive. For the Germans the war has opened badly. Their opportunity lay in swift and devastating attack. It has failed. They will now have to fight without the auxiliary of time. Thus, the war which broke out as the result of German diplomatic miscalculation has begun with repulse due to haste and military misjudgment.

But the difficulties of war on this stupendous scale are incalculable, and may well prove insuperable. Owing to the terrific power of modern guns, their awful moral effect, the enormous strength of modern fortifications, the almost impossibility of successful mass charges, rushes, and the carrying of positions by assault, and the stupendous difficulties of feeding and supplying such armies, not to speak of the inevitable shortage of horses and the rainy season beginning in September, the armies on both sides may not improbably fight themselves in the winter months to a condition of stale-mate, neither side being able to push home a "crowning mercy," to annihilate or put to rout. We must expect a long and terrible war. The experiences of the Japanese at the three weeks' battle of Mukden rather point to the likelihood of battles being neither won nor wholly lost, of destruction minus result. All the same, Germany has far more to lose than the Allies have by the protraction of war which as yet has only begun.*

* This was written before the "staggering" successes of Russian

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The task of the Allies is clear. They must press on. There can be no Peace now till the forces of England and France, of Belgium and Russia, march through the Brandenburg Gate of Berlin, past the statue of Bismarck, to the gates of the Emperor's Castle, there to impose the conditions of Europe and restore to France the annexed provinces. In the name of civilization, the Allied Powers must cripple German militarism with all that it stands for, once and for always. They must decree the end of the Bismarckian era. They must extract the fangs of the Hohenzollerns.

arms. Once more, German military opinion has failed. It was supposed in Berlin that the German Western Army of invasion had a good seven weeks before the Russians could effectively move. As we have seen, their miscalculation has proved fatal. At the moment of the German menace on Paris, every available man had to be recalled to save Austria and East Prussia, resulting in the German retreat from France, the great victory of the Allies at the Marne, the complete failure of the strategic advance in France, brought about by the Belgium defence, British heroism and German misjudgment.

THE ARMIES OF EUROPE

THEIR NUMBERS, CHARACTER, ARMS, AND THE
PROBLEMS BEFORE THEM—THE FORTIFICA-
CATIONS AND THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR

THE war in which all Europe is embarked will undoubtedly be the most gigantic struggle in the history of the world—so gigantic that even the Napoleonic wars will seem like dwarfs in comparison.

To understand the present situation in Europe one must look at the arms and aims of each country in turn.

Ever since the reign of Ivan the Great (1462–1505), Russia has pursued one policy with extraordinary consistency, her effort being to obtain access to the sea, especially in warm waters. The wars which she has waged against Poland, Sweden, the Turks of the Khanate of the Crimea, Prussia, Napoleon, the Turks in 1877–78, and Japan, her advance in Central Asia and her intrigues in the Far East, in Persia and the Balkans, are all part and parcel of this policy. She has constituted herself the protectress of the Slavonic people in the Balkans, in return for which they may help her to secure Constantinople, the plum upon which she has looked with longing eyes for centuries.

It is an open secret that Russian expansion deliberately aims at a United Slavic Balkan peninsula, bordering south and eastward on the Adriatic, the Marmora, and the Black Sea, with complete control of their strategic sea-gates, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Germany, geographically inside of Russia's enveloping ambitions, is even more resolved upon an expanding empire, which shall extend eventually from Dutch and Belgian ports on the North Sea, clear through what is now Turkey, along the line of the Bagdad railway to the Persian Gulf.

Austria is keenly alive to its need to control the Adriatic, hence her occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, her resolution not to permit the Serbians to have the port of Scutari, and her recent creation of the Kingdom of Albania. Her recent stand with respect to Serbia is based upon her determination to permit no interference with her rights in that part of Europe.

At the back of these Austrian ambitions is the Pan-Germanic idea—the German slogan of the famous March to the East—which is diametrically opposed, as already indicated, to a Russianized Balkans, or powerful Slav-Balkan state.

The map of Europe shows Great Britain separated from the continent by a narrow strip of water which has played a rôle in history only equalled by the Mediterranean. Her security is dependent mainly upon the ability of her fleets to prevent invasion. Her land forces in the past have been a secondary consideration. Her task is to defend the British Isles ; to protect the carrying trade of the world which is in her hands ; to keep open

communication with her colonial possessions scattered all over the globe; and to prevent her food supply from abroad from being cut off lest she starve to death.

The main motive in France is revenge for 1870-71 and the reconquest of the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

European armament and European armies are at the same time the result of these conflicting ambitions, just briefly indicated, and the means by which each nation hopes to satisfy its own territorial hunger at the expense of the other nations.

For the benefit of the uninitiated in military matters, it may be said that almost every great nation has a regular army, and one, two, or three reserves. In time of peace the regular armies are kept on a reduced or "peace footing." When war is imminent, they are enlarged to their "war footing" by augmenting them to full strength, either by additional men drawn from the reserves or by recruiting, and by organizing, equipping and supplying them for active operations in the field. This is known as mobilization. Army affairs are administered by a council presided over by the Minister of War, which includes certain high military officers charged with duties necessary to the proper management of land forces. One of these is the Chief of the General Staff, who is nearly always the commander-in-chief in time of war. The General Staff prepares all plans of war, sees to the proper co-ordination of the various branches of the service, and superintends the execution of the plans determined upon. There

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are two kinds of troops: mobile, and fixed, *i.e.* stationed in fortifications. The mobile troops are of two sorts: those of the line, *i.e.* the fighting men, which include the infantry, cavalry and artillery; and those of the staff. Broadly speaking the infantry is organized as follows:

THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY

Infantry

- men*
- 8 - A squad is 8 men under the command of a corporal.
 - 16 - A section is 16 men under the command of a serjeant.
 - 50-75 - A platoon is from 50 to 75 men under a lieutenant.
 - 200-250 - A company is 3 platoons, 200 to 250 men, under a captain.
 - 1000 - A battalion is 4 or more companies under a major.
 - 3000 - A regiment is 3 or more battalions under a colonel, or a lieutenant-colonel.
 - 10000 - A brigade is 2 or 3 regiments under a brigadier-general.
 - 15000 - A division is 2 or more brigades under a major-general.
 - 40000 - An army corps is 2 or more brigades, supplemented by cavalry, artillery, engineers, &c., under a major-general or lieutenant-general.

Cavalry

- A section is 8 men under a corporal.
- A platoon is 36 to 50 men under a lieutenant, or junior captain.
- A troop is 3 to 4 platoons, 125 to 150 men, under a captain.
- A squadron is 3 troops under a senior captain, or a major.
- A regiment is 4 to 6 squadrons under a colonel.
- A brigade is 3 regiments under a brigadier-general.
- A division is 2 or 3 brigades under a major-general.

Artillery

- A battery is 130 to 180 men, with 4 to 6 guns (8 in the Russian army) under a captain.
- A group or battalion is 3 or 4 batteries under a major.
- A regiment is 3 or 4 groups (battalions) under a colonel.

When regiments are combined into brigades, brigades into divisions, and divisions into army corps, cavalry, artillery, and certain other auxiliary

troops, such as engineers, signal corps, aeroplane corps, &c., are joined with them in such proportions as has been found necessary. Every unit, from the company up, has its own supply and ammunition wagons, field hospitals, &c.

In Europe almost every man has done compulsory service with the colours, varying from one to four years, and apart from the usual drills and instruction, has received training in manœuvres great or small, where the endeavour is made to reproduce the exact conditions which will occur in war. At times, however, even the “grands manœuvres” degenerate into what smacks strongly of *opéra bouffe*, despite every effort to the contrary. The writer vividly recollects a charge of five regiments of French cavalry across nearly 800 yards of absolutely open country against a battery, a battalion of infantry, and a regiment of dismounted dragoons in September last, and the unconcealed disgust of one old soldier who had fought in the battles around Metz in 1870 at what he characterized as “crass idiocy.” Even more spectacular was the charge of eighty squadrons of Bavarian cavalry, numbering more than 9000 men, across about 1000 yards of open ground against a strong position held by a brigade of Saxon infantry and several batteries, led by the German Emperor in person some years ago. The umpires decided that it was successful, whereat the military attachés smiled and remarked, as did Marshal MacMahon of the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava, “*C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre !*” (It is magnificent, but it is not war!) Upon another occasion the Kaiser indulged in a

similarly preposterous charge, but upon galloping up to the umpires and inquiring, "How's that?" was greeted with the firm but diplomatic answer, "All dead but one, your Majesty." It must not be supposed that such licence is always the case, for the training is often severe, and in the various schools of musketry the utmost attention is paid to good marksmanship—no nation being more thorough in all that relates to military matters than Germany.

To understand the efficiency of European soldiers and the never-ceasing preparation for war, let us examine the systems of the leading continental Powers, beginning with the one which has the greatest reputation.

GERMANY

The German army on a peace footing consists of 31,459 officers and 768,540 men, military service being compulsory and universal with certain exemptions. Liability to service (*Wehrpflicht*) begins at the age of seventeen and ends at forty-five; actual service (*Heerplicht*) commences at twenty. With the active army the term of service is seven years, two in the ranks and five in the reserve for the infantry, five in the ranks and four in the reserve for the cavalry and horse artillery. The soldier is permanently attached to some corps, and during his reserve service is twice summoned for training with it for a period limited by law to eight weeks, but in actual practice rarely six weeks and more usually a month. From the active reserve the soldier passes into the *Landwehr* or second line army, composed of two

“bans,” the first of five years for the infantry and three for the cavalry and horse artillery; the second “ban” of six or seven years, or eight and nine, for the cavalry and horse artillery. During the first ban there are two periods of training of eight to fourteen days each, in the second none, while the Landwehr cavalry is exempted altogether. The final reserve is the Landsturm—a force purely for home defence—in which the men remain until they have reached the age of forty-five; in other words, about six years. The Landsturm is composed of two “bans,” the first comprising all men between seventeen and thirty-nine who for any reason have received no military training; the second includes all men, trained or untrained, between the ages of thirty-nine and forty-five. The German army admits as volunteers for one year only well-educated young men who pay their own expenses and who serve to supply all the Reserve and Landwehr officers. There are also a considerable number of reserve troops intermediate between the active army and the Landwehr, and a supplementary (Ersatz) reserve of young men of twenty who are fit for service but in excess of the required number of annual recruits. They are liable for three periods of training, one of ten weeks, one of six and one of four, stress being laid on non-combatant duties, although they are also available for depot duty. The object of these various reserves is to keep the active regiments up to full strength and to replace the enormous wastage in men that invariably occurs in war.

In the organization of the German army six

battalions form an infantry regiment, two regiments a brigade, two brigades a division, and two divisions an army corps. There are ten divisions composed of three brigades each, and in the event of war it is probable that the other divisions will be similarly augmented. Adding the necessary auxiliary troops, viz. an artillery brigade of twelve batteries composed of six guns each—or four in the case of the horse batteries—a regiment of cavalry of four squadrons, an engineer battalion, sanitary troops, &c., a German three-brigade division at war strength would number about 21,000, and an army corps—to which are further attached four batteries of howitzers and a battalion of rifles—about 43,000 combatants. The cavalry division is composed of three brigades of two regiments each and two or three batteries of horse artillery, a total of twenty-four squadrons and eight to twelve guns. Twenty-five corps constitute the German army, whose war strength is (1) active army, 1,700,000 ; (2) Landwehr, 1,300,000 and (3) Landsturm, 1,000,000, a grand total of 4,000,000 men.

The infantry is armed with the Mauser magazine rifle, 1898 model, with a calibre of .311 inches and fires a “ spit ball,” *i.e.* one pointed like a pencil. The Mauser has a velocity of 2700 foot seconds, a point-blank range of about 300 yards, and has adjustable sights for ranges up to 2000 yards. The cavalry is armed with a Mauser magazine carbine, and all carry lances. The artillery, both field and horse, use a Krupp piece of 1906 model, firing a 15-pound shell. The field howitzer is a 80-pounder, the heavy howitzer a 94-pounder.

The Army Law of 1913 provided for five aeroplane battalions numbering seventeen companies with about 400 aeroplanes, and that year there were twenty-four dirigible balloons in the military establishment.

The German General Staff has the reputation of being the most thorough body of its kind in the world. The writer has been told upon excellent authority that Field-Marshal von Moltke used to declare that with the declaration of war in 1870 came his rest. The story is characteristic of the preparedness of the German General Staff, but if the plans to which the Germans are so wedded are upset, the result may be different from their calculations. As indicative of the rule-of-thumb from which no digression is permitted, every observer of German manœuvres has been struck by the obligation of troops to take the exact position assigned to them quite regardless of whether circumstances have altered conditions and whether the spot is surrounded by enemies. In war such blind adherence to orders might entail annihilation. Moreover, the training instils into the men a dependence upon others, especially the officers and non-commissioned officers, which tends to rob them of all initiative; and the most casual observer cannot fail to remark upon the difficulty of the leaders to make their men take and keep open order in skirmishes and attacks, quite in contrast to the French, English and Americans.

The German artillery is distinctly inferior to the French as a weapon, and the Mauser rifle has not such a flat trajectory (*i.e.* the bullet does not carry so far in a straight line) as the French

small-arm at distances above 900 yards. The administration of an army that includes the commissariat, the quartermaster's department, the medical corps, &c., which supply the troops with food and all necessary stores, is only slightly inferior to the French; but its officials, whose functions are semi-military and semi-civil, have been subjected for years to the most overweening arrogance on the part of the officers of the line, and it would not be surprising to see revenge play its rôle, especially if the supply system breaks down under defeat.

Germany's railways are admirably situated for military operations in every part of the Empire. There is no lack of arms or ammunition so far as is known, and in the tower at Spandau, near Berlin, an enormous amount of gold has been stored for years as a war chest. German powder is of excellent quality and fully abundant. Supplies are ample for a campaign of months, but if Germany is cut off from the sea, difficulty will be experienced in feeding her enormous armies. Her fortifications are of the latest and most approved type, heavily armed and provisioned for months. Each fortification is provided with a wireless system for communication with other fortifications, thus rendering it possible for garrisons to unite either to harass the enemy temporarily or for prolonged operations—a performance heretofore so hazardous that it has been rarely attempted in the presence of the enemy.

FRANCE

The last few years have witnessed an almost incredible resurrection in the military spirit of

the French. Less than two years ago, when Germany increased her standing army, France instantly retaliated by lengthening the term of active service from two to three years without creating so much as a ripple in her internal affairs. She is determined to recover her lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and, if the opinion of military critics is not woefully at fault, she may be counted upon to put up a desperate fight against her German adversary.

The "National Army" of France is composed of the "Metropolitan Army" and the Colonial Army, the former numbering 753,403 and the latter about 116,000—46,000 being in Morocco and 39,000 in Algeria—a total of 869,403, exclusive of 25,000 in the Gendarmerie or military police. Military service is compulsory and universal from the ages of twenty to forty-eight, the only exemptions being for physical disability. After three years in the active army, the soldier passes to the reserve for eleven years, followed by seven years in the Territorial army and seven in the Territorial reserve. In the active reserve, the conscript undergoes two periods of training and manœuvres lasting for four weeks each; in the Territorial army one period of two weeks; in the Territorial reserve, no fixed period. Unlike the Germans, the French have no one-year volunteers but every encouragement is given for voluntary enlistment for three, four, or five years, particularly in the Colonial army. The length of the reserve service produces more than 2000 reservists per battalion, so that in case of mobilization, the active units can easily be maintained at

full war strength and each battalion and regiment forms an additional reserve unit with men left over for the depot. As a necessary precaution, the troops stationed along the German frontier are kept at a considerably higher strength than the others.

In the organization of the French army, two infantry regiments—composed of six or sometimes seven or eight battalions—form a brigade, two brigades a division, and two divisions an army corps. To every division is attached a field artillery regiment of nine batteries of four guns each. The corps artillery includes nine field and three howitzer batteries, to which six reinforcing batteries are added upon mobilization, so that each corps on a war footing has 144 guns. Furthermore an army corps in the field has attached to it a cavalry brigade of two regiments, one chasseur (cavalry) battalion, engineer companies, sanitary and service troops, &c. The cavalry divisions are composed of three brigades of two regiments each—together with three batteries of horse artillery. When mobilized the strength of an army corps is approximately 33,000 combatants, a cavalry division 4700. There is also an aeronautical corps with 334 aeroplanes and fourteen dirigibles.

The French army is localized and territorialized. Of the twenty-one army corps regions, all except Algeria (the 19th) furnishes a complete army corps. The eight infantry regiments of an army corps are recruited from their respective regimental districts, but the additional regiment is obtained from the region at large. Like the

chasseur battalions, these additional regiments are usually stationed near the eastern frontier, so that the 6th Army Corps at Châlons and the 7th at Besançon are augmented to three divisions each.

The reserve army has two divisions in each region, corresponding to those in the active army. Upon mobilization the thirty-six reserve divisions contain virtually the same organization and strength as the troops of the first line. The reserves of the regional regiments, engineers and foot artillery can be utilized for garrisoning the various fortresses to which allusion will be made later. The Territorial army likewise consists of thirty-six divisions and garrison troops. Upon mobilization the remaining men of the Reserve and Territorial armies are summoned to the depots and are available to maintain the field army at war strength. The Customs Corps, the Chasseurs Forestiers, the Gendarmerie (25,000) and the Garde Républicaine (2992) have also had military training and can be utilized in time of war.

The French field army is composed of twenty army corps, the brigade of fourteen battalions stationed at Lyons, and ten divisions of cavalry. Raised to their full war strength, the active army numbers 1,009,000, the reserves and dépôts 1,600,000, the Territorial army 818,000, and the Territorial reserve 451,000, a grand total of 3,878,000.

The infantry is armed with the Lebel magazine rifle of .315 inch calibre, the cavalry with the Lebel carbine, both excellent weapons. The field piece is a rapid-fire gun of 7.5 centimetres (2.95 inches) of the model of 1907, provided with a

shield for protection. The howitzers are of 12 or 15·5 centimetres (1 cm.=·3937 inch).

For many years there existed much uncertainty as to who would command the French army in time of war owing to the fear of a dictator like Louis Napoleon or like General Boulanger attempted to be (February 1889). In July 1911, when the Moroccan trouble was at its height and war seemed imminent, it was decided that the power of appointing the commander-in-chief should be taken away from the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre—which is charged with general military questions under the presidency of the Minister of War—and vested in the Conseil des Généraux, which is composed of the officers commanding the field armies and which had selected General Joffre for supreme command.

The French artillery is generally admitted to be in a class by itself and the Intendance (commissariat, &c.) is excelled by none other. The infantry is most deceptive in appearance, but the ability of the French to march and attack has never been surpassed. The cavalry is first class and will give a good account of itself. Its work will be supplemented by the army aeroplane corps and a volunteer aeroplane corps, the latter of which can be counted upon to furnish several hundred aeroplanes, which ought to keep the commanding generals fully informed of every movement of the enemy. The Minister of War recently stated that there was no provision for the defence of the fortifications against attacks from the air, and there is also some question as to the efficiency of the wireless apparatus installed in the fortresses.

The French naval powder is notoriously uncertain and short-lived, but the same cannot be said of the army powder, and so far as is known abroad, there is no shortage in ammunition. The regimental officers are excellent, but the French success will be largely measured by the ability of the generals.

RUSSIA

The peace strength of the Russian army is 1,284,000 men, its war strength 5,962,306. Military service is compulsory and universal, beginning at the age of twenty and terminating with the end of the forty-third year. Service in the active army is for three years in the case of the infantry and artillery, for four years in the other arms. The soldier then passes into the reserve (*Zapas*) for fourteen or fifteen years, during which he receives two trainings of six weeks each. After eighteen years in the active army and reserve, he is transferred to the Territorial army (*Opolchénié*) for five years. This embraces also the surplus of the annual contingent, thus forming a supplementary reserve, and, in the second "ban," all those exempted from service, those not up to standard, and the older classes of surplus men. There also exists a modified system of volunteers for one year who supply the bulk of officers required for the reserve upon mobilization.

Owing to the enormous extent of the Russian Empire, its army is divided into three forces, the army of European Russia, the army of the Caucasus, and the Asiatic army. The Russian battalion contains 1000 men; four battalions constitute a regiment, two regiments a brigade,

and two brigades a division. The field batteries are composed of eight guns, the horse batteries of six. The ordinary army corps is made up of two divisions, a howitzer division and one battalion of sappers, and has a fighting strength of approximately 32,000 men. The rifle brigades form separate organizations of eight battalions with three batteries attached. The Cossacks, who hold their lands by military tenure, are liable to service for life, and provide their own equipment and horses. At nineteen their training begins; at twenty-one they enter the active regiment of their district, at twenty-five the "second category" regiment, and at twenty-nine the "third category" regiment, followed by five years in the reserve. After twenty-five years of age, their training is three weeks per annum. In European Russia the field army consists of the Imperial Guard and Grenadier Corps, twenty-seven line army corps and twenty cavalry divisions; in the Caucasus of three army corps and four cavalry divisions. The Asiatic army is composed of Russians with a few Turkoman irregular horse (jigits), and is mainly stationed in East Siberia. Since the Russo-Japanese war these forces have been increased and reorganized into a strong army which would mobilize as five Trans-Baikal corps and two to four Cossack cavalry divisions, numbering, together with auxiliary troops, over 200,000 men.

The system of recruitment is territorial, that is, each army corps draws its recruits from a fixed district and is usually quartered in garrisons there. In European Russia the majority of the army is stationed west of the longitude of Moscow,

so that mobilization is slower under ordinary circumstances than in France or Germany because the recruits and reservists have long distances to travel, particularly as many are consigned to corps outside Great Russia. The comparative dearth of railways is a great handicap in the matter of supplies.

The small-arm of the infantry is the "3-line" rifle of the 1901 model. It has a magazine holding five cartridges, a calibre of .299 inches, a muzzle velocity of 2035 feet per second, and is sighted to 3000 yards. The arm of the cavalry and Cossacks has a barrel $2\frac{3}{4}$ inches shorter, but uses the same ammunition, and is provided with a bayonet which no other mounted troops use. The field piece is a Krupp rapid-fire, shielded gun of the 1902 model, with a muzzle velocity of 1950 feet per second, the shell weighing $13\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. The Russian has always been a capital fighting man, and too much stress cannot be laid upon the value of actual experience in war. It is highly doubtful that the Russians will encounter any harder fighting than they did in Manchuria, and it must be remembered that a great many of the officers and men who fought against the Japanese will participate in the present war. The Russian army will therefore be a potent factor in any equation.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austria-Hungary's peace establishment is 472,716, the war strength of her regular army 1,360,000. Military service is universal and compulsory, beginning at the age of 19—but more usually at 21—and ending at 43. Service with the "Common" or active army lasts for

2 years in the case of the infantry and 3 for the cavalry and horse artillery; in the Landwehr (first reserve) 10 for the infantry and 7 for the cavalry and horse artillery, followed by the Landsturm (second reserve) until the soldier's 42nd birthday. Hungary possesses a separate and distinct Landwehr (Honvéd) and Landsturm (Népfölkelés), which constitute the Hungarian national army. There is also an Ersatz (supplementary) reserve intended to maintain the units of the Common army at full strength. The Ersatz reservists receive 8 weeks' training in their first year and are subsequently liable for the same service as the other reservists of the army corps to which they belong.

The Empire is divided into 16 army corps districts, each presumed to furnish a complete army corps of 2 divisions to the active army. Every infantry division is composed of 2 brigades of 8 battalions each, 1 artillery brigade of 10 batteries of 6 guns, a regiment of cavalry, a jäger (rifle) battalion, &c. The army corps also contains a regiment of field artillery or howitzers, a pioneer battalion, a pontoon company, &c., and numbers about 34,000 combatants. There are 6 permanent cavalry divisions, each consisting of 2 brigades (24 squadrons), 3 batteries of horse artillery and a machine-gun detachment and numbering about 4000 men. It is estimated that Austria's land forces raised to their maximum war strength would be as follows: Common or active army, 1,360,000; Austrian Landwehr, 240,000; Hungarian Landwehr, 220,000; Landsturm, 2,000,000; Ersatz reserve, 500,000; grand total, 4,320,000.

The infantry is armed with the Mannlicher magazine rifle, calibre .315, 1895 model; the cavalry with a carbine of the same make. The field gun, a Krupp, uses a shrapnel of $14\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.; the field howitzer is a 10.5 cm. piece weighing 1000 lbs. and firing a 30-lb. shell. On a peace footing all batteries have 4 guns, on war footing 6, except the mountain batteries which are provided with 4 guns.

The Hungarian cavalry is admirable; the rest of the army is not comparable to the French or German armies. It has not fought single-handed since 1866, when it was decisively defeated by the Prussians and their allies at Königgrätz.

ITALY

The Italian army on a peace footing numbers 250,860 officers and men, exclusive of the troops in Africa. Service is compulsory and universal, beginning at the age of 20. Two years in the permanent army are followed by 6 years in the reserve, 4 years in the mobile militia, and 7 years in the territorial militia. In the reserve they receive from 2 to 6 weeks' training which may be extended over several years; in the territorial militia, 30 days' training. Each division consists of 2 brigades composed of 2 regiments, each of 3 battalions, together with a regiment of field artillery (5 batteries), and has a war strength of 14,156 officers and men and 30 guns. Four regiments divided into 2 brigades and 2 horse batteries comprise a cavalry division. Each army corps has 2 divisions—save the 9th, which has 3—a regiment of field artillery (36 guns), 2 or 3 heavy

batteries, a regiment of cavalry and one of Bersaglieri (light infantry). Aside from the Carabinieri or military police and the usual auxiliary troops including the aeronautical corps with 7 companies, 30 aeroplanes, and 9 airships, are the Alpini, frontier troops organized for the defence of the mountain passes, consisting of 8 regiments (26 battalions) of Alpine infantry and 2 regiments of 36 mountain batteries. The field army comprises 12 army corps and 3 cavalry divisions, its war strength is about 2,600,000, divided as follows : active army 700,000, mobile militia 400,000, territorial militia, a large part of whom are only partially trained, 1,500,000.

The Italian infantry is armed with the Mannlicher Carcano magazine rifle of 6.5 mm. calibre, but the territorial militia still uses the old Vetterli rifle. The field artillery is now being rearmed with the De Port gun with a calibre of 7.5 cm. of the model of 1912.

The Italian army has recently been engaged in war in Africa, and has doubtless profited by its experience.

It is a compact force and well trained.

THE BRITISH ARMY

On the outbreak of war in August 1914, the total number of "first line" British troops available all over the Empire was approximately 246,000. Of these, however, only 125,000 were distributed in the British Isles. In India a force of 77,000 was situated, and about 44,000 more were distributed in our various Colonies.

The army reserve consisted of about 145,000,

all of whom were called up on mobilization, and the Special Reserve (the old Militia) totalled 65,000 men. The Territorial force, whose nominal strength should have been 315,400 men, numbered in fact only 255,000, but within a few days of mobilization the full establishment was completed.

In the Senior Division of the Officers Training Corps (the Universities, &c.) there were about 5000 men of military age, and practically the whole of these were drafted into Regular or Territorial battalions.

The Expeditionary Force, which it has been the rule to keep in a fairly advanced state of preparedness for immediate active service, was composed of 6 divisions of all arms. Each division was composed of 3 infantry brigades (a brigade consisting of 4 battalions, each 1000 strong), 3 field artillery brigades (an artillery brigade numbered 18 guns), 1 heavy gun battery, 1 howitzer battery, 2 companies of Royal Engineers and 1 squadron of cavalry, totalling approximately 18,000 men. The strength of the 6 divisions, then, would be about 110,000 men, and in addition to them were 1 cavalry division of 10,000 men and 2 supplementary cavalry brigades. The British Dominions beyond the seas immediately offered to supply expeditionary forces of their own, and within a month from the outbreak of war, Canada's offer of a force of 20,000 men to be followed by a similar number if necessary had been accepted. From Australia and New Zealand another 40,000 men are being prepared for transportation to Europe.

But the most striking tribute to England's

greatness was seen in India, where the native princes vied with each other in placing their personal services and those of their subjects at the disposal of Lord Kitchener. As a first instalment, 70,000 men (2 divisions of infantry and three of cavalry), representing every race and state in India, were dispatched to the seat of war, the whole cost being borne by the people of India themselves. At home the Prime Minister in Parliament called for a new army of 500,000 men, and these were obtained within six weeks, and at the time of writing recruiting for a second half million is proceeding steadily. The Territorial force also, owing to the formation of reserve battalions for those volunteering for active service, had risen in strength to nearly 400,000 men. Lord Kitchener was able to state in the House of Lords on September 17, that by the spring of 1915 there ought to be an army of 500,000 men ready and trained to fight alongside of or against the best troops in Europe.

Finally, in South Africa the Boers, forgetting their old differences, are actively mobilizing in order to eject the enemy from their largest colonial possession—South-West Africa.

OTHER NATIONALITIES

The Belgian army has a peace footing of 3,542 officers and 44,061 men, with a war strength variously estimated at from 300,000 to 350,000. The infantry is armed with the Mauser rifle, the artillery with a shielded Krupp quick-fire piece of 7.5 cm. calibre.

In 1913 the Netherlands had in its home army

1543 officers and 21,412 men and 152 guns. On a war footing it could probably be raised to about 270,000 men. The small-arm is the Mannlicher rifle and carbine, the field gun is identical with that of Belgium.

Serbia has 10 divisions divided into 4 army corps, with a peace footing of 160,000, and a war strength of over 380,000. The rifle is the Mauser, model of 1899, with a calibre of 7 mm., of which there are not nearly enough to arm the reserves; the field piece a quick-firing gun of the French Schneider-Canet system.

Bulgaria has a peace establishment of about 3900 officers and 56,000 men, armed with the Mannlicher magazine rifle, calibre .315, the Mannlicher carbine, the Schneider quick-fire gun of 7.5 cm., and a light Krupp of the same calibre for the mountain batteries. On a war footing she could muster 4 army corps and about 550,000 men.

Roumania's army on a peace footing is about 5460 officers and 98,000 men, on a war footing 5 army corps and approximately 580,000 men. The infantry uses the Mannlicher magazine rifle, .256 calibre, the cavalry the Mannlicher carbine. The field and horse batteries are armed with the Krupp quick-firing, 75 mm. gun of the model of 1903.

In 1912 Greece had a peace establishment of 1952 officers and 23,268 men, but the recent war has caused her to augment them to 3 army corps and her war footing is not far from 250,000 men. The infantry is armed with the Mannlicher-Schönauer rifle of the 1903 model and the field artillery with Schneider-Canet quick-fire guns.

THE NAVIES OF EUROPE

THE present war is an exception to the general rule that dominion is won or lost by the preponderance of sea-power or its opposite. At the moment of writing the navies of all the great Powers except Italy are involved in the struggle. On one side those of Great Britain, France, and Russia; on the other, Germany and Austria. The preponderance of force is thus very great against the Germanic Powers.

GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain has political dominion over nearly 35 per cent. of the habitable land of the globe and over 27 per cent. of its population, the total of which is estimated by one of the best authorities at 1,623,300,000. No such empire has ever before existed, and it is for the looking after of these tremendous and wide-scattered interests that the great navy of Britain exists. For all her highways of communication are across the seas. For this duty she has, now completed, 64 battleships, 9 battle cruisers, 34 armoured cruisers, 63 protected cruisers, 2 fast light cruisers, 8 scouts, 222 destroyers, 59 torpedo boats (and 50 old ones), and 80 submarines, besides 52 sea-going auxiliaries of the fleet, such as mother ships for destroyers,

mine-layers, distilling ships, oil ships, repair and hospital ships.

The following are the details of this great fleet, the types in each class being separated into groups :

The first group, completed between 1895 and 1898, includes the following battleships : *Magnificent*, *Majestic*, *Prince George*, *Victorious*, *Jupiter*, *Cæsar*, *Mars*, *Hannibal*, and *Illustrious*.

They are all of 14,900 tons displacement, 12,000 horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 17·5 knots, 9 inches of armour belt, and from 10 to 14 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-inch rapid fire, twelve 3-pounder rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above water and 2 under water.

The next class includes six battleships, completed between 1899 and 1902 : *Canopus*, *Ocean*, *Goliath*, *Glory*, *Vengeance*, and *Albion*.

They are of 12,950 tons displacement, 13,500 horse-power, and 2300 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18·25 knots, 6 inches of armour belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch rapid fire, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, ten 3-inch rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

Then come eight ships, finished between 1901 and 1904 : *Formidable*, *Irresistible*, *London*, *Bulwark*, *Venerable*, *Implacable*, *Queen*, and *Prince of Wales*.

They are of 15,000 tons displacement, 15,000 horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity. They

have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armour belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-inch rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

During 1903 and 1904 also were finished the *Albemarle*, *Duncan*, *Exmouth*, *Russell*, and *Cornwallis*.

They are 14,000 tons displacement, 18,000 horse-power, and 2100 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armour belt, and from 6 to 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, twelve 3-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

In 1904 the smaller *Triumph* and *Swiftsure* were completed.

They are 11,800 tons displacement, 12,500 horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19 knots, 3 to 7 inches of armour belt, and from 6 to 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 10-inch, fourteen 7·5-inch rapid fire, fourteen 14-pounder rapid fire, four 6-pounder rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 4 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

Between 1904 and 1906 eight battleships were finished: *Dominion*, *King Edward VII*, *Commonwealth*, *Zealandia*, *Hindustan*, *Britannia*, *Africa*, and *Hibernia*.

They are of 16,350 tons displacement, 18,000 horse-power, and 2150 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18·5 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armour

belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, four 9·2-inch, ten 6-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-pounder rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

In 1906 came the famous *Dreadnought*, with its 17,900 tons displacement, 23,000 horse-power (turbine), 21 knots speed, and 2700 tons coal capacity. Her armour belt is 11 inches and the big gun protection from 8 to 11 inches. She has ten 12-inch guns, twenty-four 3-inch rapid fire, 5 machine guns, and 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1908 the *Agamemnon* and the *Lord Nelson* were completed.

They are of 16,500 tons displacement, 16,750 horse-power, and 2500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 4 to 12 inches of armour belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, ten 9·2-inch, twenty-four 3-inch rapid fire, and 5 machine guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

In 1909 England completed three battleships, *Bellerophon*, *Temeraire*, and *Superb*.

They are 18,600 tons displacement, 23,000 horse-power (turbine), and 2700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 11 inches armour belt, and from 8 to 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of ten 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 5 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1910 three more ships followed : *St. Vincent*, *Collingwood*, and *Vanguard*.

They are 19,250 tons displacement, 24,500 horse-power (turbine), and 2700 tons coal capacity.

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They have a speed of 21 knots, 9·75 inches of armour belt, and from 8 to 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of ten 12-inch, eighteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1911 there were four ships completed, three of them, the *Neptune*, *Colossus*, and *Hercules*, of one type.

They are 20,000 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power (turbine), and 2700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 11 inches of armour belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of ten 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

The *Orion*, completed in 1911, and the *Conqueror*, *Thunderer*, and *Monarch*, of 1912, formed the next type.

They are of 22,500 tons displacement and 27,000 horse-power (turbine). They have a speed of 21 knots, 12 inches of armour belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of ten 13·5-inch, sixteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

The *King George V*, of 1912, and the *Centurion*, *Ajax*, and *Audacious*, of 1913, form the next class.

They are of 23,000 tons displacement, 31,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21·5 knots, 12 inches of armour belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of ten 13·5-inch, sixteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 smaller guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

This year there are two types. In the first are the *Iron Duke*, *Marlborough*, *Emperor of India*, and *Benbow*.

They are of 25,000 tons displacement, 39,000 horse-power (turbine), and 4000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 22·5 knots, 12 inches of armour belt, and 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of ten 13·5-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, and 6 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The second type launched this year includes the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Warspite*.

They are of 27,500 tons displacement, 58,000 horse-power (turbine) and 4000 tons oil capacity. They have a speed of 25 knots, 13·5 inches of armour belt, and from 8 to 13·5 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of eight 15-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, and twelve 3-inch rapid fire guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The four last are due for completion this year and will of course under the circumstances of war be hastened to completion. There are also building the *Valiant*, *Barham*, and *Malaya* of the same type as the *Queen Elizabeth*, and the *Royal Sovereign*, *Royal Oak*, *Resolution*, *Ramillies*, and *Renown*, of 29,000 tons, 44,000 horse-power turbines, and of the same armament as the *Queen Elizabeth*.

In addition to these there are ten battle cruisers, equal to taking their place in the line of battle, of which nine are now ready and the other nearly so. They are the *Inflexible*, *Indomitable*, *Invincible*, of 17,250 tons displacement and 41,000 horse-power (turbine), the *Indefatigable*, of 18,750 tons displacement and 43,000 horse-power (turbine);

the *New Zealand*, of 18,800 tons, and the *Australia*, with 19,200 tons displacement, both with 44,000 horse-power developed by turbine-engines. All these ships have a speed of 25 knots, 8 inches of armour belt, 10 inches big gun protection, and a coal capacity of 2500 tons. Their armament is eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch quick fire, 5 machines guns and 5 torpedo tubes.

The *Lion* and the *Princess Royal*, completed in 1912, and the *Queen Mary*, of 1914, are alike, except that the *Queen Mary* has 27,000 tons displacement and 75,000 horse-power.

The other two have 26,350 tons displacement, 70,000 horse-power, and 3500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 28 knots, 9·75 inches of armour belt, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of eight 13·5-inch, sixteen 4-inch quick fire and 5 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

This year's battle cruiser, the *Tiger*, has 28,000 tons displacement, her turbines develop 110,000 horse-power, she has a speed of 28 knots, 10·75 inches of armour belt, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. Her coal capacity is 4000 tons. She has eight 13·5-inch, twelve 6-inch quick fire, and 5 machine guns.

Following these are thirty-four armoured cruisers of high speed, which may be called general service ships, to be used for scouting or fighting as the case may be. They have neither the armament nor protection to enable them to take a place in the line-of-battle, but their speed is sufficient to evade action with all battleships now in actual service. The list is as follows :

Completed between the years 1901 and 1904 are the *Cressy*,* *Sutlej*, *Aboukir*,* *Hogue*,* *Bacchante*, and *Euryalus*.

They are of 12,000 tons displacement, 21,000 horse-power, and 1600 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 6 inches of side armour, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of two 9·2-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, twelve 3-inch rapid fire, 5 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1902-3 the *Drake*, *Good Hope*, *Leviathan*, and *King Alfred* were completed.

They are of 14,100 tons displacement, 30,000 horse-power, and 2500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 6 inches of side armour, and from 5 to 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of two 9·2-inch, sixteen 6-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch rapid fire, 3 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1903-4 were completed *Kent*, *Essex*, *Monmouth*, *Berwick*, *Donegal*, *Lancaster*, *Cornwall*, *Cumberland*, and *Suffolk*.

They are of 9800 tons displacement, 2200 horse-power, and 1600 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 4 inches of side armour, and 5 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of fourteen 6-inch rapid fire, eight 3-inch rapid fire, 5 smaller rapid fire, and 8 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1905 the *Antrim*, *Carnarvon*, *Hampshire*, *Devonshire*, *Roxburgh*, and, in 1906, the *Argyle* were completed.

* Sunk by German submarines, September 22, 1914.

They are of 10,850 tons displacement, 21,000 horse-power, and 1800 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 22·3 knots, 6 inches of side belt, and from 5 to 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 7·5-inch, six 6-inch rapid fire, 24 small rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Cochrane*, and *Natal* were completed in 1906, and the *Achilles* and *Warrior* in 1907.

They are of 13,550 tons displacement, 23,500 horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 6 inches of armour belt, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of six 9·2-inch, ten 6-inch rapid fire, 22 small rapid fire, and 8 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1908 came the *Shannon*, *Minotaur* and *Defence*.

They are of 14,600 tons displacement, 27,000 horse-power, and 2250 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 22½ knots, 6 inches of armour belt, and 8 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 9·2-inch, ten 7·5-inch, sixteen 12-pr., and five machine guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The details of the actual fighting ships of importance are completed with the following seventeen heavily protected cruisers :

Edgar (1893), *Endymion* (1894), *Hawke* (1893), *Grafton* (1894), *Theseus* (1894), of 7350 tons displacement.

They have 12,000 horse-power and 1250 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots,

5 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of two 9·2-inch, ten 6-inch rapid fire, 17 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Gibraltar*, *Crescent*, and *Royal Arthur*, of 7700 tons, have the same speed, armour, and coal capacity. Their armament, however, is one 9·2-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, 19 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns, and 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Terrible* in 1898 was in a class by itself.

She is 14,200 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power, and 3000 tons coal capacity. She has a speed of 22 knots, 6 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of two 9·2-inch, sixteen 6-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns.

Between 1899 and 1902 twelve heavily protected cruisers were built, all of 11,000 tons displacement. The *Diadem*, *Europa*, *Niobe*, and *Andromeda* had 16,500 horse-power, the *Amphitrite*, *Argonaut*, *Ariadne*, and *Spartiate*, 18,000 horse-power.

Each has 2000 tons coal capacity; a speed of 20·5 knots, 4 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of sixteen 6-inch rapid fire, twelve 3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machines guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

Following these are the *Arethusa* and the *Aurora*, of 3750 tons displacement, which are now ready. They were designed as scouts. They have 37,000 horse-power turbines, and a designed speed of 30 knots. They carry only the light armament

of two 6-inch rapid fire, eight 4-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. Eight more of 8740 tons of 40,000 horse-power, and 30 knots, with the same armament, the same fuel capacity (of 750 tons of oil), will not be ready until next year. All have a belt of 3-inch steel and 4-inch protection for the guns. They are, of course, in no sense fighting ships, but their rôle is of the utmost importance : that of supplying information regarding the whereabouts of an enemy.

Of the light protected cruisers now ready (twenty-eight of which antedate 1900), varying from 2135 to 5880 tons, there are twenty-six with a speed of 25 knots. None carry heavier than 6-inch guns and can be reckoned, for war, chiefly as scouts. No one of them has more than 1225 tons fuel capacity, and most of them much less. Their radius of action is thus moderate.

One hundred and thirty-four of the completed destroyers are of ocean-going type, and nearly all these are oil-burners and of from 30 to 34 knots. All exceed 700 tons displacement ; seventy exceed 800 tons ; forty are about 1000, and sixteen are from 1200 to 1350 tons. One, the *Swift*, completed so long ago as 1908, has a displacement of 2170 tons, 30,000 horse-power, and a speed of 36 knots. All are armed usually with 4-inch guns not exceeding four in number, and the majority carry 21-inch torpedo tubes. Such torpedoes of the best type have a range of more than five sea miles (say six land miles) at an average speed of 24 knots.

In addition to the ships mentioned, England has at command three merchant steamers of more than 25 knots ; four of from 22 to 25 ; eleven from

20 to 22, and twenty-nine from 18 to 20. These can all be utilized for cruising, but they can play no real part in the present war except as against like vessels of Germany, which latter is almost equally well off in this respect.

FRANCE

The French navy, though fourth in rank of naval Powers, naturally comes after that of England as an ally. There are on the list twenty-four battle-ships completed, five launched, and five building.

The *Carnot* was launched in 1896. Her displacement is 11,954 tons, her horse-power 15,000, and her coal capacity 700 tons. Her speed is 18 knots, her side armour 17·75 inches, and her big gun protection 13·75 inches. Her armament, like that of the *Masséna*, launched in 1898, is two 12-inch, two 10·8-inch, eight 5·5-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns, and 2 torpedo tubes above water, and 2 below. The *Masséna's* displacement is 11,735 tons, her horse-power 13,500, and her coal capacity 800 tons. Her speed is 18 knots, her side armour is 17·75 inches, and the big gun protection from 8·5 to 16 inches.

In 1898 France also launched the *Charlemagne*, and *Gaulois*, and in 1900 the *St. Louis*. They are of about 11,000 tons displacement, 14,500 horse-power, and 1100 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 14 inches of side armour, and from 8 to 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, twelve 5·5-inch rapid fire, eight 3·9-inch rapid fire, 20 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Bouvet* (1898), of 12,000 tons, has 14,000

horse-power, and 800 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 16 inches side armour, and 8 to 14·75 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries two 12-inch, two 10·8-inch rapid fire, eight 5·5-inch rapid fire, and 19 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below.

The *Suffren* (1903), of 12,527 tons, has 16,200 horse-power, and 1820 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 11 inches side armour, and 9 to 13 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries four 12-inch, ten 6·4-inch rapid fire, eight 3·9-inch rapid fire, and 30 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below.

The *République* (1906) and *Patrie* (1907), of 14,635 tons, have 18,000 horse-power, and 1825 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 11 inches side armour, and 9 to 13 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry four 12-inch, eighteen 6·4-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes under water.

The *Democratie*, the *Justice*, and the *Vérité* were launched in 1908.

They are of 14,640 tons displacement, 18,000 horse-power, and 1825 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 11 inches of side armour, and from 9 to 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, ten 7·6-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1911 came the *Danton*, *Mirabeau*, *Diderot*, *Condorcet*, *Voltaire*, and in 1912 the *Vergnaud*.

They are of 18,027 tons displacement, 22,500 horse-power (turbine) and 2100 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19·25 knots, 10 inches of

side armour and from 9 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, twelve 9·4-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Jean Bart* and the *Courbet* were launched in 1913, and the *France* and *Paris* in 1914.

They are of 23,095 tons displacement, 28,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots, 10½ inches of side armour, and from 9 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of twelve 12-inch, twenty-two 5·5-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns.

France has no battle-cruisers but has nineteen armoured cruisers, one of which, the *Pothuau*, is of but 5374 tons; one the *Jeanne d'Arc* of 11,092; three, the *Gueydon*, *Montcalm*, and *Dupetit Thouars* of 9367; three (completed in 1903), the *Dupleix*, *Desaix*, and *Kleber* of 7578 tons; four, the *Marseillaise*, *Gloire*, *Aube*, and *Condé* of 9856 tons; three (completed in 1904–1906), the *Leon Gambetta*, *Jules Ferry*, and *Victor Hugo* of 12,351 tons; two (1908 and 1909), the *Jules Michelet* and *Ernest Renan*, of 12,370 and 13,427 tons; and two (1910 and 1911), the *Edgar Quinet* and *Waldeck Rousseau* of 13,780 tons. The heavier of these ships has a designed speed of 23 to 23½ knots, 6 to 6¾ inches side armour, and 8-inch protection to their larger guns. They carry from 2100 to 2300 tons of coal. Their main batteries are generally of two 7·6-inch rapid fire, and eight 6·4-inch rapid fire. The *Gambetta* class, however, carries four 7·6-inch with sixteen 6·4-inch,

both rapid fire. The *Edgar Quinet* and *Waldeck Rousseau* carry fourteen 7·6-inch rapid fire.

Two protected cruisers, the *D'Entrecasteaux* and *Guichen*, and ten light cruisers of no fighting importance complete the list of French ships.

France is, however, strong, so far as numbers go, in destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines, having ready eighty-four of the first with displacements from 276 to 804 tons and speeds of 28 and 31 knots. She has one hundred and fifty-three torpedo boats and seventy submarines, but many of these are of small size. One hundred and one of her torpedo boats are of but about 95 tons, and twenty of the submarines have a displacement of but 67 tons. They can hardly cut any figure except for purely local defence. Thirty-three of the submarines, however, have a surface displacement of 390 tons; two of 410; six of about 550; two of 785, and seven of 830. The surface displacement is usually (roughly) about 70 per cent. of the submerged. These larger submarines carry from 6 to 8 torpedo tubes. Twelve now building, of 520 (surface) tons displacement, have Diesel motors of 2000 horse-power. They are expected to have a surface speed of $17\frac{1}{2}$ knots and a speed of 8 knots submerged. This last class will carry 4 small guns.

There are attached to the fleet sixteen auxiliaries as mine layers, submarine destroyers, and aeroplane mother ships, of from 300 to 7898 tons; half, however, are under 1000 tons.

RUSSIA

Russia, since her fateful struggle with Japan, has diligently laboured to re-establish her fleet,

but she has not as yet made any great actual headway. But three of her old battleships were left from the wreck of the war, the *Tri Sviatitelia*, the *Panteleimon*, and *Czarevitch*.

The *Tri Sviatitelia*, of 1896 (in the Black Sea), has a displacement of 13,318 tons, 10,600 horse-power, a speed of 17 knots, and coal capacity of 1000 tons. Her side armour is 16 inches, and the big gun protection from 12 to 16 inches. She has four 12-inch, ten 6-inch rapid fire, and four 4·7-inch rapid fire guns and 2 torpedo tubes above water.

In the Black Sea also is the *Panteleimon* (1902), of 12,480 tons, has 10,600 horse-power, and 1250 coal capacity, 17 knots speed, 7 to 9 inches of side armour, and 10 to 12 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries four 12-inch, sixteen 6-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch and 28 smaller guns. She has 5 torpedo tubes under water.

The *Czarevitch* (1902), of 12,912 tons, has 16,300 horse-power and 1,360 tons capacity; 18 knots speed, 10 inches side armour, and 8 to 11 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries four 12-inch rapid fire, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, twenty 3-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes under water.

The *Slava* (1906), of 13,516 tons, has 16,000 horse-power and 1250 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 10 inches side armour, and 8 to 11 inches of protection for the big guns. Her armament is the same as that of the *Czarevitch*.

The *Ivan Zlatoust* (1910) and the *Elstafi* (1911) are both in the Black Sea.

They are 12,733 tons displacement, 10,600 horse-

power, and 1400 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 16 knots, 7 to 9 inches of armour belt, and from 10 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, four 8-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

In 1907 the *Andreas Pervozvanni* and the *Imperator Pavel I* were launched.

They are of 17,200 tons displacement, 17,600 horse-power, and 3000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 11 inches of side armour; and from 10 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, fourteen 8-inch, twenty 4·7-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

There are altogether six armoured cruisers, none of which are in the Black Sea.

The *Rossia* (1898), of 12,130 tons, has 18,000 horse-power and 2500 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 5 to 10 inches side armour, and 2 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries four 8-inch, twenty-two 6-inch rapid fire, twelve 3-inch rapid fire, and 36 smaller guns. She has 5 torpedo tubes above water.

The *Gromoboi* (1901), of 12,336 tons, has 18,000 horse-power and 2500 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 6 inches side armour; and 2 to 16 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries four 8-inch, twenty-two 6-inch, twenty 3-inch, and 31 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below.

The *Rurik* (1907), of 15,170 tons, has 19,700 horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity; 21

knots speed, 6 inches side armour, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries four 10-inch, eight 8-inch, twenty 4·7 inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes under water.

The *Admiral Makharoff* was launched in 1907, and the *Pallada* and *Bayan* in 1911.

They are of 7900 tons displacement, 16,500 horse-power, and 1020 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 4 to 8 inches of side armour, and from 3 to 7 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of two 8-inch, eight 6-inch rapid fire, twenty 3-inch rapid fire, and 7 smaller guns.

There are eight cruisers, of from 3100 to 6700 tons, of no fighting value however. These are the *Askold* (at Vladivostok), *Diana*, *Aurora*, *Kagul* (Black Sea), *Oleg*, *Pamyat Merkurya* (Black Sea), *Zemchug* (Vladivostok), and *Almaz* (Black Sea).

Russia has but 25 torpedo boats, all small and of little value. She is, however, fairly well off as to destroyers and submarines. She has 105 of the former, 34 of which exceed 500 tons in displacement, and 10 are more than 1000. About 30 of these destroyers are in the Black Sea and 6 at Vladivostok. Of the 43 submarines built or building, 25 are completed. Twenty-two, however, are under 135 tons surface displacement ; 12 are of 360 tons or more, rising to 500.

GERMANY

Turning to the three Powers of the other alliance (though Italy at the moment of writing is not yet involved in the war), Germany of course easily has

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the lead, with 33 battleships, 4 battle cruisers, 9 armoured cruisers, and 39 cruisers, as her sea fleet. She has also, complete, 142 destroyers and 27 submarines. Her 47 torpedo boats are too small to be of value, her attention being given, very wisely, to the destroyer instead. The following is the list of her battle fleet :

The *Kaiser Friedrich III* (1898), *Kaiser Wilhelm II* (1900), *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* (1901), *Kaiser Karl der Grosse* (1901), *Kaiser Barbarossa* (1901) form the first type.

They are of 10,474 tons displacement, 3000 horse-power, and 1050 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 12 inches of side armour, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 9·4-inch, fourteen 5·9-inch rapid fire, twelve 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The second type includes the *Wittelsbach*, *Wettin*, *Zähringen*, launched in 1902, and the *Schwaben* and *Mecklenburg* of 1903.

They are of 11,643 tons displacement, 14,000 horse-power, and 1450 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 9 inches of side armour, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 9·4-inch, eighteen 5·9-inch rapid fire, twelve 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above water, and 5 under water.

In 1904 the *Braunschweig* was launched, the *Elsass*, *Hessen*, and *Preussen* in 1905, and the *Lothringen* in 1906.

They are of 12,997 tons displacement, 16,000 horse-power, and 1800 tons coal capacity. They

have a speed of 18 knots, 9·75 inches of side armour, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 11-inch, fourteen 6·7-inch rapid fire, twelve 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above water and 2 below.

In 1906, 1907, and 1908 Germany built the *Deutschland*, *Hannover*, *Pommern*, *Schlesien*, and *Schleswig-Holstein*.

They are of 13,040 tons displacement, 16,000 horse-power, and 1800 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 9·75 inches of side armour, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 11-inch, fourteen 6·7-inch rapid fire, twenty-two 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller machine guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes.

In 1909 and 1910 Germany built two ships a year, the *Nassau* and *Westfalen* in 1909 and the *Rheinland* and *Posen* in 1910.

They are of 18,600 tons displacement, 20,000 horse-power, and 2700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19·5 knots, 9·75 inches of side armour, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of twelve 11-inch, twelve 5·9-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes.

In 1911 three ships were launched, the *Ostfriesland*, the *Helgoland*, and the *Thuringen*. In 1912 there was but one, the *Oldenburg*.

They are of 22,500 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power, and 3000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20·5 knots, 11 inches of side armour belt and 11 inches protection for the big guns.

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The armament consists of twelve 12-inch, fourteen 5·9-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes.

In 1913 there were five battleships: the *Friedrich der Grosse*, *Kaiser*, *Kaiserin*, *König Albert*, *Prinz Regent Luitpold*.

They are of 24,310 tons displacement, 28,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3600 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 13 inches of side armour, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of ten 12-inch, fourteen 5·9-inch rapid fire, twelve 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

For 1914 there are the *Markgraf*, the *Grosser Kurfürst*, and the *König*.

They are of 26,575 tons displacement, 35,000 horse-power (turbine). They have a speed of 22 knots, 13 inches of side armour, and 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of ten 14-inch, fourteen 5·9-inch rapid fire, twelve 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The *Von der Tann* (1910), of 18,700 tons, has 43,000 horse-power (turbine), and 2800 tons coal capacity; 25 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armour, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries eight 11-inch, ten 5·9-inch rapid fire, and sixteen 3·4-inch rapid fire guns. She has 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Moltke* (1911) and *Goeben* (1912), of 22,640 tons, have 52,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3100 tons coal capacity; 25·5 knots speed, 4 to 8 inches side armour, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry ten 11-inch, twelve

5·9-inch rapid fire, and twelve 3·4-inch rapid fire guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Seydlitz* (1913) is the same as the *Moltke*, except its displacement is 24,610 tons and its horse-power 63,000.

The *Derfflinger* (1914), of 28,000 tons, has 100,000 horse-power (turbine), and 30 knots speed; 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ inches of side armour. Her armament is unknown except that she has 6 torpedo tubes.

The *Fürst Bismarck* (1900), of 10,570 tons, has 14,000 horse-power and 1250 tons coal capacity, 19 knots speed, 4 to 8 inches side armour, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries four 9·4-inch, twelve 5·9-inch rapid fire, ten 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. She has 1 torpedo tube above water and 2 below.

Prinz Heinrich (1902), of 8759 tons, has 15,000 horse-power, and 1500 tons capacity; 20 knots speed, 2 to 4 inches side armour, and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries two 9·4-inch, ten 5·9-inch rapid fire, ten 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. She has 1 torpedo tube above water and 2 below.

The *Prinz Adalbert* (1903) and *Friedrich Karl* (1904), of 8858 tons, have 18,500 horse-power, and 1500 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 3 to 4 inches side armour, and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry four 8·2-inch, ten 5·9-inch rapid fire, ten 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above water and 3 below.

The *Roon* and the *Yorck* (1905), of 9350 tons, have 19,000 horse-power, and 1600 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 3 to 4 inches side armour

and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry four 8·2-inch, ten 5·9-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Scharnhorst* (1907) and *Gneisenau* (1908), of 11,420 tons, have 26,000 horse-power, 22·5 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armour, and 6 to 6·75 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry eight 8·2-inch, six 5·9-inch rapid fire, twenty 3·4-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Blücher* (1909), of 15,550 tons, has 32,000 horse-power, 23 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armour, and 6 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries twelve 8·2-inch rapid fire, eight 5·9-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3·4-inch rapid fire. She has 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Magdeburg*,* *Breslau*, *Strassburg*, and *Stralsund* were launched in 1912.

They are of 4500 tons displacement, 22,300 to 25,000 horse-power (turbine), and 1200 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 26·75 knots, 4 inches of side armour, and 3 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of twelve 4·1-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Karlsruhe* and *Rostock* were launched in 1913. They are of 4820 tons displacement, 30,000 horse-power (turbine), and 1300 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 26·75 knots, 4 inches of side armour, and 3 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of twelve 4·1-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

* Sunk by submarines.

Though these are reckoned by some authorities as armoured cruisers, their armour, and particularly their gun protection, is too slight to bring them properly in the category. They are really scouts and of a high quality, as on their trials they were nearly a knot to two knots above their designed speed, the *Strassburg* showing 28·8. Some of the next class, the protected cruisers, thirty-nine in number, have practically equal value as scouts, the *Kolberg*, *Mainz*,* *Koln*,* and *Augsberg*, of 4281 tons, with turbines of 19,600 horse-power, showing on trial from 26·32 to 27·23 knots, and twenty-eight of them from 21 to 24.

Germany is unusually strong in destroyers, of which she has 142. Forty-two of these are from 350 to 413 tons; 5 of 480; 13 from 530 to 560; 47 of about 650; 36 of 840 and 900 tons. Along with these are 27 submarines, 16 of which have a surface speed of 18 knots and 12 under water. What is known as the type U21, one of which passed into service last year, has a length of 213 feet 8 inches, and 20 feet beam.

AUSTRIA

Austria, Germany's ally, has nine battleships ready, all which have been completed since 1905, as follows:

In 1906 the *Erzherzog Karl* and *Erzherzog Friedrich* were launched, and in 1907 the *Erzherzog Ferdinand Max*.

They are of 10,433 tons displacement, 14,000 horse-power, and 1315 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19·25 knots, 6 to 8·25 inches of

* Sunk by submarines.

side armour, and 9·5 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 9·4-inch, twelve 7·6-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch rapid fire, and 16 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1910 came the *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand*, and in 1911 the *Radetzky* and *Zrinyi*.

They are of 14,226 tons displacement, 20,000 horse-power, and 1200 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots, 9 inches of side armour, and 9·75 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch, eight 9-inch, twenty 3·9-inch rapid fire, 6 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1912, the *Viribus Unitis* was launched, in 1913 the *Teggethoff* and the *Prinz Eugen*.

They are of 20,000 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power, and 2500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots, 11 inches of side armour, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of twelve 12-inch, twelve 5·9-inch rapid fire, eighteen 14-pounder rapid fire, and 4 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Kaiserin Maria Theresa* (1895), of 5187 tons, has 9000 horse-power and 740 tons coal capacity; 19 knots speed, 4 inches side armour, and 4 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries two 7·6-inch rapid fire, eight 6-inch rapid fire, and 22 smaller guns. She has 4 torpedo tubes above water.

The *Kaiser Karl VI* (1900), of 6151 tons, has 12,000 horse-power and 820 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 8·5 inches side armour, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries

two 9·4-inch, eight 6-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water.

The *St. Georg* (1906), of 7185 tons, has 12,300 horse-power and 1000 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 6·5 inches side armour, and 5 to 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries two 9·4-inch, five 7·6-inch rapid fire, four 6-inch rapid fire, and 17 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes.

The six light cruisers of Austria, varying in size from 1506 tons to 3966, call for no particular remark excepting the two last completed: the *Admiral Spaun*, of 3500 tons, 20,000 horse-power, and 27 knots, and the *Saida*, of the same tonnage, but of 25,000 horse-power and (probably) 28 knots. Both have turbine engines. Their chief value in war could be only as scouts.

There are 18 destroyers; 12 of 384 tons with $28\frac{1}{2}$ knots speed, and 6 of 800 tons and $32\frac{1}{2}$ knots. These latter carry four 12-pounders and two 21-inch torpedo tubes. They have oil fuel.

Of the 63 torpedo boats, 33 are of 250 tons and 24 of 197 tons, and are thus capable craft of their kind. The rôle of such can only be, as a rule, that of inshore work.

The 10 submarines are of but moderate size, ranging from 216 to 235 tons at the surface.

THE BRITISH NAVY

A LIST OF HIS MAJESTY'S SHIPS

BATTLESHIPS

** The main armament of each class is shown on p. 224*

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
Africa	16,350	18	King Edward VII	1906
Agammenon	16,500	18	Lord Nelson	1908
Agincourt	27,500	22	Purchased from Turkey	1914
Ajax	23,000	21	King George V	1913
Audacious	23,000	21	King George V	1913
Albemarle	14,000	19	Duncan	1903
Albion	12,950	18	Canopus	1902
Bellerophon	18,600	21	Bellerophon	1909
Benbow	25,000	22.5	Iron Duke	1914
Britannia	16,350	18	King Edward VII	1906
Bulwark	15,000	18	Formidable	1902
Cæsar	14,900	17	Majestic	1897
Canopus	12,950	18	Canopus	1899
Centurion	23,000	21	King George V	1913
Collingwood	19,250	21	St. Vincent	1910
Colossus	20,000	21	Colossus	1911
Commonwealth	16,350	18	King Edward VII	1905
Conqueror	22,500	21	Orion	1912
Cornwallis	14,000	19	Duncan	1904
Dominion	16,350	18	King Edward VII	1905
Dreadnought	17,900	21	Dreadnought	1906

BATTLESHIPS—*continued*

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Com- pleted
Duncan	14,000	19	Duncan	1903
Emperor of India	25,000	22.5	Iron Duke	1914
Erin	23,000	21	Purchased from Turkey	1914
Exmouth	14,000	19	Duncan	1903
Formidable	15,000	18	Formidable	1901
Glory	12,950	18	Canopus	1901
Goliath	12,950	18	Canopus	1900
Hannibal	14,900	17	Majestic	1897
Hercules	20,000	21	Colossus	1911
Hibernia	16,350	18	King Edward VII	1906
Hindustan	16,350	18	King Edward VII	1905
Illustrious	14,900	17	Majestic	1898
Implacable	15,000	18	Formidable	1902
Iron Duke	25,000	22.5	Iron Duke	1914
Irresistible	15,000	18	Formidable	1901
Jupiter	14,900	17	Majestic	1897
King Edward VII	16,350	18	King Edward VII	1905
King George V	23,000	21	King George V	1912
London	15,000	18	Formidable	1902
Lord Nelson	16,500	18	Lord Nelson	1908
Magnificent	14,900	17	Majestic	1895
Majestic	14,900	17	Majestic	1895
Mars	14,900	17	Majestic	1897
Marlborough	25,000	21	Iron Duke	1914
Monarch	22,500	21	Orion	1912
Neptune	19,900	21	Colossus	1911
Ocean	12,950	18	Canopus	1900
Orion	22,500	21	Orion	1911
Prince George	14,900	17	Majestic	1896
Prince of Wales	15,000	18	Formidable	1904
Queen	15,000	18	Formidable	1904
Russell	14,000	19	Duncan	1903
St. Vincent	19,250	21	St. Vincent	1910
Superb	18,600	21	Bellerophon	1909
Swiftsure	11,800	20	Swiftsure	1904

BATTLESHIPS—*continued*

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
22 Temeraire	18,600	21	Bellerophon	1909
23 Thunderer	22,500	21	Orion	1912
Triumph	11,985	20	Swiftsure	1904
21 Vanguard	19,250	21	St. Vincent	1910
Venerable	15,000	18	Formidable	1902
Vengeance	12,950	18	Canopus	1901
Victorious	14,900	17	Majestic	1897
25 Zealandia	16,350	18	King Edward VII	1905

26 No with Lord Nelson

MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL BATTLESHIPS

Iron Duke (1914): Ten 13·5-in., twelve 6-in. guns.

King George V (1912): Ten 13·5-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.

Orion (1911): Ten 13·5-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.

Colossus (1911): Ten 12-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.

St. Vincent (1910): Ten 12-in., eighteen 4-in. guns.

Bellerophon (1909): Ten 12-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.

Lord Nelson (1908): Four 12-in., ten 9·2-in. guns.

Dreadnought (1906): Ten 12-in guns, twenty-four 12 pr.

King Edward VII (1905): Four 12-in., four 9·2-in., ten 6-in. guns.

Swiftsure (1904): Four 10-in., fourteen 7·5-in. guns.

Duncan (1903): Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. guns.

Formidable (1901): Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. guns.

Canopus (1899): Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. guns.

Majestic (1895) Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. guns.

BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Launched
Warspite	27,500	25	Queen Elizabeth	1913
Queen Elizabeth	27,500	25	Queen Elizabeth	1913

N.B. These ships, nearing completion, rely entirely on oil fuel, while their heavy armament consists of eight 15-in. and twelve 6-in. guns.

BATTLESHIPS BUILDING

Barham, Malaya, Valiant, Ramillies, Repulse, Renown, Resistance, Resolution, Revenge, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign.

N.B. Of these the first three belong to the Queen Elizabeth class (*see above*), while the main armament of the remainder (which will not be completed till 1916) will probably consist of eight 15-in. and twelve 6-in. guns.

BATTLE-CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
Invincible	17,250	25	Invincible	1908
Inflexible	17,250	25	Invincible	1909
Indomitable	17,250	25	Invincible	1909
Indefatigable	18,750	25	Indefatigable	1911
Lion	26,350	28	Lion	1912
New Zealand	18,800	25	Indefatigable	1912
Princess Royal	26,350	28	Lion	1912
Queen Mary	27,000	28	Queen Mary	1914
Tiger	28,000	28	Queen Mary	1914

MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL SHIPS

Queen Mary (1914): Eight 13·5-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.

Lion (1912): Eight 13·5-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.

Indefatigable (1911): Eight 12-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.

Invincible (1909): Eight 12-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.

ARMOURED CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
Aboukir*	12,000	21	Cressy	1902
Achilles	13,550	23	Duke of Edinburgh	1907
Antrim	10,850	22½	Devonshire	1905
Argyll	10,850	22½	Devonshire	1905
Bacchante	12,000	21	Cressy	1904
Berwick	9,800	23	Monmouth	1903
Black Prince	13,550	23	Duke of Edinburgh	1906
Carnarvon	10,850	22½	Devonshire	1905
Cochrane	13,550	23	Duke of Edinburgh	1907
Cornwall	9,800	23	Monmouth	1904
Cressy*	12,000	21	Cressy	1901
Cumberland	9,800	23	Monmouth	1904
Defence	14,600	22½	Minotaur	1909
Devonshire	10,850	22½	Devonshire	1905
Donegal	9,800	23	Monmouth	1903
Drake	14,100	23	Drake	1902
Duke of Edinburgh	13,550	23	Duke of Edinburgh	1906
Essex	9,800	23	Monmouth	1903
Euryalus	12,000	21	Cressy	1904
Good Hope	14,100	23	Drake	1902
Hampshire	10,850	22½	Devonshire	1905
Hogue*	12,000	21	Cressy	1902
Kent	9,800	23	Monmouth	1903
King Alfred	14,100	23	Drake	1903
Leviathan	14,100	23	Drake	1903
Lancaster	9,800	23	Monmouth	1904
Minotaur	14,600	22½	Minotaur	1908

* Sunk by German submarines, September 22, 1914.

ARMoured CRUISERS—*continued*

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Com- pleted
Monmouth	9,800	23	Monmouth	1903
Natal	13,550	23	Duke of Edinburgh	1907
Roxburgh	10,850	22 $\frac{1}{4}$	Devonshire	1905
Shannon	14,600	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	Minotaur	1908
Suffolk	9,800	23	Monmouth	1904
Sutlej	12,000	21	Cressy	1902
Warrior	13,550	23	Duke of Edinburgh	1907

MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL
ARMoured CRUISERS

Minotaur (1908): Four 9·2-in., ten 7·5-in. guns.

Duke of Edinburgh (1906): Six 9·2-in., ten 6-in. guns.

Devonshire (1905): Four 7·5-in., six 6-in. guns.

Monmouth (1903): Fourteen 6-in. guns.

Drake (1902): Two 9·2 in., sixteen 6-in. guns.

Cressy (1901): Two 9·2-in., twelve 6-in. guns.

PROTECTED FIRST CLASS CRUISERS

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Com- pleted
Amphitrite	11,000	20 $\frac{3}{4}$	Diadem	1900
Argonaut	11,000	20 $\frac{3}{4}$	Diadem	1900
Europa	11,000	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	Diadem	1899
Terrible	14,200	22	Powerful	1898

PROTECTED SECOND CLASS CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
Birmingham	5440	25	Chatham 1	1914
Bristol	4800	27	Bristol	1910
Challenger	5880	21	Challenger	1904
Chatham	5400	25	Chatham 2	1912
Crescent	7700	20	Edgar	1894
Dartmouth	5250	25	Weymouth 1	1911
Diana	5600	19.5	Talbot	1898
Dido	5600	19.5	Talbot	1898
Doris	5600	19.5	Talbot	1898
Dublin	5400	25	Chatham 3	1913
Eclipse	5600	19.5	Talbot	1897
Edgar	7350	20	Edgar	1893
Endymion	7350	20	Edgar	1894
Falmouth	5250	25	Weymouth 2	1911
Gibraltar	7700	20	Edgar	1894
Glasgow	4800	27	Bristol	1910
Gloucester	4800	27	Bristol	1910
Grafton	7350	20	Edgar	1894
Hawke	7350	20	Edgar	1893
Hermes	5600	20	Highflyer	1902
Highflyer	5600	20	Highflyer	1900
Hyacinth	5600	20	Highflyer	1901
Isis	5600	19.5	Talbot	1898
Juno	5600	19.5	Talbot	1898
Liverpool	4800	27	Bristol	1910
Lowestoft	5440	25	Chatham 4	1914
Minerva	5600	19.5	Talbot	1897
Newcastle	4800	27	Bristol	1910
Nottingham	5440	25	Chatham 5	1914
Royal Arthur	7700	20	Edgar	1893
Southampton	5400	25	Chatham 6	1913
Talbot	5600	19.5	Talbot	1897
Theseus	7350	20	Edgar	1894
Venus	5600	19.5	Talbot	1895
Vindictive	5750	20	Arrogant	1897
Weymouth	5250	25	Weymouth 3	1911
Yarmouth	5250	25	Weymouth 4	1912

MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL SECOND CLASS CRUISERS

Diadem (1898): Sixteen 6-in. guns.

Chatham (1912): Eight 6-in. guns.

Weymouth (1911): Eight 6-in. guns.

Bristol (1910): Two 6-in., ten 4-in. guns.

Challenger (1904): Eleven 6-in. guns.

Highflyer (1900): Eleven 6-in. guns.

Talbot (1896): Eleven 6-in. guns.

Edgar (1893): Two 9.2-in., ten 6-in. guns.

PROTECTED THIRD CLASS CRUISERS

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Com- pleted
Active	3440	26	Boadicea	1911
Amphion*	3440	26	Boadicea	1912
Astræa	4360	19.5	Astræa	1894
Bellona	3350	26	Boadicea	1910
Blanche	3350	26	Boadicea	1910
Blonde	3350	26	Boadicea	1911
Boadicea	3300	26	Boadicea	1909
Charybdis	4360	19.5	Astræa	1895
Diamond	3000	23	Topaze	1905
Fearless	3440	26	Boadicea	1913
Fox	4360	19.5	Astræa	1895
Hermione	4360	19.5	Astræa	1895
Pegasus†	2135	20	Pelorus	1899
Pelorus	2135	20	Pelorus	1897
Psyche	2135	20	Pelorus	1900
Proserpine	2135	20	Pelorus	1899
Pyramus	2135	20	Pelorus	1900
Philomel	2575	19	Philomel	1892
Sapphire	3000	23	Topaze	1905
Sappho	3400	20	Apollo	1893
Topaze	3000	23	Topaze	1905

* Sunk by German mine, August 6, 1914.

† Disabled by Königsburg, September 20, 1914.

MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL THIRD CLASS CRUISERS

Boadicea (1909): Six 4-in. guns.

Topaze (1905): Twelve 4-in. guns.

Pelorus (1897): Eight 4-in. guns.

Astræa (1894): Two 6-in., eight 4·7-in. guns.

NEW FAST LIGHT CRUISERS

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Com- pleted
Arethusa	3750	29	Arethusa	1914
Aurora	3750	29	Arethusa	1914

NEW FAST LIGHT CRUISERS (LAUNCHED)

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Launched
Cordelia	3800	29	—	1914
Galatea	3750	29	—	1914
Inconstant	3750	29	—	1914

N.B. The main armament of these fast light Cruisers consists of two 6-in. and eight 4-in. guns.

NEW FAST LIGHT CRUISERS (BUILDING)

Calliope, Caroline, Carysfort, Champion, Cleopatra, Conquest, Comus, Penelope, Phæton, Royalist.

SCOUTS (LIGHT CRUISERS)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
Adventure	2670	25	Sentinel	1905
Amethyst	3000	23	Topaze	1905
Attentive	2670	25	Sentinel	1906
Foresight	2850	25	Sentinel	1905
Forward	2850	25	Sentinel	1905
Patrol	2940	25	Sentinel	1905
Pathfinder*	2850	25	Sentinel	1905
Sentinel	2895	25	Sentinel	1905
Skirmisher	2895	25	Sentinel	1905

N.B. The main armament of these fast Scouts consists of nine 4-in. guns.

* Sunk by German submarine, September 5, 1914.

MINE-LAYERS (LIGHT CRUISERS)

Apollo (3400 tons).	Intrepid (3600 tons).
Andromache (3400 tons).	Latona (3400 tons).
Iphigenia (3600 tons).	Naiad (3400 tons).
Thetis (3400 tons).	

FLOTILLA LEADERS

Swift (2170 tons): Speed 37 knots, four 4-in. guns.

Broke	} Purchased from Chilian Government 1914.
Faulknor	

FLOTILLA LEADERS (COMPLETING)

Kempenfelt: Speed 31 knots, six 4-in. guns.

Nimrod: Speed 31 knots, six 4-in. guns.

TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS

"M" CLASS (building): Manly, Mansfield, Mastiff, Matchless, Mentor, Meteor, Milne, Minos, Moorsom, Morris, Murray, Myngs.

"M" CLASS (completed): Miranda.

"L" CLASS (1913-14): Displacement, 965 tons; 29 knots; three 4-in. guns; four torpedo tubes. Laertes, Laforey, Lance, Landrail, Lark, Laurel, Laverock, Lawford, Legion, Lennox, Leonidas, Liberty, Linnet, Llewellyn, Lookout, Louis, Loyal, Lucifer, Lydiard, Lysander.

"K" CLASS (1912-13): Displacement, 935 tons; 29-30 knots; three 4-in. guns; two torpedo tubes. Acasta, Achates, Ambuscade, Ardent, Christopher, Cockatrice, Contest, Fortune, Garland, Hardy, Lynx, Midge, Owl, Paragon, Porpoise, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, Unity, Victor.

"I" CLASS (1911): 27-30 knots; two 4-in. guns; two 12-pdrs.; two torpedo tubes. Acheron (773 tons), Archer (775 tons), Ariel (763 tons), Attack (785 tons), Badger (800 tons); Beaver (810 tons), Defender (762 tons), Druid (770 tons), Ferret (750 tons), Firedrake (767 tons), Forester (760 tons), Goshawk (760 tons), Hind (775 tons), Hornet (775 tons), Hydra (770 tons), Jackal (746 tons), Lapwing (745 tons), Lizard (745 tons), Lurcher (765 tons), Oak (765 tons), Phoenix (765 tons), Sandfly (780 tons), Tigress (745 tons).

"H" CLASS (1910-11): Displacement, 780 tons; 27-29 knots; two 4-in. guns; two torpedo tubes. Acorn, Alarm, Brisk, Cameleon, Comet, Fury, Goldfinch, Hope, Larne, Lyra, Martin, Minstrel, Nemesis, Nereide, Nymphé, Redpole, Rifleman, Rugby, Sheldrake, Staunch.

"G" CLASS (1909-10): Displacement, 885-984 tons; 27 knots; one 4-in. gun; two torpedo tubes. Basilisk, Beagle, Bulldog, Foxhound, Grampus, Grasshopper, Harpy, Mosquito, Pincher, Raccoon, Rattlesnake, Renard, Savage, Scorpion, Scourge, Wolverine.

"F" CLASS (1907-09): Displacement, 865-1090 tons; 33-35 knots; five 12-pdrs.; two torpedo tubes. Afride, Amazon (2 4-in. guns), Cossack, Crusader (2 4-in. guns), Ghurka, Maori (2 4-in. guns), Mohawk, Nubian (2 4-in. guns), Saracen (2 4-in. guns), Tarter, Viking (2 4-in. guns), Zulu (2 4-in. guns).

"E" CLASS: Displacement, 550 tons; 25 knots; four 12-pdrs.; two torpedo tubes. Arun, Boyne, Chelmer, Cherwell, Colne, Dee, Derwent, Doon, Eden, Erne, Ettrick, Exe, Foyle, Garry, Itchen, Jed, Kale, Kennet, Liffey, Moy,

Ness, Nith, Ouse, Ribble, Rother, Stour, Swale, Test, Teviot, Ure, Usk, Waveney, Wear, Welland.

"D" Class (1896-1900): Displacement, 300-400 tons; 30 knots; one 12-pdr. gun; five 6-pdr., two torpedo tubes. Angler, Coquette, Cygnet, Cynthia, Desperate, Fame, Mallard, Stag.

"C" CLASS (1896-1901): Displacement, 300-400 tons; 30 knots; one 12-pdr. gun; five 6-pdr., two torpedo tubes. Albatross, Avon, Bat, Bittern, Brazon, Bullfinch, Cheerful, Crane, Dove, Electra, Fairy, Falcon, Fawn, Flirt, Flying Fish, Gipsy, Greyhound, Kestrel, Leopard, Leven, Mermaid, Osprey, Ostrich, Racehorse, ~~Recruit~~, Roebuck, Star, Sylvia, Thorn, Velox, Vigilant, Violet, Vixen, Vulture.

"B" CLASS (1895-1901): Displacement, 300-400 tons; one 12-pdr., five 6-pdr. guns; two torpedo tubes. Albacore, Arab, Bonetta, Earnest, Express, Griffon, Kangaroo, Lively, Locust, Myrmidon, Orwell, Panther, Peterel, Quail, Seal, Spiteful, Sprightly, Success, Syren, Thrasher, Wolf.

"A" CLASS (1894-95): Displacement, 275-320 tons; one 12-pdr. gun; five 6-pdr., two torpedo tubes. Conflict, Fervent, Lightning, Opossum, Porcupine, Sunfish, Surly, Zephyr.

SUBMARINES

80 completed. 16 building.

Class	No. in Class	Date of Building	Submerged Speed	Surface Speed	Displacement
"A"	9	1904-06	9 knots	12 knots	200 tons
"B"	10	1904-06	9 "	13 "	314 "
"C"	37	1906-09	10 "	14 "	320 "
"D"	8	1910-11	10 "	16 "	550 "
"E"	16	1911-13	12 "	16 "	810 "

The boats of the "E" class are the latest in the Navy. They have a radius of 2000 miles, and are capable of remaining about twenty-four hours under water. They carry four torpedo tubes and two quick-firing guns. On the surface they run with heavy oil engines, and under water they are driven by motors

supplied with electric current from accumulators. They have cabins and berthing for about twenty-five officers and men. Most of them carry two torpedo tubes.

Several boats of the "F" class are now building, and will displace nearly 1200 tons and carry six torpedo tubes, and disappearing quick-firing guns.

TORPEDO BOATS IN COMMISSION

The number of torpedo boats is ninety-one, of which twenty-one are over twenty years old.

LIST OF MERCHANT VESSELS

Commissioned as H.M. Ships

Alsatian, Anglia, Aquitania, Armadale Castle, Cambria, Carmania, Caronia, Empress, Empress of Britain, Engadine, Kinfauns Castle, Macedonia, Mantua, Marmora, Otranto, Riviera, Scotia, Tara, Venetia, Victorian.

DEFENCE FORCES OF THE DOMINIONS AUSTRALIA

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Guns	Com- pleted
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BATTLE-CRUISER

Australia	19,200	25	Eight 12-in., sixteen 4-in.	1913
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PROTECTED SECOND CLASS CRUISER

Encounter	5880	21	Eleven 6-in.	1906
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LIGHT CRUISER

Pioneer	2200	20	Eight 4-in.	1900
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AUSTRALIA—*continued*

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Guns	Com- pleted
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NEW LIGHT CRUISERS

Melbourne	5600	25½	Eight 6-in.	1913
Sydney	5600	25½	Eight 6-in.	1913

NEW LIGHT CRUISER (BUILDING)

Brisbane	5600	25½	—	—
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TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS

Parramatta (700 tons), Warrego (700 tons), Yarra (700 tons).

TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS (BUILDING)

Derwent (700 tons), Swan (700 tons), Torrens (700 tons).

SUBMARINES

*AE 1 ; AE 2.

* Sank, September 20, 1914.

CANADA

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Guns	Com- pleted
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FIRST CLASS CRUISER

Niobe	11,000	20	Sixteen 6-in.	1899
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SECOND CLASS CRUISER

Rainbow	3600	20	Two 6-in.	1893
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THE GERMAN NAVY

BATTLESHIPS (MODERN)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
12" { König Albert	24,312	21	Kaiser	1913
5.9" { Kaiserin	24,312	21	Kaiser	1913
Freiderich Der Grosse	24,312	21	Kaiser	1912
Kaiser	24,312	21	Kaiser	1912
Prinz Regent Luitpold	24,312	21	Kaiser	1913
12" { Helgoland	22,440	20	Helgoland	1911
5.9" { Oldenburg	22,440	20	Helgoland	1911
Ostfreisland	22,440	20	Helgoland	1912
Thüringen	22,440	20	Helgoland	1911
11" { Nassau	18,600	20	Nassau	1909
5.9" { Posen	18,600	20	Nassau	1910
Rheinland	18,600	20	Nassau	1910
Westfalen	18,600	20	Nassau	1909

BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Probable date of Completion
15" { König	26,575	23	König	1914
5.9" { Grosser Kurfurst	26,575	23	König	1914
Markgraf	26,575	23	König	1914
Kronprinz	26,575	23	König	1915

MAIN ARMAMENTS OF TYPICAL BATTLESHIPS

Kaiser (1913): Ten 12-in., fourteen 5·9-in. guns.

Helgoland (1911): Twelve 12-in., fourteen 5·9-in. guns.

Nassau (1909): Twelve 11-in., twelve 5·9-in. guns.

König (1914): Ten 12-in., fourteen 5·9-in. guns.

BATTLESHIPS (MODERN) BUILDING

Ersatz Wörth: Probable displacement, 29,000 tons; designed speed, 23 knots.

"T": Probable displacement, 29,000 tons; designed speed, 23 knots.

N.B. These two ships may be armed with eight 15-in. and sixteen 5·9-in. guns.

BATTLESHIPS (OLDER)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
Deutschland	13,000	19	Deutschland	1906
Hannover	13,000	19	Deutschland	1907
Pommern	13,000	19	Deutschland	1907
Schlesien	13,000	19	Deutschland	1908
Schleswig-Holstein	13,000	19	Deutschland	1908
Braunschweig	13,000	19	Braunschweig	1904
Elsass	13,000	19	Braunschweig	1904
Hessen	13,000	19	Braunschweig	1905
Lothringen	13,000	19	Braunschweig	1906
Preussen	13,000	19	Braunschweig	1905
Mecklenburg	11,643	18	Wittelsbach	1903
Wettin	11,643	18	Wittelsbach	1902
Wittelsbach	11,643	18	Wittelsbach	1902
Schwaben	11,643	18	Wittelsbach	1903
Zähringen	11,643	18	Wittelsbach	1902
Kaiser Barbarossa	10,600	17	Kaiser Friedrich	1901
Kaiser Friedrich III	10,600	17	Kaiser Friedrich	1898

BATTLESHIPS (OLDER)—*continued*

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Class	Completed
9.4 { Kaiser Karl der Grosse	10,600	17	Kaiser Friedrich	1901
6.7 { Kaiser Wilhelm II	10,600	17	Kaiser Friedrich	1900
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse	10,600	17	Kaiser Friedrich	1901

N.B. The Deutschland and Braunschweig classes are armed with four 11-in. and fourteen 6.7 in. guns; the Wittelsbach and Kaiser Friedrich classes are armed with four 9.4-in. and eighteen 6-in. guns.

BATTLE-CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Main Armament	Completed
Derfflinger	26,200	27	Eight 12-in., twelve 5.9-in.	1914
Goeben*	22,640	28	Ten 11-in., twelve 5.9-in.	1912
Moltke	22,640	28	Ten 11-in., twelve 5.9-in.	1911
Seydlitz	24,600	27	Ten 11-in., twelve 5.9-in.	1913
Von der Tann	18,700	28	Eight 11-in., ten 5.9-in.	1911

* Sold (?) to Turkey.

BATTLE-CRUISERS (BUILDING)

Ersatz Hertha: Probable displacement, 28,000 tons; designed speed, 27 knots.

Ersatz Victoria Luise: Probable displacement, 28,000 tons; designed speed, 27 knots.

Lützow: Probable displacement, 26,200 tons; designed speed, 27 knots.

ARMoured CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Main Armament	Completed
Blücher	15,550	25	Twelve 8·2-in., eight 5·9 in.	1909
Gneisenau	11,400	23	Eight 8·2-in., six 5·9-in.	1908
Scharnhorst	11,400	23	Eight 8·2-in., six 5·9-in.	1907
Fürst Bismarck*	10,750	19	Four 9·4-in., twelve 5·9-in.	1900
Roon	9,350	21	Four 8·2-in., ten 5·9-in.	1905
Yorck	9,350	21	Four 8·2-in., ten 5·9-in.	1905
Prinz Adalbert	8,850	21	Four 8·2-in., ten 5·9-in.	1903
Friedrich Karl	8,850	21	Four 8·2-in., ten 5·9-in.	1903
Prinz Heinrich	8,760	20	Two 9·4-in., ten 5·9-in.	1902

* Is being converted into a torpedo training-ship.

PROTECTED CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Main Armament	Completed
Kaiserin Augusta	6000	20	Twelve 5·9-in., eight 3·4-in.	1894
Freya	5600	19	Two 8·2-in., six 9·5-in.	1898

PROTECTED CRUISERS—*continued*

	Displace- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Main Armament	Com- pleted
Hansa	5791	19	Two 8·2-in., eight 5·9-in.	1899
Hertha	5600	19	Two 8·2-in., six 5·9-in.	1898
Victoria Luise	5600	19	Two 8·2-in., six 6-in.	1898
Vineta	5600	19	Two 8·2-in., six 5·9-in.	1899
Rostock	4870	28	Twelve 4-in.	1913
Karlsruhe	4870	28	Twelve 4-in.	1913
Graudenz	4870	28	Twelve 4-in.	1913
Regensburg	4870	28	Twelve 4-in.	1914
Breslau*	4520	28	Twelve 4-in.	1912
Strassburg	4520	28	Twelve 4-in.	1912
Stralsund	4520	28	Twelve 4-in.	1912
Augsburg	4280	27	Twelve 4-in.	1910
Kolberg	4280	27	Twelve 4-in.	1910
Magdeburg†	4478	27	Twelve 4-in.	1912
Mainz‡	4280	26	Twelve 4·1-in.	1909
Köln‡	4280	26	Twelve 4·1-in.	1909
Dresden	3544	27	Twelve 4-in.	1908
Emden	3544	24½	Ten 4-in.	1909
Koenigsburg	3350	24	Ten 4-in.	1907
Nürnberg	3350	23	Ten 4·1-in.	1908
Stettin	3350	23	Ten 4·1-in.	1908
Stuttgart	3350	23	Ten 4·1-in.	1908
Bremen	3200	22½	Ten 4·1-in.	1904
Berlin	3200	22½	Ten 4·1-in.	1905
Danzig	3200	22½	Ten 4·1-in.	1907
Hamburg	3200	22½	Ten 4·1-in.	1904
Leipzig	3200	22½	Ten 4·1-in.	1906
Lübeck	3200	22½	Ten 4·1-in.	1906
Munchen	3200	22½	Ten 4·1-in.	1905

* Sold to Turkey.

† Sunk by Russian fleet, August 27, 1914.

‡ Sunk by British fleet, August 28, 1914.

PROTECTED CRUISERS—*continued*

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Main Armament	Completed
Arkona	2660	21	Ten 4.1-in.	1903
Frauenlob	2660	21	Ten 4.1-in.	1903
Undine	2660	21	Ten 4.1-in.	1903
Amazona	2630	21½	Ten 4.1-in.	1901
Gazelle	2630	20½	Ten 4.1-in.	1898
Medusa	2630	21½	Ten 4.1-in.	1901
Niobe	2630	20	Ten 4.1-in.	1899
Nymphe	2630	20	Ten 4.1-in.	1901
Thetis	2630	21½	Ten 4.1-in.	1901
Ariadne*	2630	21½	Ten 4.1-in.	1901

* Sunk by Russian fleet, August 27, 1914.

PROTECTED CRUISERS (BUILDING)

Ersatz Gefion : Probable displacement, 5500 tons ; designed speed, 28 knots.

Ersatz Hela : Probable displacement, 5500 tons ; designed speed, 28 knots.

GUNBOATS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Condor	1600	15	1892-95
Cormoran	1600	15	1892-95
Geier	1600	15	1892-95
Seeadler	1600	15	1892-95
Iltis	880	14	1898-1900
Jaguar	880	14	1898-1900
Tiger	880	14	1898-1900
Luhs	880	14	1898-1900
Panther	900	14	1902-3
Eber	900	14	1902-3

THE GERMAN NAVY

TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS

142 completed. 10 building.

TORPEDO BOATS

47, excluding those twenty years old.

3 MINE-LAYERS

SUBMARINES

27 completed. 12 building.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY

BATTLESHIPS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Arpad	8,208	19	1903
Badenberg	8,208	19	1904
Erzherog Friedrich	10,433	20	1906
Erzherog Karl	10,433	20	1905
Erzherog Ferdinand Max	10,433	20	1907
Erzherog Franz Ferdinand	14,226	20	1910
Habsburg	8,208	19	1902
Radetzky	14,226	20	1911
Tegetthoff	20,000	20	1913
Viribus Unitis	20,000	20	1913
Zrinyi	14,226	20	1911

BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Launched
Prinz Eugen	20,000	20	1912
Szent Istvan	20,000	20	1914

244 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY

FIRST CLASS CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Kaiserin Maria Theresia	5185	19	1895
Kaiser Karl VI	6150	20	1900
St. Georg	7180	22	1906

LIGHT CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Admiral Spaun	3500	26	1910
Aspern	2362	20	1901
Kaiserin Elizabeth	3966	19	1892
Kaiser Franz Josef I	3966	19	1891
Szigetvár	2313	20	1901

LIGHT CRUISERS (LAUNCHED)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Launched
Helgoland	3500	27	1912
Novara	3500	27	1913
Saida	3500	27	1912

19 DESTROYERS

58 TORPEDO BOATS

SUBMARINES

10 completed. 4 building.

THE FRENCH NAVY

BATTLESHIPS (MODERN)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Main Armament	Completed
Condorcet	18,028	19	Four 12-in., twelve 9·4-in.	1911
Courbet	23,100	20	Twelve 12-in., twenty-two 5·5-in.	1913
Danton	18,028	20	Four 12-in., twelve 9·4-in.	1911
Diderot	18,028	19·73	Four 12-in., twelve 9·4-in.	1911
Jean Bart	23,100	21	Twelve 12-in., twenty-two 5·5-in.	1913
Mirabeau	18,028	19·73	Four 12-in., twelve 9·4-in.	1911
Vergniaud	18,028	19·67	Four 12-in., twelve 9·4-in.	1911
Voltaire	18,028	20·66	Four 12-in., twelve 9·4-in.	1911

BATTLESHIPS (OLDER)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Bouvet	12,007	18	1898
Brénnus	11,190	17	1893
Carnot	12,000	18	1897
Charlemagne	11,108	18	1898

BATTLESHIPS (OLDER)—*continued*

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Charles Martel	11,693	18	1897
Démocratie	14,635	19	1907
Gaulois	11,105	18	1899
Henry IV	8,807	17	1902
Jauréguiberry	11,650	18	1896
Justice	14,635	19	1907
Masséna	11,735	17	1898
Patrie	14,635	19	1906
République	14,635	19	1906
St. Louis	11,000	18	1900
Suffren	12,527	18	1903
Vérité	14,635	19	1908

N.B. Most of these battleships carry two 12-in. and two 10·8-in., and a varying number of 5·5-in. guns.

BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Launched
Bretagne	23,177	20	1913
France*	23,100	20	1912
Lorraine	23,177	20	1913
Paris*	23,000	20	1912
Provence	23,177	20	1913

* Should be completed this year.

BATTLESHIPS (BUILDING)

	Displacement Tons	Designed Speed Knots	
Béarn	24,830	21	—
Flandre	24,830	21	—
Gascogne	24,830	21	—
Languedoc	24,830	21	—
Normandie	24,830	21	—

BATTLE-CRUISERS

None built or building.

FIRST CLASS CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Amiral Aube	9,856	21	1904
Amiral Gueydon	9,367	21	1902
Condé	9,856	21	1904
Desaix	7,578	21	1903
Dupetit Thouars	9,367	22	1905
Dupleix	7,578	21	1903
Edgard Quinet	13,427	23	1911
Ernest Renan	13,427	25	1909
Gloire	9,856	21	1904
Jeanne d'Arc	11,092	21	1903
Jules Ferry	12,350	22	1906
Jules Michelet	11,092	23	1906
Kléber	7,578	21	1904
Léon Gambetta	12,350	23	1904
Marseillaise	9,856	21	1903
Montcalm	9,367	21	1902
Victor Hugo	12,350	22	1907
Waldeck-Rousseau	13,780	23	1911

N.B. These ships carry two or more 7·6-in., eight 6·4-in. guns, and several 4·1-in. guns.

LIGHT CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Amiral Charner	4702	18	1895
Bruix	4735	18	1896
Cassard	3890	19	1898
Chateaurenault	7898	24	1902
D'Entrecasteaux	7990	19½	1898
D'Estrées	2421	20½	1900
Du Chayla	3890	20	1897
Friant	3882	19	1894
Guichen	8150	23	1902
Jurien de la Gravière	5590	22	1901
Lavoisier	2285	20	1899
Pothuau	5374	19	1895

DESTROYERS

83 completed. 4 building.

153 TORPEDO BOATS

SUBMARINES

70 completed. 23 building.

THE RUSSIAN NAVY

N.B. The abbreviation "B.S." denotes Black Sea Fleet

BATTLESHIPS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Andrei Pervozvanni	17,400	21	1910
Cesarevitch	12,912	19	1903
Evstafi, B.S.	12,733	16	1911
Imperator Pavel I	17,400	18	1911
Ioann Zlatoust, B.S.	12,733	16	1910
Panteleimon, B.S.	12,582	17	1902
Rostislav, B.S.	8,880	16	1900
Sinope, B.S.	10,180	16	1890
Slava	13,516	18	1905

N.B. The more recent of these ships carry four 12-in. and twelve 8-in., and a large number of 4·7-in. guns.

BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Launched
Alexander III, B.S.	22,500	21	1914
Gangut*	23,000	21	1911
Imperatritsa Maria, B.S.	22,500	21	1913
Petropavlovsk*	23,000	21	1911
Poltava*	23,000	21	1911
Sevastopol*	23,000	21	1911

* May be completed this year.

BATTLESHIP (BUILDING)

Ekaterina II, B.S., 22,500 tons.

BATTLE-CRUISERS (BUILDING)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	
Borodino	32,200	27	—
Ismail	32,200	27	—
Kinburn	32,200	27	—
Navarin	32,200	27	—

FIRST CLASS CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Admiral Makaroff	7,900	22	1908
Bayan	7,900	21	1910
Gromoboi	13,220	20	1900
Pallada	7,900	21	1910
Rossia	12,130	20	1897
Rurik	15,170	21	1907

LIGHT CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Almaz	3285	19	1904
Askold	5905	23	1901
Aurora	6700	20	1902
Diana	6630	20	1902
Kagul, B.S.	6675	23	1905
Oleg	6675	23	1904
Pamyat Mercuria, B.S.	6675	23	1907
Zemtchug	3106	23	1903

LIGHT CRUISERS (BUILDING)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	
Admiral Boutakoff	7600	32	—
Admiral Greig	7600	32	—
Admiral Lazareff, B.S.	7600	32	—
Admiral Nakkimoff, B.S.	7600	32	—
Admiral Nevelskoi	4300	32	—
Admiral Skiridoff	7600	32	—
Mouravieff Amoursky	4300	32	—
Svietlana	7600	32	—

105 DESTROYERS

25 TORPEDO BOATS

SUBMARINES

25 completed. 18 building.

THE ITALIAN NAVY

BATTLESHIPS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Ammiraglio di St. Bon	9,645	18	1901
Benedetto Brin	13,214	19	1905
Dante Alighieri	19,400	23	1912
Emanuelo Filiberto	9,645	18	1901
Guilio Cesare	22,340	23	1914
Leonardo da Vinci	22,340	23	1914
Napoli	12,425	22	1909
Regina Elena	12,425	22	1907
Regina Margherita	13,214	20	1904
Re Umberto	13,673	19	1893
Roma	12,425	22	1909
Sardegna	13,640	20	1895
Vittorio Emanuele III	12,425	22	1907
Saint Bon	9,645	18	1900

BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Launched
Conte di Cavour	22,340	22	1911
Doria (Andrea)	23,025	23	1913
Duilio (Caio)	23,025	23	1913

BATTLESHIP (BUILDING)

"G," 28,000 tons, 25 speed knots (?).

FIRST CLASS CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Amalfi	9956	23	1909
Carlo Alberto	6396	19	1898
Francesco Ferruccio	7294	20	1904
Giuseppe Garibaldi	7294	20	1901
Marco Polo	4511	19	1894
Pisa	9956	23	1909
San Giorgio	9832	22	1910
San Marco	9832	22	1910
Varese	7294	20	1901
Vettor Pisani	6396	20	1897

LIGHT CRUISERS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Calabria	2452	16	1897
Elba	2689	17	1895
Etruria	2245	19	1893
Libia	3690	22	1913
Liguria	2245	19	1894
Puglia	2498	20	1901
Quarto	3220	28	1912

LIGHT CRUISERS (LAUNCHED)

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Launched
Marsala	3400	28	1912
Nino Bixio	3400	28	1911

LIGHT CRUISERS (BUILDING)

Basilicata (2460 tons).

Campania (2460 tons).

Mirabello (5000 tons).

DESTROYERS

36 completed. 10 building.

70 TORPEDO BOATS

SUBMARINES

18 completed. 10 building.

AIR CRAFT OF THE FIGHTING NATIONS

BRITISH

BATTLE AIRSHIP (BUILDING)

One rigid battle airship of 23 tons displacement, with 44 knots speed, is being built.

SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS

7 completed. 7 building.

Seven of these airships varying from 1 to 10 tons displacement, with speed from 25 to 44 knots, are completed, while 7 varying from 10 to 15 tons displacement, with speed from 40 to 44 knots, are building.

AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES

About 250 are completed.

GERMANY

BATTLE AIRSHIPS

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Zeppelin L3 *	32	40	1914
„ Z8	22	42	1914
„ Z7	22	42	1913

* Has maintained a speed of over sixty miles an hour, and remained in the air thirty-five hours. She can carry at least a ton and a half of explosives.

BATTLE AIRSHIPS—*continued*

	Displacement Tons	Speed Knots	Completed
Zeppelin Z6	19	42	1913
„ Z5	19	42	1913
„ Z4	19	42	1913
„ Z3	17	42	1912
„ Z2	17	41	1911
„ Z1	19	42	1913
„ (Sachsen)	19	42	1913
„ (Hansa)	18	43	1912
„ (Victoria Luise)	18	42	1912
Parseval	27	43	1914
Schutte-Lanz L4	30	?	1914
„ SL2	23	?	1914

BATTLE AIRSHIPS (BUILDING)

One Zeppelin of 32 tons displacement, with 44 knots speed.

Other Zeppelins are doubtless building, but reliable particulars are not available.

SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS

5 completed. 1 building.

Five of these airships varying from 6 to 13 tons displacement, with speed from 24 to 41 knots, are completed.

One Scouting and Bomb-dropping Airship is being built.

AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES

About 500 completed.

FRANCE

BATTLE AIRSHIP (COMPLETED)

Zodiac, 20 tons displacement, completed 1912.

BATTLE AIRSHIP (BUILDING)

Astra, 38 tons displacement, 61 knots speed.

SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS

8 completed. 4 completing.
3 building.

AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES

About 830 completed.

RUSSIA

SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS

7 (efficient) completed. 4 building.

AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES

About 500 completed.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS

3 completed. None building.

AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES

About 100 completed.

ITALY

SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS

10 completed. 1 building.

AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES

About 150.

NEW THINGS IN WAR

GUN-TURRETS ON LAND—AEROPLANE AND SUB-
MARINE—THE FRENCH ZEPPELIN DESTROYER—
MINES ON LAND AND AT SEA

By JOHN S. GREGORY

WAR is now waged on earth, in the air, on the sea, and beneath the waters thereof with the aid of numerous devices never before tested in actual hostilities. Aeroplanes, automobiles, and submarines have been used in previous wars, but on scarcely more than an experimental scale. All have been greatly improved since these tests and many accessories have been added.

The most spectacular of new developments in warfare is the advent of the airship and the aeroplane on an imposing scale. Military authorities appear to have become convinced of the value of these new fighting machines. At least, France, Germany and Russia, and more recently England, have displayed an energy amounting to frenzy in the development of these machines. With £6,500,000 for the purpose, Germany set out to offset England's naval supremacy by building a great fleet of dirigibles. At first the Admiralty professed to scoff at Germany's purpose; but after contemplating the possibility of a fleet of airships

flying across the North Sea a comprehensive programme for building air craft was undertaken in haste.

Millions have been lavished on experiments with air craft, aviators have been drilled by hundreds, every contingency in war that could be foreseen has been tested at the annual army manœuvres of the great nations. The result has been the development of two widely different types of flying machines, each of which has its own peculiar sphere of usefulness.

Germany pins her faith to the dirigible, "The Dreadnought of the Air," of which two principal types have been developed, the Zeppelin and the Schuette-Lanz. These monsters are from 400 to 500 feet long, have a speed of 50 to 70 miles an hour, a cruising radius of 1200 to 3000 miles, and a carrying capacity of from 8 to 10 tons. They are armoured against rifle and machine gun bullets, carry small guns, wireless telegraph, and a crew of 20 to 30 men.

As an indication of their reliability, the Zeppelin Company announced that out of 334 days from January 1 to December 1, 1912, their airships flew on 308 days, bringing up a total of 1167 hours and covering a distance of 41,145 miles and carrying a total of 10,291 persons, including 5609 members of the crews and 4682 passengers, all without a single fatal accident.

From the German point of view these craft are battleships of great destructive power, for they can release half a ton of explosives at once; and in experiments they have completely shot to pieces the silhouette of a village from an alti-

tude of six thousand feet. Another, flying at an altitude of three thousand feet, got the range of a canvas target representing a boat on Lake Constance at the third shot, and then scored nearly one hundred per cent. of hits. Some of these big ships have a platform on the top of the gas bag on which a machine gun is mounted as a protection against aeroplanes.

Against these bulky and somewhat clumsy dirigibles France has developed the "Zeppelin Hunter," an aeroplane, armoured against machine gun and rifle bullets, carrying two or three men besides the pilot and a couple of machine guns. The French regard an encounter between an aeroplane and a dirigible as a climbing contest. The strategy of the aeroplanist is to get above his big and awkward antagonist and from this superior height to drop explosives upon him. The dirigible, on the other hand, depends upon its superior armament and the far greater steadiness of its gun platform to protect it from the aeroplane.

These widely different types of air craft are expected to play two distinct rôles: the dirigible is a fighting machine to be directed against troops in the field, and more especially against the works of the enemy, trains, bridges, magazines, &c., and to protect its own lines from incursions by hostile aeroplanes on scouting expeditions. The chief value of the aeroplane is in reconnaissance. Its superior speed is expected to enable it to elude dirigibles. Only in an incidental way is it expected to assume the offensive, with its machine gun or by dropping bombs.

An exception to this is the giant Sikorsky

aeroplane, a Russian machine capable of carrying seventeen men. With its great bulk and comparatively slow speed this recently invented type must necessarily be a fighting machine rather than an aerial scout.

Notwithstanding the frequency of tragedies in the air the aeroplane also has been developed into a fairly trustworthy machine. Colonel Seely surprised the House of Commons last April by informing it that there were only six days in the preceding year on which there had been no flights by British army aviators, and that there had not been a single fatal accident or the breakage of any main part of a machine while in the air.

In France, where the aeroplane is considered more valuable than the dirigible, the aviation corps has been organized with the *Escadrille* as the unit. The personnel and matériel of the *Escadrille* is designed with the object of keeping six machines in the field. Its transport consists of three automobiles for the crews, two motorcycles, six motor trucks with "prolonges," an extra pair of trailing wheels on which the aeroplanes, folded, are hauled, and two workshops on motor trucks. One of these aviation camps was struck, packed, and ready to move in less than an hour at the 1913 manœuvres.

THE NEW ART OF OBSERVATION IN MID-AIR

The aeroplane scout must fly high and swiftly to avoid hostile bullets. At an altitude of three thousand feet, at which he is fairly safe, he has a range of vision of four to five miles. Troops on the march can be seen and their number esti-

mated by the road space occupied. Artillery in action is easily distinguishable, as are cavalry and transport of all kinds on the move. Massed infantry in the open is fairly distinct, though khaki-clad men in open order or moving over stubble or ploughed fields are difficult to distinguish and they are not always readily seen on grass. The flying scout can readily obtain an idea of trenches, outposts, and methods of occupation of bridges and fords. Field works, if their colour and outlines do not blend with the landscape, can be seen at a distance of five miles, though they are not readily distinguishable. It is difficult for the aviator to tell "dummy" trenches from real ones.

French aerial scouting is superb. The commanding general can count on having any specified region examined. The art of observation from mid-air has been reduced to a system as exactly regulated as that of cavalry reconnaissance. British aviators have also distinguished themselves by their success in aerial scouting.

Yet there is another side to the story, for aviators are as far from perfection as their fellow mortals are in other ways. At the 1913 manœuvres, a French general and his staff were surprised and captured despite the utmost vigilance of his aerial scouts. A British "Blue" division of twelve thousand men with horses stole a march of sixteen miles on the "Red" division while the aerial scouts of the latter were hunting for it. The men skulked along under hedgerows and other cover while guns and transport wagons were hidden under straw so that they might be mistaken for farmers'

wagons. Whenever a "Red" aeroplane came into view a whistle from the "Blue" lookout warned every man to crouch in his tracks, or under the nearest cover. Aerial scouts have been repeatedly deceived in German manoeuvres.

Although the Germans claim to have dropped bombs from an altitude of five thousand feet on a target fifteen feet in diameter, extravagant claims regarding the effectiveness of aerial bombs must be accepted with reservations. In a lecture before the Brooklyn Aeronautical Association, Mr. Hudson Maxim, who must be conceded to be an authority on explosives, said that explosives so powerful and destructive when employed in aerial bombs as to fulfil expectations and predictions of the scaremongers could not be made. The destructive power of torpedoes and shells is enormous under favourable conditions, but never so great as the average man supposes after a short course in blood-curdling aerial fiction. Experiments with dropped live shells and explosives showed that although they might land within a remarkably short distance of the target, it was just that distance that made all the difference in the resulting damage; for the effects of high explosives are very local. Furthermore, the momentum of a heavy object falling from a great height is so great that it is buried in the ground and the force of the explosion is thus neutralized. Judging from analogy with artillery practice against towns, aerial bombs are not worth the time, energy, ammunition, and risk to life involved. In the Boer War, Ladysmith withstood the battering of twenty thousand or more shells

with practically no damage. Similar results were observed at Pretoria. Lyddite shells dug caves and made breaches in the walls of a fort at Omdurman, but did little real damage.

Experiments in defence against hostile aeroplanes and airships have been quite as elaborate as those in offensive operations. It has been found, for instance, that at three thousand feet an aeroplane is a hard thing to hit, though experience in actual warfare has shown that an aeroplane affords a pretty good target.

AEROPLANES VERSUS SUBMARINES

A curious development in aerial navigation has been the pitting of the airship against the submarine. In fairly clear and smooth water submarines and even submarine mines can be readily seen from the lofty outlook of an airship or aeroplane. As the submarine moves slowly when under water a battleship guarded by aerial scouts might be able to manœuvre out of the way. It has also been proposed to use the airship as a mine destroyer by dropping bombs near enough to the mines to explode them, the ships following close enough in the wake of the aerial pilot to avoid other mines outside the cleared zone.

At all events, England regards the airship as such an important naval auxiliary that the dirigibles have all been turned over to the navy, the army retaining only aeroplanes. The navy also has a number of seaplanes, and the naval estimates for the current year have an item of £80,000 for the construction of a new ship for carrying seaplanes. This will be the first vessel of the kind

A German bomb designed for use from the air weighs twenty pounds and is charged with four pounds of trinitrotoluol and 340 steel balls. To guard against mishaps it has a safety catch so that it will not explode until a fall of at least two hundred feet allows a revolving vane to unscrew the safety catch and bring the firing pin in contact with the explosive. A slight touch will then set off the bomb.

The Krupp works have devised a fire bomb which sheds a bright light during its flight to the earth and after it strikes, so that airship gunners may be able to aim accurately during the darkest night.

Another German bomb for the use of aeroplanists and airships releases a tremendous quantity of dense smoke which spreads in a great cloud, under cover of which the aviator may possibly have a chance to make his escape.

Still another bomb is charged with 150 pounds of chemicals which, upon exploding, is supposed to fill the air with gases so poisonous that every living creature within a radius of a hundred yards will be killed, and the influence of the gas is expected to extend in a lesser degree to twice that distance.

The French have a message carrier, to be dropped by an aviator who wishes to continue his flight, consisting of a brass tube in which the message is enclosed with a charge of Bengal fire, which is ignited by a firing pin on striking the earth. The fire and smoke mark the spot long enough for a man to reach it from a distance of three hundred yards.

Progress in submarine craft and projectiles has been as marked as in airships. Submarines are older than the flying machine but, even so, their size, trustworthiness and radius of action are amazing. A typical submarine is capable of a speed of sixteen knots on the surface and ten knots submerged. Some of the more recent have a radius of action of 4500 miles ; that is, they could cross the North Atlantic without replenishing their fuel and stores. While cruising on the surface they are propelled by gasoline engines. While running submerged they use electric motors which are driven by storage batteries, charged by the gasoline engines while on the surface. They are not particularly comfortable craft, even for the most seasoned mariner ; but they can go anywhere at any time. If the weather gets too rough they can submerge and thus escape the worst of the wave motion. In tests submarines have stayed under water for twenty-four hours at a time.

Russia, which has produced a successful aeroplane vastly larger than any other nation has thought of building, is reported to be constructing a submarine so enormous that all others seem pigmies by comparison. This submarine cruiser is 400 feet long, 34 feet beam, and of 5400 tons displacement, which is eleven times the size of the next largest craft of the kind. Its engines of 18,000 horse-power are capable of driving it at a speed of 26 knots on the surface, and its motors of 4400 horse-power are capable of maintaining a speed of 14 knots submerged. Either on the surface or beneath the waves the giant Russian

is capable of swiftly overhauling any other vessel of its kind. It has a cruising radius of 18,500 miles, and can run under water a distance of 275 miles at a stretch. Its armament consists of five 4·7-inch guns for surface fighting, and 36 torpedo tubes, of which 16 are on each broadside. It carries 60 torpedoes and 120 mines, for it is equipped for laying mines. It is capable of creeping into an enemy's harbour under cover of darkness so that no lurking aeroplane can discover it, surrounding the hostile fleet with mines so that certain destruction will follow any attempt to move, and creep away again, and be not only out of sight but also beyond suspicion when the tragedy it has prepared is enacted.

As a protection against their new enemy, the flying machine, the latest submarines are equipped with a machine gun which folds down within the hull when cruising either on the surface or submerged. If an inquisitive aeroplane comes too near, the submarine can rise to the surface while a man climbs out, fishes up the machine gun, and attacks the aerial enemy.

The unvarying accuracy of the new gyroscope compass is expected to be of great value in enabling the submarine to stalk its prey with the least possible risk to itself. A hostile ship can be located at a distance of eight miles, after which the submarine can run fully submerged with the aid of the gyroscope compass to within striking distance.

A TORPEDO THAT WEIGHS 1600 POUNDS

Great improvements have also been made recently in the torpedo. Lieutenant Hardcastle,

of the British Navy, has perfected a torpedo that weighs 1600 pounds and that carries a charge of 250 pounds of gun-cotton, enough to blow the whole side out of a battleship. It has a range of 7000 yards, or about four miles. In this case, too, the gyroscope plays a vital part. A torpedo fitted with the new gyroscope is more certain of hitting its mark than the big guns. Furthermore, the gyroscope rudder can be set so that the torpedo can be fired from the broadside of a ship, when it will turn through an angle of ninety degrees and run dead ahead to its target.

Other great improvements that have completed the revolution of the torpedo are the substitution of the turbine engine for the old three-cylinder engine of the original Whitehead torpedo, and a method of heating the compressed air that furnishes the power. Air under high pressure is contained in a flask within the torpedo. When the latter is fired a valve is opened, admitting air to the engine through a reducing valve which brings down the pressure to 300 pounds. As the flask is emptied the temperature falls, sometimes below zero. This freezes oil on the bearings and generally retards the torpedo and renders it ineffective. By adding a flask of alcohol with a method of igniting it when the torpedo is fired, the air is heated after leaving the reducing valve and before entering the turbines, thus greatly increasing its efficiency. When the pressure in the air flask is reduced and the temperature falls another burner is automatically lighted that heats the air flask itself, thus preventing freezing. This quadruples the range of the projectile. According to the

best available information the submarine equipment of the five warring nations is as follows :

	<i>Submarines</i>						
Great Britain	80
France	70
Russia	25
Germany	27
Austria-Hungary	10

These figures are some months old. Facts about submarines are jealously guarded military secrets.

One of the most notable phases of the campaign will be the wonderful revolution wrought in transportation methods by the automobile and motor truck. On the battlefield, as elsewhere, the horse is yielding to motor-driven vehicles the place he has held so long. In recent years Germany and France have systematically subsidized motor trucks on condition that they should be available for governmental use in case of need. In Germany, by complying with certain conditions, the purchaser of a motor truck receives a subsidy of £200 to be applied on the purchase price, and £50 a year for upkeep for four years. These subsidized trucks must carry a load of 13,000 pounds and haul a trailer besides ; be capable of running ten miles an hour with full load, be able to climb a 14 per cent. grade, and be able to haul a second trailer if necessary. Eight hundred subsidized trucks were available, up to January 1, 1912. The number has since been materially increased, and, besides, the Government has the power to requisition every motor vehicle in the Empire. At the very beginning of hostilities it even exercised the privilege of requisitioning the automobile of a

party of American ladies who had innocently crossed the frontier.

Even the motor-cycles are subsidized. When the war began a force of 2000 subsidized motor-cyclists, or *schnellfahrer* (fast riders), as the Germans call them, were ready for instant service in carrying dispatches, reconnoitring, and the like. In times of peace, these *schnellfahrer* have the blessed privilege of disregarding all speed limitations, are paid 8s. a day at manœuvres, are protected against loss of their positions while serving the Government, have their machines repaired at the Government's expense in case of accident, and are themselves cared for in hospitals without expense if they get hurt while riding. In case of mobilization they are paid full value for their machines.

In France the owner of a three-ton motor truck can get a governmental subsidy of £120 and £40 a year for upkeep for three years. Here, too, the Government freely exercises the right to take possession of all motor vehicles if needed. All the taxi-cabs in Paris were commandeered at the beginning of hostilities.

Austria-Hungary also subsidizes motor vehicles and requisitions all that are needed.

The result of all this is to render the armies in the field to-day mobile beyond the wildest dreams of strategists of a former generation.

Artillery, which has been so radically improved that it now plays a far more important part in deciding battles than it ever did before, is hauled by motors to a large extent in the armies of all the countries now at war, especially the big guns. The French gave their artillery tractors an elaborate

test in the 1913 manœuvres. These tractors are of a special build and of 35 horse-power. They are equipped with a winch and chain cable for pulling the gun out of the mud. They can carry a load of two and a half tons and draw fifteen tons additional at a speed of fifteen miles an hour with a full load. In an emergency the speed can be considerably increased.

Everything that an army in the field needs, or can use, is now provided, mounted on motor trucks, though such equipment is by no means universal. There are auto-ambulances, auto-kitchens, auto-wireless outfits, armoured autos, sleeping and office autos for the generals, and special airship guns for firing at a high angle mounted on motor trucks.

A Russian automobile field kitchen consists of a motor truck carrying the stock of provisions and a trailer containing the kitchen designed to prepare food and coffee for 250 men at one time, or 2000 men in twenty-four hours. The kitchen includes a twenty-gallon coffee-pot and a kettle of a capacity of fifty-three gallons that is jacketed with glycerine, which retains the heat so that the contents continue to cook after the fire is out and keep hot for six or eight hours on the well-known fireless cooker principle. Food and coffee are transferred to fireless cookers to be taken to the men in the field.

No commander has ever been able to keep in as perfect touch with all the units of his force as those in the field to-day, for in this line also there have been improvements in recent years. The portable field wireless telegraph is being used for

the first time in a great war. Portable wireless sets of various sizes are made for use in the field. One outfit is transported on a single wagon. It has telescoping masts that can be set up in a very short time, and a gasolene motor for driving the generator that furnishes the current. A still smaller outfit which can be packed on three horses has a generator that is driven by cranks turned by two men.

The field telegraph and telephone, which have rendered good service in former times, have been developed into a combined instrument about the size of a large field glass and weighing four and a half pounds. An insulated field wire weighing seventy-five pounds to the mile, which can be used lying on the ground, can be laid from a reel on an auto at ten miles an hour, or it can be carried on horseback, or a man on foot wearing a reel strapped to his breast can creep right up to the firing line, where he can establish a station simply by thrusting a steel ground rod into the earth. The commander can maintain communication with each unit of his force at all times, for these lines can be laid as fast as troops can advance against the enemy.

However, the modern commander is by no means dependent on the field telegraph or telephone to keep in touch with his troops. He now has aeroplane and motor-cycle messengers, besides the signal flag and the heliograph, all which have their place in the equipment of the modern army. Even the homing pigeon, which was used for carrying messages in the days of the Pharaohs, still has its place in the scheme of military organization, for the wireless telegraph and the motor-

cycle can no more supplant these time-tried messengers than the aeroplane scout can take the place of cavalry. But even the homing pigeon has been modernized. In no previous war did pigeons have the advantage of military training.

The famous performance of these winged messengers during the siege of Paris in the Franco-Prussian war, when they carried upward of forty thousand messages, was the result of an inspiration rather than of forethought. Private citizens who chanced to have pigeons offered them to the Government. Their performance was such a splendid success that France has ever since maintained large flocks in charge of the engineer corps. The birds are carefully trained as soon as they are able to fly and are then drilled daily for the rest of their useful lives. They are taught to fly and to alight on signal. The first thing Bismarck did after the treaty of peace was signed was to establish pigeon lofts in Berlin and elsewhere throughout the Empire. Every other nation in Europe followed his example, and to-day every Government has thousands of pigeons, all ready to carry messages in time of war.

At the siege of Port Arthur the Japanese made such effective use of improvised hand grenades that the attention of military experts was attracted, with the result that this ancient weapon has also been modernized. One type of modern hand grenade, the Aasen, weighs one kilogram, and contains 190 bullets. As these fly in all directions, it can be used only from under cover. Another form of the grenade can be fired from a "howitzer" weighing about twenty-four pounds,

which can be carried in a case like a rifle. It throws a murderous missile weighing about two pounds to a distance of three hundred yards. It explodes on contact, scattering 215 bullets over an area of about a hundred square yards. Still another type of this so-called grenade can be fired, with the aid of a stick thrust into a rifle barrel, to a distance of four hundred yards.

Most deadly of all is the mine "grenade," weighing eight pounds and containing 400 large bullets. This is buried a few inches underground. When the enemy is over the mine the touch of an electric button causes it to spring out of the ground until it is checked by a chain at a height of a yard above the surface, when it explodes, mowing down every man in the vicinity.

The mine at sea is not a new device. In the Russo-Japanese war the Japanese used electro-mechanical mines as well as free mines around the harbour of Port Arthur. The Russian flagship, the *Petropavlovsk*, was blown up by the mines set off by electricity. On the other hand the Japanese themselves were literally hoist by their own petard, for they lost two of their largest ships, the *Hatsuma* and the *Yashima*, from the free mines that they loosed for the destruction of the Russian battleships.

Every decade in the last half-century has seen an improvement in the accuracy, range, and power of heavy artillery and the destructive power of the projectiles.

The Belgian prolonged resistance at Liège has drawn public attention to modern fortresses and their defence. Heavy shells fired from long ranges

will penetrate as much as twenty feet of sand, which offers more resistance than other soils. Moreover, a shell which explodes after it has penetrated soil will cause more damage than if it explodes in the air, on account of the confinement of the earth it has penetrated. Walls exposed to fire are therefore made of from five to ten feet of concrete, sometimes reinforced with steel. Over these there is a few inches of soil as a bed for grass, so that the fortification may be concealed.

There are in most European countries either turrets or iron and steel revolving cupolas containing guns such as those as were at Liège. The cupolas are a kind of flattened dome, and the turrets are flat topped like those aboard ship. There are "disappearing" cupolas mounting small guns, oscillating cupolas set up on edge and balanced by springs which turn the cupola forward after a shot is fired until the gun is under cover, and others that move on a central pivot. There are large single gun cupolas with very heavy armament and smaller ones of light batteries. There are even portable ones.

The value of night attacks, always more or less appreciated by military commanders, was emphasized in the Russian-Japanese war, with the result that troops have been specially drilled in this form of operations, and numerous devices for offence and defence have been invented. One of these is the portable searchlight with which all European armies are provided to some extent at least. These consist of a generator driven by a gasoline engine mounted on an automobile. These are specially relied upon for protection in

case of attack by a dirigible, and also in attacks on the ground. Without light, artillery would be of little use in a night attack; but with a searchlight playing upon an assaulting column, it can be used with deadly effect.

In the absence of a searchlight a force may be equipped with parachute lights, a sort of grenade weighing fourteen ounces which, with the aid of a firing stick, can be shot from a rifle to a distance of fifty to a hundred yards where it will float in the air and burn brilliantly for a half to three-quarters of a minute. A larger form of parachute light fired from a field gun with a small charge of powder floats in the air, giving a dazzling light for several minutes.

A phase of the war of interest to the military expert is the fact that an American invention, the gun silencer, devised by Hiram Percy Maxim, of Hartford, may be given a thorough trial. There are Maxim silencers in small numbers in each of the nations now at war. The inventor expects that the military advantages of the silencer will be developed, just as Great Britain demonstrated the value of machine guns at the battle of Omdurman. When the inventor's father, Sir Hiram Maxim, first presented his Maxim gun it was considered an extremely clever and interesting novelty, but impractical under the conditions of warfare. The old argument against Gatling guns was revived against it—that ammunition could not be supplied fast enough. If it taxed the organization to keep the firing line supplied with ammunition when men with repeating rifles were firing twenty shots a minute, what would happen

if an attempt were made to supply machine guns firing 650 shots a minute? But when the English at the battle of Omdurman were able to rout an enormous rush of mounted Dervishes they decided that the machine gun was a pretty good thing, after all.

No world power has been at war with another world power since the Maxim silencer was invented, though very elaborate field trials have been conducted. Some of the silencer's advantages are, according to official reports, the muffling of the noise of firing, allowing the voice of the officer to be heard, thus giving better control of firing. The nervous strain and consequent fatigue of the soldier due to the distressing noise of firing is abolished. Another important aspect is that it not only muffles the noise but at the same time reduces the recoil, so that it becomes a gentle push instead of a sharp blow. The soldier no longer flinches instinctively as he pulls the trigger. This is conducive to better marksmanship, and, by abolishing nervous strain, the soldier is less liable to yield to panic. The diminution of the noise of the report increases the enemy's difficulty in locating the firing line. The difficulty is still further increased by the fact that the flash is absolutely annulled in the dark.

All the foregoing facts show what a huge experiment the present war is. It will settle not only the fate of Europe for many years to come, as all the diplomatists are predicting; it will settle the future of warfare itself. In many respects these new contrivances, like the aeroplane and submarine, introduce elements that really

put a premium upon military skill. In others, such as the new bombs and the proposed use of gaseous fumes, they simply add to its most brutal horrors. After considering these new engines, the conviction remains that there is only one possible "improvement" in modern accoutrements. The newspapers have recently described the so-called invention of a young Italian by which explosives could be shot off at a distance, something on the wireless principle. That invention seems clearly to have been a fraud. The idea, however, seems to be about the only thing that could make warfare more horrible than it is. Before this conflict is over, possibly some one may actually make it work.

EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY IN WAR TIME

ENGLAND'S SUPPLY DEPENDS ENTIRELY UPON HER
SUPREMACY AT SEA—GERMANY'S LARGE IM-
PORTATIONS OF WHEAT—FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND
AUSTRIA - HUNGARY ESSENTIALLY SELF-SUP-
PORTING

By JAMES MIDDLETON

READERS of history are fond of detecting a resemblance between the present European situation and that which prevailed a century ago. Then the greatest European Powers were united in a struggle against one country—France; now they are united against another common enemy, Germany. Now, as in 1814, all the forces of Europe are determined to humiliate one overweening personality. In one respect, however, and this is a fundamental one, the situation is entirely different. A hundred years ago practically every great European Power was an economic entity. Each one could have built a Chinese Wall about itself and lived indefinitely. Each one, that is, raised on its own soil enough of the essential food-stuffs to support itself. Even England, in the Napoleonic wars, was largely an agricultural

community. It raised both cereals and meat in sufficient quantities to stand an indefinite siege. Even as late as the Crimean War, in 1853, England could go cheerfully to war with no fear of national starvation.

If, as some one has said, an army travels upon its stomach, the same statement may be made of a nation itself at war. Clearly, a country that has its supply of food cut off would immediately have to submit to any humiliating terms proposed. Its position would be that of a huge beleaguered fortress. And there is at least one of the nations engaged in the present struggle, England, that faces this contingency; and another, Germany, that certainly has reasons for apprehension. A remarkable development of the present international situation is the dependence of one nation upon others for its food supply. There is no country of importance that does not import large amounts of food from almost every other. The United States, huge as are its foodstuffs, adds millions of dollars' worth to its supply from other sources. Even China, content, as we have supposed with its staple rice, purchases immense quantities of American canned goods, especially salmon. Looking over the statistics, one is forced to conclude that there is no longer any such thing as a national taste in foods; each nation is rapidly picking up all the good things of another. The extent to which almost the entire world depends upon one or two countries for its coffee and tea—foods which, in the Middle Ages, were practically unknown in Europe—sufficiently illustrates the growth of this international taste.

In the present conflict, however, these special foods will cut no particular figure; the great staples of life are the important considerations in an international war. In this struggle, wheat, not cotton, promises to be king. What, then, is the situation of the several nations in this respect? How are they to feed not only the huge armies in the field, but their own peoples? Unquestionably this is the first time in history when war has presented precisely this problem to the peoples involved.

THE NATIONS THAT CAN SUPPORT THEMSELVES

There are seven nations, at this crisis, immediately involved. These are England, Germany, France, Russia, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia. We can immediately clarify the situation by arranging these countries in two classes: those that raise the essential food materials in sufficient quantities to support themselves, at least in time of peace, and those that do not. This division, as accurately as can be determined from available statistics, is as follows:

Countries Self- supporting

Russia
France
Austria-Hungary
Serbia

Countries not Self- supporting

England
Belgium

Doubtful
Germany

Of these Russia, next to the United States, is the largest wheat-growing country in the world.

Seven-eighths of all the peasants are tillers of the soil. Two-thirds of all the lands are sown with cereals. The nation raises not only enough to support its own enormous population, but exports large quantities. France, most investigators are surprised to learn, ranks third—next to Russia and the United States—as a wheat-growing land. The thrifty French farmers, with their comparatively small acreage, raise more wheat than the Argentine, British India, or Canada—all of them usually regarded as huge granaries. They produce 100,000,000 more bushels than the whole of South America. France grows about 315,000,000 bushels a year—almost half as much as does the United States in normal years; it imports about 22,000,000 bushels. Clearly, with strict economy enforced by war conditions, France can easily furnish its own wheat supply without calling on outside nations. Austria-Hungary and Serbia are similarly situated. When we come to England, Germany, and Belgium, however, the conditions are different. The United Kingdom raises about 65,000,000 bushels of wheat every year and imports 217,000,000. Belgium raises 14,000,000 bushels and imports 49,000,000. The situation in Germany is not so acute as this, but still, with importations shut down, the wheat situation might become embarrassing. The empire raises 149,000,000 bushels a year and imports 67,000,000. Clearly the sudden wiping out of these importations, while they might not produce an actual wheat famine, would so considerably reduce the food supply as to amount to a distinct military disadvantage. Germany's situation is considerably

better than that of England, but inferior to that of France and Russia. Russia raises all of its wheat and more ; France raises ninety per cent. ; Germany raises sixty per cent. On the other hand Great Britain and Belgium raise only about twenty per cent. each. On the theory that a nation that raises only sixty per cent. of its most important article of food can hardly be regarded as entirely self-supporting, Germany is included, in the classification given above, as in a more or less precarious position.

ENGLAND ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON OUTSIDE SOURCES

From the standpoint of food supply in case of war, England, of course, presents the most interesting problem. There was a time when English statesmen worried little over this situation. The supremacy of England's sea power was regarded as a fixed, determined fact. The fleet was so immeasurably superior to other navies, and, indeed, to all of them combined, that England went on serenely developing a huge industrial state within, and depending upon other nations for her food. About fifteen years ago, however, Englishmen began to be nervous on this point ; since then there have been periodical scares. The building of other formidable navies, especially that of Germany, began to cause general alarm. The last of these great searchings-of-heart was in 1903. Parliament then appointed a Royal Commission, of which the Prince of Wales, the present king, served as chairman, to investigate the question. This Commission collected a large array

of facts, most of them alarming. It found that the precariousness of England's food supply was about as black as it had been described. England imports four-fifths of all her food. Most of it comes from far distant countries—from North and South America, British India and Australia. She gets large quantities of butter, eggs, bacon, poultry, fruit, and potatoes, and other vegetables from France, Denmark, and the Baltic ports.

A certain amount of grain comes also from Russian-Baltic ports—and from the Black Sea region. For the larger staples, however, like wheat and meat, England has to go several thousand miles. She always has a comparatively small supply of food on hand. The swiftness of the modern steam vessel has made any large storage system unnecessary. Of butter she has normally only a seven or ten days' supply; of cheese only a month's supply; of eggs—England consumes 80,000,000 a week—only four or five weeks' supply. Her resources in wheat vary through the year; she has the highest supply in September, when it has enough for seventeen weeks, and the lowest in August, when she has enough for only six and a half weeks. England has a larger supply, however, than that stored up in her own larder. There is always an immense amount floating in ships—in thousands of English vessels, crowding the trade routes in all parts of the world. This usually amounts to from three to seven weeks' supply. An interesting fact herein disclosed is that England's lowest stock on hand is reached in August—the very month in which she went to war. The whole food situation was well summed up in a formal

declaration made to the Royal Commission by the most influential members of the wheat trade in London: "We, the undersigned, concur in the opinion that, if Great Britain should become involved in a European war, the country must be prepared to see bread at practically famine prices."

THE UNITED STATES SENDS LITTLE WHEAT TO ENGLAND

From 1870 until 1902, the United States did the larger part in feeding the British Isles. They not only had a large surplus of foodstuffs, but the shortness of the voyage gave them an advantage over competitors. The enormous increase in their population forces them now to keep the larger part of their food, especially wheat, to feed their own stomachs. Although they are still the world's largest wheat producers, they send comparatively little of it abroad. England now draws her supply from Russia, Canada, the Argentine, British India, and Australia. The figures for 1911 are as follows :

PRESENT SOURCE OF ENGLAND'S WHEAT SUPPLY

(Hundredweights)

British India	20,161,518
Russia	18,106,100
Argentine	14,748,600
Canada	14,373,700
Australia	13,910,720
United States	12,939,229

England likewise imports two-thirds of all her meat. She gets a small supply fresh killed from Holland and Denmark and a far greater amount in the shape of live animals from Canada and the

United States. Her frozen carcasses come mainly from the Argentine and Australia. She usually has about one month's supply of all kinds of meat on hand.

SEA POWER ENGLAND'S ONE SALVATION

The practical question that has agitated England for many years has been : How are we to protect our food supply in case of war ? Some authorities have advocated the building of huge granaries that would hold a large reserve supply. There are many practical objections to this proposition and it has never enlisted popular approval. Most Englishmen who have had the courage to face the situation have reached the same conclusion : that there is only one way of protecting the food supply and that is the navy. Even with England in command of the sea, there might be certain difficulties in feeding the nation ; without this control, most people agree that the game would be fairly up. With a hostile navy blockading the important ports and so shutting out the food ships, England could undoubtedly be starved into submission in a few weeks. The Royal Commission, which investigated this subject, came to this conclusion. The enormous navy which England maintains in the North Sea, therefore, has ample justification.

England will certainly control the sea in the present conflict ; there are other problems, however, that she will have to solve. Many ships are drawn from the mercantile marine for the use of the Admiralty ; inasmuch as there are thousands of English ships, however, this pro-

bably will not seriously interfere with transportation facilities. Nor does there seem much danger that the German and Austrian navies will prey to any extent upon English shipping. The days of the privateer are over ; the steamship, involving the difficulty of coaling, has practically made impossible this old-fashioned roving of the sea. Nor is Germany likely to send many of her rapid cruisers to prey upon English trade ; she will weaken her fleet, already considerably overmatched, by doing so. Neutrals ought not to suffer, especially as the Declaration of London has settled the fact that food, unless intended for military purposes—such as the feeding of armies and fortresses—is not contraband. Some English ships unquestionably must be captured ; but there will be few in comparison with the depredations that seem likely to be made on German commerce. One consideration that especially protects England's food supply is the fact that it is not drawn from any one country, but from five—the United States, Canada, Argentine, Russia, and British India. It comes over three great trade routes—the North Atlantic, the South Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The first has its most important port in New York, the second in Buenos Ayres, while the third leads to Bombay and Australian depots. There seems no likelihood that Germany can control these three transportation routes, or any one of them. When the Royal Commission made its investigation, the Mediterranean route was the one that gave the greatest anxiety. The Entente Cordiale was then not a factor in European politics ; and war with France was not an impossibility. The

Republic's naval strength in the Mediterranean in that event would have endangered such of England's food supply as came by way of Suez. The present European alignment makes this same Mediterranean route perhaps better protected than either of the other two routes.

UNITED STATES AS A FOOD SUPPLY IN WAR TIME

With an English fleet victorious on the sea, therefore, the English food supply seems abundantly safeguarded. In all probability, if the war lasts any time, the United States will largely increase its exports. Their natural position should make them the largest storehouse of the Englishman's food. The route to the River Plata is 6500 miles; that to Bombay is 6250 miles by the Suez Canal and 10,500 by the Cape. New Zealand and Australia are 10,000 miles away; the distance to American ports, however, is only 3500 miles. Moreover the ships coming this short distance can carry more than those sailing on the other routes. The longer the voyage, the more coal the ship has to carry, and, proportionately, the smaller is its cargo. Inasmuch as England will naturally import from the places whence the food will come quickest and in the largest amount, it should naturally draw first of all upon the resources of the United States. It will do this particularly this year, as their grain crop is unusually large and that of the other agricultural nations unusually small.

When we look to Germany, however, the opportunities for food importations do not seem so

reassuring. German ships are not able to use the North Sea. With both the French and the British fleets in the Mediterranean, there is apparently no hope of obtaining supplies from that source. It is even probable that the larger part of the mercantile marine which Germany has been building up at such enormous cost will be swept from the sea. That scurrying to friendly ports that marked the first days of war has developed into little less than a stampede. Moreover, while the blockading of the English coast is a difficult problem, owing to its character and extent, the blockading of the German North Sea sealine presents comparatively few problems to a victorious fleet. Germany will find some embarrassment also in the fact that she has gone to war with the country that furnishes the larger part of her additional food. This is Russia. She takes from the Tsar's empire large quantities of wheat, barley, oats, and corn every year. In fact she imports foodstuffs from much the same countries as England herself. The following table, showing her importations of wheat, illustrates this point :

GERMANY'S IMPORTATIONS OF WHEAT
(Tons) 1912

Russia	558,422
Argentine	546,439
Canada	269,530
United States.	446,512
Australia	322,590

The Germans, therefore, use the same trade routes as the English ships. With the English and French commanding the sea, however, the Germans cannot draw any wheat from these sources.

GERMANY'S LARGE SUPPLIES OF MEAT

The stoppage of these foreign supplies would not effect Germany to the same extent that a similar scarcity would embarrass England. In the British Isles such a calamity would mean starvation ; in Germany it would mean a severe scarcity of food. For Germany still produces the larger part of what it eats. Although in the last forty years the empire, like England, has become a great industrial state, with the consequent shifting of the population from town to city, the imperial policy has still promoted agriculture. Agrarianism has long been a political issue. As part of its monarchical system, the ruling forces have used the powers of government to sustain the landlord class. The junker aristocracy has been the mainstay of the throne and the prevailing social system. The Government has, therefore, protected its interests by placing high tariff duties upon agricultural and meat products. As far as food is concerned the empire has been in about the same position as England before the passage of the corn laws ; it does not raise food enough for its own purposes, and has difficulties in importing it. Especial restrictions have been placed upon the importation of meats. As a result, large supplies are grown in the empire itself. Germany produces almost one-third as many cattle as does the United States—about 20,000,000 to their 71,000,000—and stands second to the United States in the breeding of hogs. In times of peace this protective policy has great

disadvantages. As one result meat famines have become almost chronic. In recent years to supply the need, the municipalities have themselves erected slaughter houses and swineries. The increased cost of living has been an even more acute problem in Germany than here, and has figured largely in politics. All popular appeals for the removal of restrictions, however, have failed. And in times like these the policy has certain compensations. For it has furnished Germany with a large supply of meat; in all likelihood it can worry along for an indefinite time without any imports.

Their embarrassment will come only from the destruction to crops that is incident to war, and to the removal of large masses of cultivators to face the cannon. No one can estimate, of course, to what extent these circumstances will affect the food situation.

The other three great countries, as already said—France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia—are practically self-supporting, so that their provisioning will involve no particular problem.

A crisis of the most serious character for the German farmer arose in the "four years of gloom" from 1896 to 1900. The competition of agricultural exporting countries, such as the United States, Argentina, and Uruguay, caused a drop of more than 25 per cent. in prices. Mortgages increased, market value of land decreased, and in those four years alone the indebtedness of the farms increased by several million pounds.

Irretrievable ruin faced the German agriculturists and immediate steps were taken to save

the situation. The protectionist policy was made more rigid, railway rates were lowered on behalf of the home producer to enable him to meet foreign competition more successfully, Government education of advanced agricultural methods was widely used, and a widespread system of credit in the agricultural department was organized.

WHAT AMERICA THINKS OF THE WAR

A UNIVERSAL FEELING THAT THE KAISER HAS
FORCED ON THE CONFLICT

By C. D. M.

AT the outbreak of the great war in August 1914, I made it my business to ramble about the streets of New York among the crowds watching the newspaper bulletins, at cafés, on street-cars, talking with every one I came across. The current of popular feeling was not difficult to trace. Denunciation of the Kaiser was in most cases a sure passport to the approval of the little knot of listeners who gather to every argument. From the Battery to the Bronx, everywhere I found a definite anti-German sentiment. Not against the German people, of course, who are bound to us by close ties of blood and commerce ; but against the Kaiser and the whole armour-plated superstructure of German militarism which seems to have cudgelled into war a people flourishing in the arts of peace, a people whose genius is for literature and art and commerce, the kindest-hearted people in the world. Sympathy with the Germans there exists in abundance, and horror at the task which their troops are called upon to perform. But approval of the German War Office ? No ! Unless it comes from

Germans or Austrians themselves. Near the *Staats-Zeitung* office, or at the Kaiserhof, Lüchow's, the Hofbräu, Little Hungary or any other of the well-known Pan-German restaurants, one may hear "Hoch der Kaiser" uttered in all sincerity; but even there one finds thoughtful souls who think that the War Lord is costing the Fatherland dear.

Any serious attempt to find the prevailing national sentiment behind the street clamour must reckon with the tremendous growth of socialistic and anti-autocratic feeling which the war is causing. A Europe generally undesirous of war has been hurried into conflict by a few men—such is the prevailing idea.

The death of M. Jaurés, foully murdered for having been brave enough to protest against war-like preparations, has not gone unnoticed.

A handbill on the street announces a big anti-war meeting of socialists. The legend began :

WAR IS HELL

And the workers of the world
Are roasted in its fires.

The sentiment is crudely expressed, but can any one doubt its essential truth? So in a way the war is acting as a terrible public educator.

"I hope the war will be sharp enough to cure the Germans of their Kaiser folly," said one man to me. The New York *Evening Post* voices a large public when it prophesies the defeat of the Kaiser's armies and says :

"Out of the ashes must come a new Germany, in which pure democracy shall rule, in which no

one man and no group of professional man-killers shall have the power to plunge the whole world into mourning. If this be treason to Germany, our readers must make the most of it. To our minds, it is of profound significance that so many Americans are saying to-day : ' We wish that the Kaiser might be beaten and the German people win.' ”

Undoubtedly Americans are realizing (what has never been so plainly brought home before) the cruel folly of a nation hurried into war by an unrepresentative military clique. It is significant that so many editorial-writers have now for the first time appreciated the value to this country of President Wilson's policy in Mexico.

In the crowd circulating in front of the Horace Greeley statue by the *Tribune* building I asked fifty men of all classes, all Americans as far as I could judge, whether they were for the Germans or against. The count was eight for and forty-two against. If hard words could have killed the Kaiser, he would have perished speedily on City Hall Square. The verdict of the American people undoubtedly is that the war was “ Made in Germany.”

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL

BY CHARLES CHENEY HYDE
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
NORTH-WESTERN UNIVERSITY

UPON the outbreak of the European war the United States finds itself placed in a new relation to each belligerent Power, and suddenly subjected to a variety of duties, and possessed of certain rights that accrue only in such abnormal times. With a merchant marine shrunk to insignificance, with a vast export trade threatened with paralysis by the lack of neutral bottoms, and with many American citizens stranded on European soil, we nevertheless face a situation that Washington would have rejoiced to substitute for that which confronted him in 1793, for to-day the United States as a neutral enjoys rights that were not dreamed of at the close of the eighteenth century, and those rights are in large degree codified.

To the Hague Conventions of 1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers in naval war, and the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in case of war on land, the United

States is, happily, a party. It has also accepted the Declaration of London of 1909, concerning the laws of naval war. The purpose of that agreement was to make clear the law to be applied by the proposed International Prize Court, the arrangement for the establishment of which was formulated at The Hague in 1907. Though the Powers have not established the Prize Court or accepted generally the Declaration of London, the United States has formally ratified both agreements. By so doing it has recorded its approval of the rules enunciated in the latter document. It cannot, therefore, complain of the conduct of any belligerent which may seek to conform to or rely upon them. Although the Parliament of Great Britain has acted adversely upon the Declaration of London, that country is, nevertheless, free to change its position and to make that arrangement the guide of its own prize courts. Deriving their law from that source, their decisions cannot be denounced by us as unjust. For these several codifications the United States has had to pay a price the extent of which is hardly yet appreciated. However useful may be the knowledge at the very commencement of hostilities of what a neutral may reasonably expect, the rules themselves are in certain respects so adverse to interests of such a state that it is only through the grim experience of a general European war that the United States can fairly estimate how well it has conserved its vital interests in accepting as law principles that may now be relentlessly applied.

According to The Hague Conventions, the

United States as a Government is obliged to refrain from taking any part in the war. Impartial participation does not suffice. We could not excuse the sale of arms to Germany by pleading readiness to supply likewise France or Russia. The scope of the duty of abstention is broad. The Government must not furnish a belligerent with anything that will serve to increase its fighting power, such as ammunition or other war material, or warships. Incidental to this general duty to abstain from participation, the neutral finds itself burdened with a still more onerous duty to prevent its territory and resources from being employed to strengthen the military or naval power of a belligerent. The diligence required of a neutral is measured by the "means at its disposal." Those means must be used to prevent the commission of warlike acts within its waters, or the passage of belligerent troops over its territory. The neutral is obviously not responsible for what it is powerless to prevent.

From the rules of the Treaty of Washington of 1871, which made possible the Geneva Arbitration of the so-called Alabama Claims, has been derived the well-known principle expressed in happier terms in 1907, that "a neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace." The same vigilance is required of a neutral to prevent the departure from its territory of a vessel there adapted entirely or partly

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for warlike use, and intended to cruise or engage in hostile operations. Pursuant to this obligation the United States has already taken extraordinary precautions to prevent the departure from Atlantic ports of merchant vessels sailing under belligerent flags if equipped in such a way as to fight for their own countries, and under contract for public service in case of war.

In sharp contrast to these obligations is the express understanding that a neutral is not bound to prevent the export or transit for the use of a belligerent of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet. Thus the United States is not required to prevent its citizens from selling or exporting arms or war material of any kind. Such transactions would, nevertheless, constitute direct participation in the war, and hence be regarded as internationally wrongful, so as to subject the participant to serious penalties in case of the capture of his property. Such conduct would also, moreover, disregard the spirit if not the letter of President Wilson's Proclamation of Neutrality of August 4, in which it is declared that "the statutes and the treaties of the United States alike require that no person within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States shall take part, directly or indirectly, in said wars."

Whether war is waged on land or sea, neutral territory is deemed inviolable. As to this requirement The Hague Conventions are explicit. Acts of war in neutral waters are forbidden. Thus if the *Kronprinzessin Cecilie* had been captured by any enemy cruiser just as she entered French-

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man's Bay on August 4, the United States would have had good cause to demand reparation from the Government of the captor, and would also have found itself compelled to demand the release of the vessel. A Prize Court cannot be set up on neutral territory or in neutral waters. Nor can belligerent warships make use of such waters for the purpose of increasing supplies of war material or of completing their crews, or as a base of operations against the enemy.

For numerous purposes a belligerent warship may endeavour to make use of neutral waters. The Hague Convention of 1907 indicates the scope of the privileges that such a vessel may be permitted to enjoy, and thereby enables the neutral to follow with certainty a course that shall not expose it to the charge of unneutral conduct. Let us consider a situation that might arise. A French cruiser, short of coal and provisions, and in an unseaworthy condition, is pursued by the enemy, and puts into Portland Harbour to escape capture, and to rehabilitate herself generally. Just inside of Cushing's Island she finds herself in the unwelcome company of a German warship that made the same port a few hours earlier. The Hague Convention has marked out the general course which the United States should follow, and by his Proclamation of Neutrality, President Wilson has indicated with precision what we would permit. Accordingly, the French ship would be allowed fuel sufficient to enable her to reach her nearest home port, or half of that amount if she were rigged to go under sail and also be propelled by steam. Although the United States

could, without impropriety, if it had adopted that method of determining the amount of fuel to be supplied, allow the vessel to fill its bunkers built to carry fuel, and thereby greatly increase her efficiency, the President has announced a rule that is consistent with our previous policy and in harmony with what was, prior to 1907, generally regarded as sound practice. The latitude accorded the neutral in 1907 was not sought by the United States, was vigorously opposed by Great Britain, and was the result of a compromise to satisfy the far-reaching demands of Germany. With respect to provisions, the French ship could supply herself with garlic and Aroostook County potatoes *ad libitum*, so long as the revictualing did not exceed the so-called "peace standard."

If it were in a seaworthy condition the German cruiser would be obliged to depart within twenty-four hours after its arrival. The French vessel might, however, be allowed additional time if needed for recoaling or repairs. The latter might necessarily consume a few days. Repairs would not be permitted that would serve to do more than place the ship in a seaworthy condition, and even such repairs would not be allowed if they necessitated a long sojourn. If, as in the case of the Russian ship *Lena*, that entered San Francisco Harbour in September 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, necessary repairs would require a stay of several weeks or months, the vessel would be promptly interned by the United States. By interning the ship the United States would be taking measures to render her incapable of putting to sea during the war.

It was declared in 1907 that the citizens of a state which is not taking part in the war are considered as neutrals. To the Americans who are now in belligerent European countries that status is precious. It enables the possessor to escape numerous burdens which the state that is engaged in war justly and of necessity imposes upon its own citizens. One cannot, however, avail himself of his neutrality if he commits acts against a belligerent, or if he voluntarily enlists in the ranks of a party to the conflict. There are, nevertheless, services which the neutral citizen on belligerent soil may render without losing his distinctive character. Americans in France or Germany might, for example, organize for the purpose of assisting in matters of police or civil administration. They might also furnish loans (if their means permitted) to one of the belligerents in whose territory they did not reside.

Neutrals on belligerent territory where martial law has been declared necessarily feel the rigour with which the Government asserts its authority. It must be obvious that measures which, in seasons of peace, indicate abuse of power, in times of war lose their arbitrary aspect and, despite harsh aspects, cease to be regarded as wrongful. Thus the movement of neutrals on belligerent soil may be restrained, and they may be even temporarily prevented from leaving the country. Slight ground for suspicion that they are acting as spies justifies arrest and ample inquiry to determine the grounds for such a charge.

To the people of the United States as a whole the war presents no graver aspect than in its

bearing upon our right to export and transport to the belligerent countries food, clothing, fuel, and other things known as conditional contraband. To make clear the problem now confronting us a brief explanation of the law is necessary. "Contraband" is the term employed to describe an article which is liable to capture because of its use in the prosecution of the war, and because of its hostile destination. Contraband is subject to capture on a neutral vessel and is liable to condemnation. Goods which belong to the owner of the contraband and which are on board the same vessel are also liable to condemnation. Moreover, according to the Declaration of London, the vessel carrying such articles may be confiscated if the contraband forms "by value, by weight, by volume, or by freight, more than half the cargo." Maritime states have long been aware of the importance of the distinction between articles adapted solely for use in war, such as guns and projectiles, and those susceptible of use in the pursuit of peace as well as in that of war, such as food and coal. Articles of the former class have come to be known as absolute contraband, those of the latter as conditional contraband. The purpose of the distinction is to limit the right to capture articles of the latter kind to occasions when they are destined for an essentially hostile end, and to permit the capture of those of the former kind whenever they are bound for the territory of a state engaged in war. In order to protect neutral commerce from interference, the United States has struggled hard for recognition of the principle that what is capable

of feeding and clothing, and otherwise ministering to the sustenance of the people of a belligerent state, should not be subject to capture and condemnation, unless shown to be not only capable of use in war, but also destined for that use. Though maritime states are not indisposed to accept this principle, there has been diversity of opinion respecting, first, what articles should be treated as conditional contraband, and secondly, under what circumstances articles recognized as such should be subject to capture. The Declaration of London appears to have solved the first difficulty by specifying in appropriate and careful lists certain articles as absolute, and others as conditional contraband (and still others as not contraband at all). Thus arms of all kinds, gun-mountings, clothing and harness of a distinctively military character, animals suitable for use in war, and armour-plate are among the articles placed in the first category. They are subject to capture if destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. This is true whether the carriage of the goods is direct, or entails transshipment or subsequent transport by land. What is decisive is the destination, not of the vessel but of the goods. Thus a consignment of uniforms, shipped from New York on an American vessel bound for Naples or any other neutral European port, would be subject to capture, even within sight of Nantucket, if it were shown that the ultimate destination of the goods was Trieste.

Articles in the second category, and described by the Declaration of London as conditional contraband, include foodstuffs, gold and silver,

paper money, boots and shoes, vehicles, material for telephones and telegraph, fuel, lubricants, and harness. These articles furnish a substantial portion of the export trade of the United States.

The second difficulty already noted—concerning when conditional contraband is subject to capture—is the all-important question before the United States to-day. In more concrete and simpler form the question is: When is such contraband to be deemed to be intended for a hostile use so as to justify its capture? The vital significance of the answer that the belligerents may give is hardly yet appreciated. Thus far popular attention in this country has been focussed on the lack of American and other neutral ships available for our foreign trade. Relying upon the assurance that “free ships make free goods,” we have concerned ourselves about vehicles of transportation rather than with the safety of our produce. It is important to note what assurance the Declaration of London affords. It is there provided that conditional contraband is liable to capture if shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces of a belligerent, or for a department of its Government unless, in the latter case, circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war. (This exception is not, however, applicable to a consignment of gold or silver, or paper money.) It is further provided that a hostile destination is presumed to exist in case the goods are consigned, not only to enemy authorities, but also to a contractor in the enemy country who as a matter of common knowledge supplies articles of the same kind to the enemy.

Again, a similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or to another place serving as base for its forces.

In the meantime American exporters must face the fact that, if propriety of conduct is to be tested by the Declaration of London, the belligerent Powers are in a position to capture and condemn foodstuffs, coal, and other articles within the same category, with an ease that renders shadowy and dangerously vague the distinction between what is conditional and what is absolute contraband.

CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS' HEALTH

REDUCING THE LOSS FROM SICKNESS AND WOUNDS
—BUSINESSLIKE HUMANITY—BURYING 140 MEN
AN HOUR

SOLDIERS who escape death on the battlefield in the great conflict of 1914 have had a far better chance of returning home alive than any soldiers ever had before. It must be remembered that in all previous wars the worst enemy was not the one with gun in hand under the opposing flag, but disease, which mowed down troops on both sides impartially. It has taken the world a long time to grasp so obvious a fact, but the lesson has been thoroughly learned at last, and it has been applied in all civilized armies.

Sick soldiers of an earlier day received no attention whatever. If the wounded received any care it was from a comrade or from the women who followed in the wake of the army. Then the barber became the army surgeon, when there were any, to give way later to monks. Napoleon paid little or no attention to sick and wounded. In the Peninsular campaign about 60,000 French soldiers were killed in battle in Spain, and about 400,000 died of disease. In the Russian campaign

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of 1812, of 500,000 who crossed the Dnieper in June scarcely 20,000 returned in December. Bullets killed some, to be sure ; the deadly cold claimed others ; but the great majority perished of disease. The 1813 campaign after Leipzig was no less disastrous. Of an army of 100,000 that left Leipzig in October, only a few fragmentary battalions followed the eagles across the Rhine in November. The total ruin of this army was due to sanitary neglect. Soldiers died of disease by thousands, scattered among the villages along the route from Germany, leaving pestilence in their wake.

In the Crimean campaign 230 out of each 1000 British soldiers died annually of typhoid fever, dysentery, and other infectious diseases.

In the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, the annual death-rate from disease among French troops was 140·8 per thousand ; among the Germans 24·5.

In the Boer War, lasting two years and eight months, 5774 British soldiers, in a force having an average strength of 208,326, were killed in battle, and 2108 died of wounds, a total of 7882, or about 14 per thousand a year. Disease claimed 14,210, or 25·58 per thousand a year, which was almost double the number slain by Boer bullets. The total death-rate was 39 per thousand a year, and the total wastage, including invalided, missing, and prisoners, amounted to 40 per cent. of the total strength of the army annually. Nearly 3 per cent. of the total strength was constantly sick.

In the Russo-Japanese War, which lasted twenty months, the number of Japanese alone, in killed

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and death from wounds, averaged 54 per thousand a year. Disease claimed 27,142 or 25 per thousand a year, a showing no better than that made by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War.

The foregoing figures serve to give an idea of the magnitude, as well as of the character, of the task confronting the medical staff of the modern army. All the world seems to have realized after the Russo-Japanese War the absolute necessity of caring for the health of troops in the field. Soldiers are no longer regarded as merely "food for cannon," but as valuable property belonging to the State, which it is good business policy to care for with at least as much pains as are bestowed on other war material.

In the last ten years the medical staff of every army has been completely reorganized and brought up to date. In every language elaborate treatises have been written on the proper methods for preserving the health of troops and for taking care of the wounded with a view to returning them to the ranks as soon as possible. Text-books containing "problems" are prepared for the young military surgeon who aspires to promotion, so that he may become skilled in the art of providing for large numbers of wounded under various difficult conditions, on paper at least. The most minute studies have been made of every detail in the daily life of the soldier in barracks, on the march, in battle, and after he has been wounded.

The first department of the army with which the prospective soldier comes in contact is the medical staff, which examines all applicants for enlistment and decides whether they shall be

accepted or rejected. In England, the only country now at war in which military service is voluntary, the physical examination is rigid and the percentage of rejections is high. Even in those countries in which military service is compulsory and universal the unfit are excluded from the ranks. The volunteer, or the conscript who reports for his compulsory period of military duty, and is accepted as a recruit, is never thereafter free from the watchful care of the medical department until he is discharged or dies and is buried under the direction of that department.

The medical staff prescribes, or at least modifies, the exercises and physical drill for the raw recruit to make sure that he is not overworked; for in Europe the young recruit is likely to have been underfed. The medical department makes a point of feeding up these weaklings while it begins their physical education. Hygiene is now all-important in the military world, for the fact is recognized that it is much cheaper to keep the soldier well than to cure him after he becomes ill. Besides, the commander wants a fighting force, not a hospital population.

Thanks to vaccination, typhoid fever is becoming a negligible element in the military organization. The United States army leads the world in the extent to which this preventive is used, and France is foremost in this regard among European nations. Owing to the great numbers in continental armies, typhoid vaccination is proportionately less used than in the United States army; but American military surgeons predict that if the war is prolonged all the troops will

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be inoculated against their deadliest foe. Vaccination against smallpox is practically universal. Besides these there are numerous infectious diseases for which vaccine therapy has, as yet, provided no remedy; and these cause the army medical officer no end of trouble. Soldiers seem prone to mumps, measles, and kindred ailments, which run through a camp or a garrison as through a boarding school.

The medical staff is consulted about the soldier's clothing, and especially about his boots; for if these are not properly made he becomes footsore on the march. England, like the United States, provides socks for her soldiers; but troops on the Continent, if they want such luxuries, must buy them themselves. Germany, by unanimous consent, is conceded to provide worse boots for her troops than any other nation, though improved footwear has recently been adopted.

Extraordinary care has been bestowed upon the soldier's ration. Since the work men and steam-engines can do depends upon the amount and quality of fuel supplied them, the continental soldier is nourished as carefully as a locomotive is stoked by an expert fireman. The army medical staff of each nation has made exhaustive experimental studies in order to arrive at the proper quantity of food required by the average individual to do the average day's work for a soldier. This amount is measured in calories, which is the standard heat unit used by physicists, a calorie being the amount of heat required to raise the temperature of a kilogram of water from zero to one degree Centigrade.

The Russian soldier either requires more food than other men, or else he is blessed with a more liberal Government, for his daily field ration amounts to 4929 calories. The French soldier is the next best fed, his daily field service ration providing him 3340 calories. England ranks third with a field ration of 3292 calories, and the Dual Alliance is at the bottom of the list, the German ration being 3147 calories, and the Austrian only 2620 calories, or but little more than half the Russian ration. From the military surgeon's point of view this inferiority in rations bodes no good to the Dual Alliance.

The British ration is not much different from that of the American soldier, consisting of a pound of bread and three-quarters of a pound of fresh meat with bone, or seventeen ounces of preserved meat when in camp or abroad. In addition to these staples, he is allowed a messing allowance of 5d. a day with which to purchase vegetables and the like. For service in the field, the French and Germans use to some extent tinned meats strengthened with vegetables and consommé. In some of their African campaigns the Germans found that contractors, with a view to economy, had filled the tins chiefly with water ; so now the Government packs its own tinned meats for army use.

Food may contain proteins and carbohydrates in the proper proportions and be in good condition, yet so unappetizing as to cause aversion, or even loathing ; so the army medical officer must see that the troops have the proper condiments to season their food and that it is well cooked. For this

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purpose they visit the men at meal time. Only last year the sanitary chief of the French army reported that the food of the soldier had been most carefully considered and regulated with proper regard to obtaining the highest efficiency from the individual fed on a scientific diet. Since 1905, when the doctors recommended a better cooked and more varied diet, a system of instruction in cookery had been introduced in the army with gratifying results. One of the results is a death rate in time of peace of only 3·75 per thousand as compared with a fraction more than 20 for the nation, and 8 per thousand for the civilian population between the ages of 20 and 22.

The motor omnibuses, familiar to visitors to Paris, are now being used, with wire screens replacing the windows, to convey fresh meat to the French troops in the field. One of these vehicles can haul a load of two and a half tons of frozen beef imported from Argentina, or fresh killed beef from the herd, about forty miles back from the front.

To wash down his carefully measured dose of proteins and carbohydrates the English soldier is allowed twenty-two hundredths of an ounce of tea daily. On the Continent the average soldier prefers coffee. The French soldier is provided with a coffee-mill; but the Germans, at least in some of their African campaigns, had to use the butts of their rifles, which proved to be a very poor substitute for a coffee-mill.

From the military surgeon's point of view, water is even more important to the soldier than food. The classic example illustrating the con-

sequences of a hard march without water is Napier's description of the march after Sauroren, when "many fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time."

It is an axiom among mountain climbers that "the more you drink the farther you go." The soldier is not allowed to drink whenever he pleases. On the contrary the medical staff insists that water discipline is as essential as firing discipline. They say a man is not allowed to expend a single round of ammunition without authority, and that he should not be allowed a drop of water without specific permission while on the march. Indeed, in some native regiments in India, the water bottle is carried in such a manner that its owner cannot reach it while marching. He can get a drink only when halted for that purpose.

The time for drinking and the quantity to be allowed have been carefully calculated on a scientific basis. It has been found that the evaporation of two grams of water abstracts one calorie from the body and that the average expenditure of energy per man in marching is 90 calories per mile, which is equivalent to the evaporation of 180 grams of water. In six miles the evaporation amounts to one litre, or $1\frac{3}{4}$ pints, or say, one-fortieth of the water in the body, which is about as much as should be lost without replacing, if full vigour is to be maintained. But as it takes a march of about three-fourths of a mile to raise the temperature to the evaporating point, the

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military surgeon calculates that the men should be halted after marching the first seven miles, when they should be allowed the contents of their water bottles, which hold one litre. After that they should be allowed one litre every six miles. In the German army during manœuvres mounted officers, or orderlies on bicycles, are sent ahead of a marching column to warn the inhabitants of villages to turn out and have water ready on both sides of the road for the troops. If possible a short halt is made while the men refresh themselves ; if time presses they must snatch a drink as they pass, and if they can manage it they also fill their water bottles.

The medical staff is keenly interested in the equipment the soldier carries and the manner of its adjustment ; for every pound added to his load means the expenditure of energy at the rate of 4·5 small calories a minute, and an awkwardly placed load may interfere with his breathing, or do some other mischief.

Foreign writers pay the American army the compliment of saying that it has the best selected and best managed equipment in the world. Something appears to be wrong with all other equipment and the way it is carried, according to medical writers on the subject.

Here is what every soldier must carry about with him all the time while in the field : a rifle, weighing about 9 pounds with bayonet, cleaning materials for keeping his gun in order, ammunition, and an entrenching tool ; his clothing, including coat, trousers, puttees, boots, neckcloth, handkerchief, a change of underwear, identification

disk, and first-aid dressing ; food, including one reserve or emergency ration, or, in the case of the Germans and Austrians, two reserve rations, and in the case of the Russians two and a half ; water bottle, mess tin, knife, fork and spoon, though the Russians carry merely a wooden spoon stuck in the boot in lieu of these refinements ; accoutrements, including knapsack, belt, and braces ; a great coat, and half a shelter tent, 4 by 6 feet, which upon being buttoned or hooked to another half carried by another man, forms a shelter for the two ; personal necessities, including toilet articles and spare linen. In the case of the British soldier this totals 47 pounds ; in the case of the Germans, 38 pounds, and the French, 44 pounds. These lighter weights are due to the fact that the French and Germans carry fewer rounds of ammunition than the British soldier, who never has less than 150 rounds. The Russian soldier has the heaviest load of all to carry, 61 pounds ; or, when he sets out with four days' rations and extra ammunition, 72 pounds.

The medical department also prescribes rules for the sanitation of the camp, disposal of waste material, and sees that public as well as personal cleanliness is enforced.

Though it finds its sphere of greatest usefulness in maintaining the troops at the maximum of physical efficiency, thereby contributing directly to their fighting effectiveness, the medical department has a second important function, and that is to relieve the field force of the incumbrance of sick and wounded. In this work the authority of the medical director, or chief surgeon, is supreme.

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In time of peace the medical department has constantly under its care from 3 to 4 per cent. of the entire force ; in war, more than twice this proportion. The department must provide everything required for the well-being of the men, their medical and surgical treatment, food, clothing, and transportation, from the time they fall out of the ranks till they return.

Every soldier carries, in a sealed tin box, a first-aid packet, consisting of a bandage, gauze, and adhesive plaster. If the wound is but slight and in an accessible place the soldier may apply the dressing himself ; if more severe, a comrade may apply it for him. The importance of this first-aid may be better understood when it is said that infection is the most frequent cause of death from wounds not immediately fatal. This first-aid serves the double purpose of preventing infection to a large extent and of checking hemorrhage, which ranks third in causes of death from wounds, shock being second. Military surgeons say that the great majority would recover from gun-shot wounds if infection could be prevented. The fate of the wounded is in the hands of the man who applies first-aid.

The wounded soldier, with or without first-aid dressing, passes back to the rear by the way of dressing stations beside an ambulance in a spot that is more or less sheltered from hostile fire to the field hospital. As soon as he can stand transportation, he is passed on to the general hospital, and thence in due time to the convalescent camp to recuperate. A large proportion of the wounded require transportation by litter and ambulance

to the field hospital, which is located as near the firing line as prudence will permit.

Though the medical staff of no two nations is identical, it may be said, in a general way, that equipment is provided on the theory that 10 per cent. of a division will be killed or wounded in a single battle. If the number engaged is 18,000, 20 per cent., or 3600 will be dead on the field; 8 per cent., or 1440, will be so severely wounded that it will be inadvisable to move them; 40 per cent., or 7200, will be able to walk, one-half of them to the station for the slightly wounded at the rear, the rest to the dressing station, and 32 per cent. will require transportation. In recent wars the mortality among the wounded collected and transported to the rear has averaged from 3 to 6 per cent. In the Manchurian campaign, one-third of the wounded Japanese returned to the ranks within a month.

In deciding on his arrangements for a battle, the chief surgeon bears in mind that the wounded will be distributed in "zones of losses." The usual proportion of wounded is 20 per cent. up to 1000 yards range; from 1000 to 400 yards range, 60 per cent.; in the final rush, 10 per cent.; in pursuit, 10 per cent. The field hospital is not pitched till the tactical situation develops and the point where the main attack is to be made is known. Then a site is chosen beyond range of the enemy's fire, accessible to front and rear by road, yet off the route of march of advancing troops, convenient to wood and water and, if possible, near buildings which may be used for the overflow of wounded, for, of course, casualties

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in battle are not limited by rule, and the facilities provided may be overwhelmed. Conditions on the battlefield are all unfavourable for clean surgical work, and it is often impossible to reach many of the wounded for hours. The results achieved by modern military surgeons under the difficulties inherent in their work seem little less than miraculous.

A pleasant fiction widely credited is that men have been studying for years to make war more humane—as if war could be humane! For example, one of these “humane” devices is the small bullet at high velocity. Stories are told of men who, after being shot through the chest or head with a modern bullet, about the diameter of an ordinary lead pencil, have walked long distances to the dressing station and have then recovered in a miraculously short time.

Military surgeons who have seen actual service tell a different tale. It is true that really slight wounds made by modern bullets heal more quickly and thoroughly than in former days. But severe wounds are no less severe and much more frequent.

The Germans use a steel-jacketed bullet with a core of lead hardened with antimony. The steel jacket frequently comes off in jagged fragments which horribly lacerate the flesh.

The French bullet, a mixture of copper and zinc, is not jacketed, but is longer and sharper than the German bullet. Bent by ricochetting, it often enters the body as a hook; sometimes it “tumbles” and enters broadside on, making a long, gaping wound. Up to a range of about 800 yards one horror is as bad as the other.

These "humane" bullets have three general effects: up to a range of 500 yards they have an explosive effect, splintering the bone so thoroughly as to explain the frequent accusation that explosive bullets have been used; at ranges of 500 to 1500 yards the effect is comminutive, grinding the bone to powder, and not infrequently carrying with it into the wound fragments of soiled clothing, thus causing gangrene. The third effect is contusive. A bullet fired into an empty metal vessel enters and leaves by a small hole. Fill the vessel with water, and the bullet will still enter by a small hole, but will make a large, jagged wound in leaving. The bullet has exactly the same effect on the body or the head. In any case the bullet strikes a heavy blow as with a club.

Modern bullets are "humane" only when compared with the effects of shells, and it must be remembered that a far greater proportion of casualties are due to shells than ever before. In the Franco-Prussian War, shell wounds were 91 per thousand; in the Manchurian campaign the ratio had increased to 176 per thousand, and in the Balkan War of 1912 the proportion was 364 per thousand. The Russians in Manchuria called shrapnel "the devil's watering-pots." When they burst they scatter hundreds of round bullets as well as fragments of the shell itself. They are most deadly within a radius of ten to thirty yards, but even at a hundred yards the "dewdrops" are lively enough to penetrate six inches of pine. The common shell is still more terrible. The fragments, heated to a very high temperature

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by the explosion, burn the flesh so as to compel cries of agony that only morphine can quiet. The large shells of the navy not only cut like razors, but asphyxiate, amputate portions of the body, and crush. Altogether, the experienced military surgeon is not unduly impressed with the "humane" aspects of war.

The last service rendered to the soldier by the medical department is to see that he is promptly buried after the battle; for as he has now become waste matter, his disposal is properly a part of the sanitary work of the medical staff. The widow and orphans, waiting at home until anxiety deepens into dread, and dread into despair, may be able to form some estimate of the reverent care with which this last rite is performed for their loved one, "humanely" killed by modern methods, when they know that the chief surgeon, according to the standard authors, counts on a burial squad of 500 men disposing of 140 bodies an hour, after the bodies have been collected.

NOTES ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION

“THE Geneva Convention is an international agreement, adhered to by practically all the civilized States, for the purpose of ameliorating the condition of the sick and wounded in war. The objects are essentially humanitarian.”

The events which led up to the Convention were connected with the battle of Solferino, in 1859, at which M. Dunant, a Swiss gentleman, who had been influenced by Florence Nightingale's work in the Crimea, was present as an onlooker.

Deeply moved by what he saw, he published “Un Souvenir de Solferino,” and subsequently visited the various Courts of Europe with the view of enlisting their sympathies. Eventually, a Convention was held in Geneva in 1864, and a code of rules drawn up, while the Red Cross on a white ground was taken as a distinctive emblem “as a compliment to Switzerland.”

The present Geneva Convention is dated 1906, and has certain differences from that originally signed in 1864.

The following points are noteworthy :

Sick and wounded must be taken care of irrespective of nationality.

Medical personnel must be left in charge of sick

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and wounded, and this personnel, if captured by the enemy, must continue their duty under his direction, receiving pay from the enemy at the same rate as similar ranks in his medical service ; they will be sent back to their own army when their assistance is no longer indispensable.

None of the medical personnel are to be regarded as prisoners of war, but shall be respected and protected under all circumstances.

The sick and wounded, however, who fall into the hands of the enemy are prisoners of war.

After each engagement the victorious commander shall take measures to search for the wounded.

The following are protected by the terms of the Convention provided that they wear, fixed to the left arm, an armlet (brassard) with a red cross on a white ground, delivered and stamped by the *competent military authority* and accompanied by a certificate of identification, in the case of persons who are attached to the medical service of armies but who have not a military uniform :

- (i) Personnel engaged *exclusively* in the collection, transport, and treatment of the wounded and sick ;
- (ii) Chaplains attached to armies ;
- (iii) Personnel of voluntary aid societies, duly recognized and authorized by their Government, who may be employed in medical units, and subject to military law ;
- (iv) Personnel of a recognized society of a neutral country.

The personnel of medical units may take temporary possession of the weapons and ammunition of those under their care.

A distinction is made in the Convention, between mobile and fixed hospital establishments as follows :

1. Material of mobile units of the Army Medical Service is not prize of war, and must be restored whenever this can be done.

It can, however, be used by the enemy for the treatment of sick and wounded pending restoration.

2. Material of fixed medical units is prize of war, but must not be diverted from its purpose as long as there are sick and wounded requiring succour.
3. Medical material of convoys, including special ambulance and medical wagons, along with their teams, ambulance trains, and river or lake ambulance boats, are to be restored, but not the general service or other military vehicle of convoys.
4. *Material belonging to voluntary aid societies is private property in all circumstances where it is found, and can only be retained on requisition—that is to say, a receipt must be given to the owner, or representative of the owner, if it is necessary to make use of it, so that the cost may be recovered subsequently.*
5. *Similarly, civilian vehicles belonging to convoys can only be retained by the enemy on requisition.*

It must be clearly understood that the Red Cross on a White Ground is the emblem and distinctive sign of the medical services of armies, and not, as is popularly supposed, of voluntary aid societies.

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The latter are entitled to use the sign, and the words "Red Cross," *only when they are authorized by the State* to render assistance to the regular medical service of its army, and are employed with medical units and establishments of armies.

The national flag of the belligerent must always be hoisted along with the Red Cross flag, except when a medical unit is captured by the enemy, in which case the Red Cross only is flown.

Regarding the general use of the Red Cross emblem, and the words "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross," the practice is strictly forbidden, "either in time of peace or in time of war, except to protect or to indicate the medical units and establishments, and the personnel and matériel protected by the Convention."

INFORMATION FOR WORKING PARTIES OR PRIVATE WORKERS

MATERIALS

Flannel—natural, grey, wincey, or striped union.
Flannelette (non-flam.).

Unbleached calico } for bandages (must be
Twilled calico } washed).

Twilled cotton (white) for nightshirts.

Wool for knitting.

ARTICLES TO BE MADE

BANDAGES.—Can be made of flannel or domette,
4 in. wide, 8 yds. long ;

- or* mull muslin, $2\frac{1}{2}$ and 3 in. wide, 6 yds. long ;
- or* white calico, $2\frac{1}{2}$ and 3 in. wide, 6 yds. long ;
- or* thin unbleached calico ($2\frac{3}{4}$ d. per yd.), $2\frac{1}{2}$ and $3\frac{1}{2}$ in. wide, 6–8 yds. long, washed and tightly rolled ;
- or* loosely woven cotton, same measurements.

Triangular bandages, 40 in. square of unbleached calico, cut diagonally from corner to corner, makes 2 bandages.

All bandages after being tightly rolled should be fastened with a safety-pin.

PYJAMA OR BED JACKETS (flannel or wincey).—

Large size, reaching to knees, tied with tape at waist and neck, pocket, and no buttons.

DRESSING GOWNS (washing).—Flannel, thick flannel or soft serge.

DAY OR NIGHT SHIRTS, flannel or twill, $15\frac{1}{2}$ – $16\frac{1}{2}$ in. neck.

SURGICAL CASE SHIRT.—New approved pattern, must be of 40 in. material. Ask for patterns of BRACKNELL shirt at Messrs. Selfridge.

HELPLESS CASE SHIRTS.—White flannel, viyella or wincey.

KNITTED CARDIGAN JACKETS.—Dark or khaki wool. Get reliable pattern from Head's, Sloane Street.

WOOLLEN SOCKS.—Foot 11–12 ins. Dark or natural wool.

OPERATION STOCKINGS.—Heel-less, long, wide. White wool.

KNITTED CHOLERA BELTS.

FLANNEL HOT WATER BOTTLE BAGS.—White or natural.

INVALID SLIPPERS.—Knitted or crocheted.

OTHER ARTICLES WANTED

Pillow cases. 24 in. by 32 in.

Towels of all kinds.

Sheets. Old ones washed.

Sheets, if made, best size 72 in. by 108 in.

Glass cloths. Dusters.

Handkerchiefs. Japanese paper handkerchiefs.

Scouring cloths.

Hot water bottles, rubber, with cover.

Rolls of butter muslin.

White tape (all widths).

Hair brushes and combs. Tooth brushes.

Safety razors, nail brushes, clothes brushes.

Slippers (new).

White waterproof sheeting, 1 yd. wide, 2s. 6d. yd.

Plain unbleached twill (for draw sheets).

Bundles of old linen and flannel (washed).

Blankets. Turkish towelling, by yards.

Safety-pins.

KIT BAGS are very useful. Special directions for these can be obtained.

PATTERNS

Can be obtained from the British Red Cross Society and seen at the following shops :—Messrs. Gorringe, Selfridge, Barker, Debenham, Harrods.

N.B. Some of the patterns supplied prior to August 15 are cut in a small size. It is desirable that the largest sizes referred to on the instructions on slips should be cut out.

THE RED CROSS OF THE WARRING NATIONS

THE EFFICIENT RED CROSS OF RUSSIA—HOW IT WORKS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

THE women of many nations wearing the Red Cross are following the armies on to the battlefields. The work of the Red Cross is more rapid and effective than ever before. Hospital corps have trailed ammunition wagons and the wounded have often been moved to field hospitals before the first numbness of injury has given way to pain. This is modern warfare, as unbelievably humanitarian as it is barbarous.

Every European nation in the war has an efficient Red Cross service of its own. In every one the Red Cross has a somewhat different standing. In Russia it stands higher than anywhere else. It is given great freedom and deserves it. At the same time it is more of a state affair than anywhere in Europe. It is supported by special taxes and is given unusual privileges at all times. The nurses of the Red Cross form a sisterhood. They are, in a measure, consecrated to the cause. The Russians have come to a better understanding of the usefulness of women nurses on the battlefield than have the people of any other nation.

At the outbreak of the Spanish War, the Russian Red Cross, which was at the time almost the only effectively organized Red Cross in the world, offered its services to both the United States and Spain. The United States declined, but Spain accepted. The United States might have done better to accept. Lack of a modern Red Cross was responsible for much suffering and loss of life in Cuba and Porto Rico. Tampa and Chickamauga might have had other stories to tell if the Russian Red Cross had been there to help. Now, of course, such conditions would be impossible. The United States Red Cross has learned how to handle the situation.

The Russians divide the field work of the Red Cross into five divisions : Handling supply depots ; taking the injured back from the firing line, which means an emergency transportation system ; assistance to the regular surgeons ; direct relief on the battlefield ; and caring for the feeding stations in the rear of the army. In war time the Russian Red Cross does more than the Red Cross of any other nation. Russia began developing the Red Cross in the Crimean War. When the Russo-Japanese War came on, the " white trains " given by wealthy nobles were particularly conspicuous. Altogether, the Red Cross took to the front 3000 truckloads of material and food. The nurses were as efficient at the front as the organization was in forwarding supplies. At the fall of Port Arthur all stray ends of that ugly business were left to them. The Red Cross really did the evacuating. When Mukden was evacuated there were many hundreds of wounded whom it was impossible to

move. Surgeons and nurses remained behind with them and were given every courtesy by the conquering Japanese.

The Japanese themselves developed the Red Cross into the best possible field force in a very short time. Taking advantage of the national patriotism, all the women of Japan were organized. The nurses and cooks formed one body and went to the front. Another body developed lunch and refreshment rooms, and women everywhere made bandages and helped to prepare field outfits. Now the Red Cross operates hospitals throughout Japan, and one out of every forty persons in the empire belongs to the Red Cross organization.

In contrast to Russia's attitude is Germany's limitation on all volunteer nursing. It is contrary to the German character to leave matters of that kind to any chance. It is all worked out methodically by the army medical corps, and the volunteers are held in check. They are used to help expand the regular forces, but they have no such independence of action as they enjoy in Russia.

The French Red Cross has more of the liberties of the Russian. It is a question of national temperament. The French in their nursing make up for lack of drill by the enthusiasm with which they enter into the combat. The volunteer French Red Cross is composed, as in the United States, of the best trained nurses in France. They have no experience in that particular service, but they understand nursing and sanitation. They are organized according to army divisions and do better work perhaps because of their freedom from red tape.

The Italian Red Cross is admittedly the best organized for war, and here again its effectiveness is due to the lack of restraint. The Austrian Red Cross has also been giving a good account of itself for several years. Its organization is much like the Italian.

Almost every nation was represented by the Red Cross in the Balkans, but the absence of Red Cross organizations in the Balkan States themselves brought about in the first battles suffering to which only the battlefields of the Middle Ages could offer comparison. Stories that came to the outside world from the few nurses present roused the world and made the later battles less awful. The graphic account of twenty-four hours at an operating table in the rear of the Serbian army, as told by the Countess Maggiolini, did more for humanitarianism in the Balkan wars than any other single influence.

The Red Cross has been even more conspicuous in this war than in any previous one. Where lines are so tightly drawn and the fighting is frequently in a comparatively small area, the crossing of lines and the invasion by hospital corps of hostile territory bring up fine points. It is a question how far the Red Cross may go toward relieving the suffering of the non-combatants without interfering with the brutal purpose of war. There have been charges of violation of the Red Cross, and the extent to which the Red Cross will be permitted to go will depend largely upon the humanitarianism of the individual commanders. Despite its many other activities the Red Cross is always associated with the battle-

field. There it has certain coveted rights in the name of humanity, and it never yields any. If anything, it is inclined to stretch them. At its conventions war is always foremost, as it has a perennial discussion as to its rights. Part of the purpose of war is to lay waste the invaded country and make its inhabitants suffer want. The Red Cross stands for the alleviation of suffering wherever found. These two cross-purposes constantly clash, and the needs of war generally win. The Red Cross can go no farther than it is permitted. It can only be so bold before it is interfered with.

Besides trying to define and enlarge its rights on the battlefields, the Red Cross conventions bring out new inventions for giving better service. The Dowager Empress of Russia contributed a fund of about £10,000 to stimulate the inventive ability. The first prize is of 6000 roubles, about £600, the second of 3000 roubles, and the third 1000 roubles. These prizes, known as the Marie Feodorovna prizes, have been won for the invention of a considerable list of handy contrivances—from stretchers which can be changed to meet almost any condition, to handy kits for the uses of nurses in war. They have been awarded for practical things, and the work of the Red Cross in the present war, as well as the work of the medical corps, will be greatly facilitated by the fact that those prizes were given.

When the Geneva Convention was held in 1864 the world had been sickened with the smell of blood. The horrors of war were uppermost in the minds of the people. It was possible to gain a wide appeal for the movement. But it was found

out before long that the work of the Red Cross was not always to the best interests of a conquering army, and this, added to the poor handling of the Red Cross, caused a reaction. In England's various campaigns, particularly in Egypt, the Red Cross met almost violent opposition from the English army officers. It was not until army officers discovered in the Spanish War that the Red Cross could be effectively used for repairing broken men that it began to gain in standing.

From the devoted labours of scattered volunteer nurses, typified and ennobled in Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton, the immediate care of the wounded has become a part of the modern fighting machine. It was found in the last war in the Balkans that it paid as a mere matter of repairing the injured men. Unless a man was mortally wounded or required a serious operation, he was usually back in the ranks fighting in two weeks. The Red Cross had become a repair shop.

Efficiency has come in the Red Cross, as a matter of fact, only with the passing of the compassionate women like Clara Barton. She was frequently alone on battlefields in the American Civil War where hundreds lay wounded. She was nothing short of the "angel of the battlefield." The same was true of Florence Nightingale in the Crimea. Those two women made names for themselves that will outlast war. But the movement languished. The American Association of the Red Cross, of which Clara Barton was president for twenty-two years, consisted chiefly of a dozen women. The American National Red Cross of to-day, incorporated in 1905, after Clara Barton's

death, has 3500 trained nurses, all with three years' hospital training, ready to mobilize as rapidly as the army.

If the United States were to go to war the volunteer organization of the Red Cross would in fact be mobilized with the army. This was made possible by an Act of Congress two years ago authorizing the spending of the money. Much the same thing happened when the European armies mobilized. Not only the highly developed hospital corps were immediately behind the artillery, but the Red Cross came in behind as medical reserve fully as well equipped. In most of the armies, in fact, every soldier has had an emergency kit the existence of which was due to the Red Cross movement.

The Red Cross has become what it is in this country to-day largely on account of the unnecessary sickness at Chickamauga during the Spanish-American War. The modern sanitation campaign carried on since by army surgeons, for that matter, also had its rise in the Spanish War. The cleaning up of Havana led to the sanitation of the Canal Zone. The English learned their lesson in South Africa, although the peculiar unhealthiness of much of India had already forced some measures of care. Both the Japanese and Russian armies were followed in the Russo-Japanese War by very good Red Cross corps. They worked together sometimes, in sorting the wounded, and, through the French Red Cross, which was also very active in Manchuria, the names of the dead were listed to be sent back to friends and families. The French Red Cross served as a news agency.

It has only been within the last fifteen years that the Red Cross has come to play the part it now plays in warfare. It was thirty-five years, after the organization of the international Red Cross at Geneva, in 1864, before it became what it was planned to be. This was almost simultaneous with the discovery in poverty of the man who was responsible for it. Jean Henri Dunant, the Swiss author, the founder of the Red Cross, who stirred Europe with the horrors of war and brought about the international convention at Geneva, was found in an old man's home in Switzerland, in 1897. It was at this time that the Spanish-American War showed how the development of the Red Cross had been neglected and Dunant began to assume the position in the world he deserved. Four years later, the Nobel Peace prize, given for the first time, went to him and to Frederick Passy. His share of that was 104,000 francs, about £4000, which, with a small pension from the Dowager Empress of Russia, served him until he died in 1910.

He, with his horrible description of Solferino, and Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton, with their vivid experiences, launched the international Red Cross with much more to go on than it took advantage of for many years. Clara Barton even foreshadowed the industrial activities of the American Red Cross by helping to organize workshops in Paris and Strassburg to save the women left destitute by the Franco-Prussian War.

The report of the Sanitary Commission of the American Civil War, which raised by voluntary subscription £100,000, was also largely responsible

for the shaping of the original Red Cross. The Sanitary Commission used a Greek cross surrounded by an oval band. But the red cross has long ago become standard throughout the world except where the red crescent is used.

Attempts have been made to protect the insignia from indiscriminate use. It is frequently abused in war for scouting purposes and non-combatants adopt it as a shield. There is nothing to prevent it. Even at catastrophes where the red cross serves merely as a convenience in facilitating progress it is usually abused. At the San Francisco fire after three days every automobile displayed the red cross and it came to mean nothing at all. As a result, those who were entitled to use the red cross changed suddenly to the use of a piece of red flannel, and the red cross insignia was not honoured.

The slowness of the Red Cross movement to get under way, in fact, was due to the misuse of it. In the Franco-Prussian War it fell into disrepute. Ignorance of the rules laid down by the Geneva Convention was largely responsible. Though it had been carefully laid down just how far the Red Cross could go without being looked upon as succouring the enemy, the volunteer field workers paid no attention. There were also jealousies between the various Red Cross organizations. The Red Cross got such a bad name among military men in that one war that volunteer nursing was discouraged up to the time of the Spanish-American War.

There is hardly any chance that there will be any accidental complications of this kind in the

present war. The Red Cross may be deliberately used to get information or to advance supplies, but the volunteer organizations are so completely in hand now that they act under the orders of the military surgeons. The Red Cross is to the armies of the world now what the volunteers are to the regular army. It is officered by army surgeons and becomes a part of the army sanitary body.

A dispatch dated Washington, August 6, 1914, said: "Committees of the American National Red Cross to-day were at work on plans to rush aid to the sick and wounded in the European war. Surgeon-General William C. Braisted and a party went in search of a ship to carry doctors, nurses and hospital supplies across the Atlantic, and others were receiving and disbursing funds for supplies.

"The ship will be painted white with a red cross on the funnels, and will sail under the Red Cross flag. She will also be under the treaties of Geneva and the Hague, and will be able to enter any harbour."

The American Red Cross has played a leading part in alleviating the suffering caused by every kind of catastrophe, except war, during the last ten years. Even in war it has done its part, especially in Turkey, feeding and clothing the non-combatants when the Bulgarians made their spectacular dash at Constantinople. From the plague in Manchuria to the Triangle Building fire in New York, the American Red Cross met the emergency. But when it came to general European warfare, every army had worked out a complete Red Cross system.

The American Red Cross did not jump directly into the field in Europe because there was no place for it. It would not fit in. It could be useful only as an organization handling and forwarding supplies. But once the armies are disorganized or the initial organization is broken up by defeat, the American Red Cross, or any body of foreign nurses, could do as good work as the nurses of the country.

At present, however, the Red Cross societies of the warring nations, with the same sympathy and heroism that prompted Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton, and with modern organization and effectiveness, are caring for the sick and wounded on the stricken fields of Europe.

THE BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY

OBJECTS AND ORGANIZATION

Reprinted from Official Publications

THE British Red Cross Society was founded at a meeting held at Buckingham Palace on July 17, 1905, under the Presidency of her Majesty Queen Alexandra ; and is the outcome of the fusion of the late " British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War," which was founded in the year 1870 by the late Lord Wantage, V.C., and the " Central British Red Cross Council " ; it having been considered by his late Majesty King Edward VII desirable that the Red Cross movement in the Empire should be represented by one society, which should co-ordinate all such associations as are concerned with the succour of the sick and wounded in war.

The National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War was the first Red Cross association to be established in England. Of its foundation, Lord Rothschild, the chairman of the society, thus spoke at the inauguration of the British Red Cross Society on July 17, 1905 : " When the Franco-German War broke out in 1870, that gallant soldier, the late Lord Wantage, who had planted

the colours of his regiment on the heights of Alma, for which he received the Victoria Cross, and who had served with distinction all through the Campaign in the Crimea—Lord Wantage, who knew from experience the misery and sufferings of wounded and sick soldiers in a campaign, who was aware of how little was done in those days to alleviate men fighting for the honour and glory of their Sovereign and country, took advantage of the rules of the new Geneva Convention to start the society over which he long presided, namely, 'The National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War.' His Majesty the King was the patron of that society, and his Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught was one of the trustees."

The great work accomplished by the late "British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War" has been worthy of its distinguished founder, and of the country in which it originated. From the time of its foundation in 1870 to the time it was merged into the British Red Cross Society it expended nearly £500,000 in assisting the sick and wounded in war.

On the outbreak of the recent war in the Near East, the Governments of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey, each having accepted with gratitude the society's offer of assistance, complete male Red Cross units were organized, each with a personnel of eighteen, consisting of three medical officers, three dressers (medical students), six nursing orderlies (one acting as serjeant-major), five general duty orderlies and one cook, and dispatched with the utmost expedition to the seat of war in each of the above

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countries. Each unit was self-contained and independent, and capable of taking duty either in the field or at the base, and, moreover, was furnished with a complete medical and surgical equipment, and with ample stores.

The importance of the practical work accomplished by the society throughout the war may best be judged from the fact that it dispatched to the seat of hostilities ten complete units and four relief parties, with a total personnel of 222, of whom two nursing orderlies succumbed to enteric fever whilst nobly doing their duty, and were buried with military honours.

The personnel was composed of three directors, thirty-seven medical officers, one superintending sister, thirty-seven dressers, nine trained female nurses, eleven serjeant-majors, one X-ray operator, sixty-six male nursing orderlies, forty-nine general duty orderlies, six cooks, and two clerks, and in addition a large supplementary Red Cross personnel was engaged locally in each country. Base and field hospitals were opened by the Red Cross units in : BULGARIA—Lozengrade ; GREECE—Salonica ; MONTENEGRO—Antivari, Boboti, Boric Vraki, Pentari, S. Giovanni di Medua, Reci, Rjeka, St. Nicola, Vilgar, Virpazar, Zogaj ; SERVIA—Uskub ; TURKEY—Abi Bey Chiftlik, Bigardos, Fine Arts Museum, Constantinople, Beicos, Kalikratia, Vehfa. The total number of in- and out-patients treated at these places was 16,358, whilst assistance, though strictly outside the scope of the society's work, was organized, and a certain amount of relief afforded from the funds to the large numbers of refugees in Greece and Turkey.

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A part of the Red Cross appliances, including the X-ray apparatus, which were actually employed and brought home by the society's units from the recent Balko-Turkish War, have been cleaned, sterilized, and placed on exhibition from May to October 1913 in the Red Cross Portable Hospital, and also in the Ducal Hall of the Imperial Services Exhibition, Earl's Court, London.

The society was granted by his late Majesty King Edward VII a Royal Charter of Incorporation by letters patent under the great seal on September 3, 1908.

The work of the society in the United Kingdom is organized and carried out mainly through the medium of county branches, the president of each respective branch usually being the wife of the Lord-Lieutenant, or some person nominated by him. The president of every respective colonial branch is the Governor, or some person appointed by him.

The primary object of the society is to furnish aid to the sick and wounded in time of war. Such aid must necessarily be supplementary to that provided by the medical departments of the navy and army.

Except in regard to the raising of voluntary aid detachments under the War Office scheme for dealing with medical organization in case of an invasion of these islands, the society's aid will consist only of additional comforts and of such general help as may be considered beyond the reasonable scope of the medical departments of the navy and army under the control whereof the society will act in time of war.

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The Admiralty and War Office have accorded their official recognition to the British Red Cross Society as the organization responsible for the Red Cross movement throughout the Empire.

The society also is the only body specifically named by the War Office for the purpose of undertaking the formation and organization of voluntary aid detachments in connexion with the medical organization of the Territorial Forces, and the county associations of the Territorial Force are recommended to delegate this work to the British Red Cross Society. This special side of the society's activities is dealt with in "Form D," to be obtained on application.

It is, therefore, desirable to prepare for, systematize, and co-ordinate all offers of help—in time of peace—so as to be able to render prompt and efficient assistance in time of war. It is only by such preparation that confusion, waste and overlapping can be prevented.

In order to be ready to undertake its responsible duties the society wishes—in time of peace—to ascertain from its branches and other sources the extent and nature of the voluntary aid which has been promised or can be expected in the event of war.

The nature of the aid furnished by the society must, to a great extent, depend upon the circumstances in which military operations are being carried out at the time, and especially upon the climatic conditions of the theatre of war.

Branches shall be formed throughout the Empire, in the counties, cities, and principal

towns of the United Kingdom, as well as in the colonies.

Through the medium of these branches members, associates, adherents and assistants shall be enrolled.

The society may enrol members and associates, adherents and assistants.

Members shall be those who :

- (a) Subscribe annually the sum of £1 1s. to the society's funds ; or
- (b) Guarantee to contribute the sum of £5 5s. to the society's funds, if called upon, on the outbreak of a war in which British forces are engaged.

Associates shall be those who :

- (a) Subscribe annually the sum of 5s. to the society's funds ; or
- (b) Guarantee a contribution of £1 1s. under the conditions above-named.

[The society prefers the annual subscription (a) to the guaranteed amount (b).]

Adherents shall be those who :

- (a) Subscribe annually any sum less than 5s. a year.

Subscribers are for the ordinary work of the society, or for the voluntary aid detachment branch of its work. Subscribers may allocate any part of their subscription to either division of the work at their choice.

Assistants shall be those who undertake any practical work for a county branch of the society, and county branches are authorized to enrol workers under this name.

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All ladies who have received the decoration of the Royal Red Cross, and approved lecturers who have given five series of lectures for the society gratuitously, shall be eligible as honorary members of the society.

The moneys collected by all branches located in England and Wales shall be forwarded to the executive committee annually, minus a deduction for the local expenses of the branch, unless the money has been given for the voluntary aid detachment side of the society's work.

The moneys collected for the voluntary aid detachment side of the work may be retained by the county branch and expended on the organization, training and equipment of British Red Cross Society detachments within the county borders: but moneys so retained may not be expended for any other purpose; and if the raising and maintaining of such detachments within the county should at any time cease, any moneys remaining at the credit of the voluntary aid fund of the county branch shall be thereupon transferred to the fund for the general purposes of the society in that county.

The Secretary of State for War issued on August 16, 1909, to Territorial Force associations in England and Wales, a "Scheme for the Organization of Voluntary Aid for Sick and Wounded," in the event of war in the home territory. Full details of this scheme are contained in the society's "Form D."

From the inception of the above "Scheme" the British Red Cross Society has taken an active part in the organization of voluntary aid detach-

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ments, and by July 1, 1913, the society had raised and registered at the War Office 1759 Red Cross detachments with a total personnel of 51,082.

In this "Scheme" a county system has been adopted because it is the one upon which the Territorial Force is organized, and which the British Red Cross Society had adopted as the basis of its constitution; and the society is the body recommended by the War Office to the Territorial Force associations for the carrying out of this important work.

The medical service of the Territorial Force has no establishment for carrying out the duties in connexion with (*a*) clearing hospitals, (*b*) stationary hospitals, (*c*) ambulance trains, and (*d*) other formations, viz., entraining and rest stations, private hospitals, and convalescent homes.

In order to provide a personnel that will be available for any or all of the duties indicated, Red Cross voluntary aid detachments are organized in each county, consisting respectively of men and women, as follows :

MEN'S DETACHMENT

- 1 Commandant
- 1 Medical Officer
- 1 Quartermaster
- 1 Pharmacist
- 4 Section Leaders
- 48 Men (divisible into 4 sections of 12 men each)

Total 56

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WOMEN'S DETACHMENT

- 1 Commandant (man or woman, and not necessarily a doctor)
- * 1 Medical Officer (to be attached when available, and when the commandant is not a doctor)
- 1 Lady Superintendent (who should be a trained nurse)
- 1 Quartermaster (man or woman)
- * 1 Pharmacist (if available)
- 20 Women (of whom 4 should be qualified as cooks)

Total 23

Each detachment, as it is formed and approved, is registered by the Council of the British Red Cross Society, is given a consecutive number by the War Office, and forms part of the technical reserve, and is inspected annually by an inspecting officer detailed by the War Office.

The society's uniform may be optionally worn by members of detachments, and the regulations in regard thereto are included in the society's Form D (7).

The War Office having approved the certificates granted by the society in first-aid and nursing, the Red Cross branches are empowered to form classes to use the society's syllabuses and textbooks and to hold examinations in these subjects, in order to qualify candidates who do not already possess such certificates for admission to detachments. Proficiency badges are also awarded for

* Supernumerary.

examination successes in conformity with the regulations detailed in Form C. The men's detachments must be thoroughly trained as stretcher bearers, and to some extent as male nurses. A certain proportion of clerks, carpenters and mechanics would be especially useful. The principal duties of the personnel would consist in carrying sick and wounded by stretchers, and, when necessary, in preparing means of transport by road or rail, in converting local buildings or whole villages into temporary hospitals, and in disinfecting buildings, &c.

The women's detachments would be employed chiefly in forming railway rest stations for preparing and serving meals and refreshments to sick and wounded during transit by railway, and in taking temporary charge in the evacuation stations or temporary hospitals of severe cases unable to continue the journey. They should, therefore, be trained not only in cooking and the preparation of invalid diets, but also in the method of arranging small wards for patients in suitable buildings, preferably near a railway station, and in such nursing as is necessary for the temporary care of patients until they can be transferred to the general hospitals. Detachments, or a certain portion of a detachment, may be employed for duty in ambulance trains.

Each member of a detachment, when called up on mobilization for service, will be provided with an identity certificate and a "brassard" or arm badge bearing the Geneva Cross. The identity certificate and brassard will be issued by a responsible officer of the army. The wearer of the

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brassard so issued is "protected" under the articles of the Geneva Convention.

By the Geneva Convention Act, 1911, "it shall not be lawful for any person to use for the purpose of his trade or business, or for any other purpose whatsoever, without the authority of the army council, the heraldic emblem of the red cross on a white ground formed by reversing the federal colours of Switzerland, or the words "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross."

The British Red Cross Society has the authority of the army council to use the heraldic emblem of the Red Cross and the words "Red Cross."

The official badge of the society, with the emblem of the society as a circular pendant attached to an ornamental bar lettered with the name of the respective county, may be worn by those who belong to any branch of the society, or its voluntary aid detachments so long as a connexion with the branch is maintained. This badge is only issued in accordance with the society's regulations, on the nomination of its branches.

Detailed information as to joining Red Cross voluntary aid detachments, or of the organization and objects of the society, may be obtained on application to the Secretary, 9 Victoria Street, London, S.W.

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